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As the Millennium Development Goals pass their 2015 deadline and the international community 
is discussing the future of international development policy, Poverty and the Millennium 
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and hunger, even as the global distribution of income, wealth and access to health services 
becomes ever more imbalanced. 
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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
This book has its origin in a workshop organized by the CROP Secretariat 
for its Scientific Committee members and invited guests. The workshop 
had the title ‘The MDGs and poverty reduction in the 21st century: a 
critical assessment’ and took place in Bergen, Norway, in August 2012. 
We are pleased that the book is being published at a challenging 
moment in time, as the international community transits from the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and negotiates climate change action.
The editors would like to express sincere thanks to the CROP 
Secretariat, the contributing authors and all those involved in producing 
the final result: Poverty and the Millennium Development Goals: A Critical 
Look Forward. 
PART ONE
THE GLOBAL POVERTY CHALLENGE
1  |  P O V E R T Y  A N D  T H E  M I L L E N N I U M 
D E V E L O P M E N T  G O A L S :  A  C R I T I C A L 
L O O K  F O R W A R D
Alberto D. Cimadamore, Gabriele Koehler and 
Thomas Pogge
Poverty has been at the centre of the debate on development for 
several decades. A series of UN Decades on development and on 
the eradication of poverty1 framed the discourse of the international 
community. Institutional and material resources have been mobilized 
at national and international levels since the 1950s, but with modest 
results. Poverty has remained a structural feature in most societies, 
accompanied by growing and increasingly visible income and wealth 
disparities. Despite progressive discourses and policies, high- and 
middle-income countries witnessed an unprecedented accumulation 
of wealth, and developing countries saw a skewed concentration of 
welfare and human development outcomes to the disadvantage of 
poor and socially excluded communities. National and international 
systems have worked very well for the elites, while the majority of the 
world population continues to suffer multiple deprivations, foremost 
among them extreme poverty and hunger. 
It does not take an academic or an expert in social relations to realize 
that the systemic biases towards income and wealth concentration in 
the face of persistent – and increasing – poverty render current national 
and international systems ethically unacceptable and politically 
unsustainable. This is the conviction and the concern which drive this 
volume.
The new millennium: from an overarching Declaration to 
specific goals
In the year 2000, the rousing Millennium Declaration and its timid 
operationalization, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
conveyed the message that concrete and stepped-up action was 
needed: the economic and social systems were reproducing poverty 
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and exclusions at levels that were not compatible with democratic 
ideals and the notion of dignity and a decent life for all. These had been 
promised by the UN and the multilateral system since 1945 (Stokke 
2009; Koehler this volume). 
There was a noticeable change in the discourse and mobilization 
of resources during the first fifteen years of this century, and another 
shift may be on its way (UN SG 2014). A critical assessment of the 
MDGs is necessary and we could have reached a moment in history 
conducive to producing the meaningful changes required to fulfil the 
commitment to eradicating extreme poverty and achieving human 
development and a better life for all. This volume intends to provide 
that kind of assessment, combined with a look ahead at the new 
development agenda, currently cast as the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). 
The Millennium Declaration signed by leaders of 189 states resulted 
in one of the most visible and unified global campaigns to address 
poverty in the history of multilateral development cooperation: the 
Millennium Development Goals (UN SG 2001). A critical review 
of the MDGs needs to acknowledge their merits, even if the text of 
the eight MDGs considerably weakened and watered down the core 
tenets of the Millennium Declaration. Chapter III of the Millennium 
Declaration, on development and poverty eradication, for example, had 
clearly spelt out the commitment of the leaders of the world to ‘spare no 
effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and 
dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty’ and ‘to making the right 
to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human 
race from want’. The road out of poverty was more vaguely defined as 
the aspiration to create an environment – at national and global levels 
alike – ‘conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty’.2 
Still, the Declaration conveyed a strong commitment at the highest 
level in world politics. Fifteen years later, its fragility and ineffectiveness 
are more than evident: we observe an environment that is not especially 
conducive either to the elimination of poverty, or to fair development 
for all. On the contrary, hunger and poverty remain an oppressive 
reality for many people, and we observe growing inequality as well 
as extreme economic, political, social and environmental inequities. 
Some analysts argue that the depth of income and wealth inequalities is 
unprecedented (Piketty 2014), and that the exploitation of nature has 
already outstripped several planetary boundaries (Steffen et al. 2015).
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The time has therefore come to critically highlight the shortcom-
ings of the Millennium Declaration. This is primarily because a ‘rosy’ 
picture of MDG success tends to obscure their weaknesses and fail-
ures. During recent years, UN top officials have been reaffirming ‘that 
the MDGs have made a profound difference in people’s lives’ and that 
‘global poverty has been halved five years ahead of the 2015 timeframe’ 
(UN 2014c: 3; see also UN 2014b and UN 2012: Foreword). Many 
other examples could be cited of international and national politicians, 
journalists and development professionals making selective use of 
statistics to proclaim good news about the worldwide decline in poverty. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, poverty reduction is caus-
ally attributed to the MDGs: ‘the MDGs have helped to lift millions of 
people out of poverty’ (UN 2011: 3).
There are always different ways to look at the same social reality. 
The official discourse of states and the UN system tends to focus 
on progress and success. This is understandable, since they need to 
remain credible and have a responsibility to sustain the momentum 
of the development agenda. Academics and civil society, however, 
need to push the boundaries of knowledge, and have a responsibility 
to elucidate and advocate for social justice as a necessary condition for 
better societies. Their task is to provide a critical view: to assess progress 
analytically, expose the lack of achievement, provide explanations for 
both – and offer genuine alternatives. 
Critical analysis and monitoring of national and international policy 
responses to poverty, and the offering of alternatives, are among the 
core objectives of the Comparative Research Programme on Poverty 
(CROP). For that reason, CROP convened a workshop on the MDGs 
in 2012, to discuss – among other things – these and other related 
UN assessments of poverty eradication initiatives, and the plausibility 
of crediting the MDGs as a driving force for contemporary poverty 
reduction.
Three interrelated questions shaped the 2012 CROP workshop, 
with a view to producing a constructive evaluation of the impact of 
the MDGs on substantially reducing poverty around the world. These 
questions were:
• Has poverty really declined in a way consistent with international 
legal and political commitments?
• What role have the MDGs played in producing meaningful changes?
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• What are the main lessons to be learned from the joint analysis of 
the workshop towards conceptualizing a post-MDG agenda – a new 
development agenda?
This volume was conceived as a response to these questions from an 
analytical, academic perspective.
Assessing the impact of the MDGs on global poverty
In order to answer the first two questions, workshop participants 
considered it absolutely necessary to have a precise measurement of 
the extent of poverty in the base year. Only then is it possible to track 
performance over time. However, there was considerable controversy 
about the accuracy of available poverty statistics and measurement, 
as well as about the baseline chosen to evaluate this complex social 
phenomenon. 
The following problems emerged (Pogge 2013; CROP 2013):3
1 Distortion through use of general-consumption purchasing power 
parities (PPPs). These give much less weight to food prices than 
these have in the actual consumption of the poor. Because of this 
distortion, PPPs drastically overstate the purchasing power of poor 
households with respect to foodstuffs – by roughly 50 per cent.
2 Excessive sensitivity of the measured poverty trend to the selected 
level of the international poverty line (IPL). For example, between 
1990 and 2011, the number of people with less than $1.25 per day 
had reportedly fallen by 47.4 per cent, but the number of people 
below the $3.00 IPL had fallen by only 7.1 per cent (iresearch.
worldbank.org/PovcalNet/).
3 Excessive sensitivity to the base year chosen to determine the 
purchasing power of all currencies relative to one another.
4 Distortions through the use of general consumer price indexes 
which likewise give less weight to food prices than these have in 
the consumption of the poor. This leads to an overly rosy trend 
picture during periods when food prices are rising relative to prices 
in general.
5 A simple binary measure that classifies households as either poor or 
non-poor incentivizes policy-makers to prioritize people just below 
the poverty line.
6 Such a measure also disregards the intra-household distribution and 
varying course-of-life needs, since the aggregated view masks the 
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differing implications of poverty for women, children, seniors and 
people living with disability in the same household. 
7 By focusing on income/consumption expenditures alone, the 
prevalent methodology also reifies poverty and disregards other 
dimensions of poverty: the amount of labour required to gain the 
relevant income, environmental challenges, availability of goods and 
services, issues such as powerlessness, exploitation or fear, time for 
the care ‘economy’ and leisure time for women, men and children.
The World Bank is the primary agency contributing data and 
analysis for progress on Goal 1: ‘Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’ 
and its Target 1A: ‘Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than $1.25 a day’ (UN 2014c: 56).4 The 
World Bank’s Development Research Group produces its statistics 
based on data obtained from government statistical offices and World 
Bank country departments (UN 2003). As a result, the data tend to 
be biased in the direction of an optimistic trend, because governments 
and international institutions want to convey a sense of success for the 
policies they employ or recommend.
In addition to these methodological biases, there are also significant 
gaps in the data. One of the MDG Reports acknowledges the problem: 
‘The task of monitoring progress on poverty reduction is beset by a 
lack of good quality surveys carried out at regular intervals, delays in 
reporting survey results, and insufficient documentation of country 
level analytical methods used. It is also hampered by difficulties in 
accessing the underlying survey micro-data required to compute the 
poverty estimates.’ These gaps remain especially problematic in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the data necessary to make comparisons over the 
full range of MDGs are available in fewer than half the countries (UN 
2011: 7). These are central problems for both academic and policy 
evaluation, and are difficult to solve in the short term. 
According to the latest information provided by the World Bank 
on data and analysis for Goal 1, the number of people living on less 
than US$1.25 a day (2005 PPP) declined globally from 1.922 billion 
in 1990 to 1.011 billion in 2011. The proportion of extreme poor 
(that is, living on below US$1.25 a day, 2005 PPP) as a percentage 
of the population of the developing countries decreased from 43.35 
per cent in 1990 to 16.99 per cent in 2011 (iresearch.worldbank.org/
PovcalNet/). As we can easily see, even though the number of poor 
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people was not halved, ‘the proportion of people whose income is less 
than $1.25 a day’ was. Therefore, Target 1A was reached because the 
World Bank and UN agreed to operationalize the poverty definition 
in this particular way. 
It is quite clear that, according to this measurement, extreme poverty 
can be reported as reduced. Figure 1.1, based on the World Bank data, 
also represents this optimistic view.
‘Poverty rates have been halved, and about 700 million fewer 
people lived in conditions of extreme poverty in 2010 than in 1990’ 
(UN 2013). Such ‘quick facts’ are presented to show that the MDG 
campaign is moving in the right direction. 
The important question is now how this assessment was made. The 
following figure provides some information.
China reduced the number of extreme poor from 694 million in 
1990 to 123 million in 2010 (iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/). 
This is the most significant reduction of acute income poverty made 
by a single country in the history of humankind. If we also consider the 
region where China is located, we can see that the number of extreme 
poor fell from 939 million in 1990 to 207 million in 2010 (iresearch.
worldbank.org/PovcalNet/). 
Accordingly, the number of people categorized as living below the 
































1.1 Proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day, 1990 and 2010 (percentage) 
(source: United Nations 2013)
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Pacific region. This fact accounts for most of the reported global success 
of the MDGs campaign (see also Koehler this volume). 
However, Figure 1.2 shows that developing countries in general, and 
sub-Saharan Africa in particular, are not doing well. In fact, the number 
of people living in extreme poverty increased noticeably from 287 
million in 1990 (baseline) to 416 million in 2011 (iresearch.worldbank.
org/PovcalNet/). According to the latest available estimates measuring 
Goal 1, Target 1A, sub-Saharan Africa will have 403 million people 
living in extreme poverty when the MDGs are assessed and replaced by 
a new development agenda in September 2015 (World Bank 2015).
Moreover, the projections are not encouraging. The calculations 
on poverty and poverty projections from the World Bank PovcalNet 
database indicate that by 2030 the number of people living in extreme 
poverty will reach around 335 million (ibid.: Table 1). 
This projection reveals three great challenges for the future. First, it 
signals the need for a methodological shift – to use the absolute number 
of poor as a measuring rod for progress, instead of the proportion of poor, 
which was the indicator used to guide evaluations of the MDGs. The 
0











Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)
China
Low income countries
1.2 Number of poor (at less than $1.25 a day, PPP, in millions) in selected 
countries and regions, 1990–2011 (source: World Bank: Poverty and Inequality 
Data Base, 2015. Date of access: 25 January 2015)
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goal set in the new proposal to ‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’ 
(UN 2014a) implies reducing extreme poverty to zero while at the 
same time dealing with other forms of poverty within the context of 
the SDGs. Secondly, the consistently high level of extreme poverty in 
low-income countries, and the number of extreme poor in sub-Saharan 
Africa, brings into question the strategies implemented or encouraged 
by the agents of the MDGs process. Thirdly, it points to the need to 
introduce meaningful policy changes when adopting the SDGs. 
What was the causal role of the MDGs?
Over the past decades, the international community and individual 
countries have been mobilizing towards the common objective of 
poverty eradication. The official discourse voiced by UN top officials 
(and uncritically reproduced by many) suggests that the MDGs had in 
fact a causal effect in reducing poverty globally. This is the implication 
of statements such as ‘the MDGs have made a profound difference in 
people’s lives’ (UN 2014c: 3) or ‘the MDGs have helped to lift millions 
of people out of poverty’ (UN 2011: 3). Such pronouncements are, 
at best, ambiguous as they suggest a causal role for an international 
initiative, disregarding (in analytical and practical terms) the specific 
role of states and government policies on the one hand, and international 
systemic issues on the other. 
States can be – and in fact often are – part of the problem as much 
as the solution. Nevertheless, the performance of the state in reducing 
or eliminating poverty has been crucial in recent history and its efforts 
need to undergo empirical evaluation (Cimadamore et al. 2005: 16). 
If we analyse countries’ performances, we can easily see which public 
policies and historical forms of states produced or are producing the 
best and worst results respectively in substantially reducing poverty. 
This is something we can learn from. The point here is not to respond 
to these very relevant questions but to emphasize that any search for 
causal explanations in poverty reduction strategies needs to include the 
role of the state from the outset.
Identifying the analytical level where relevant variables are located is 
as important as having a clear understanding of the type of policies that 
have been effective. This is particularly true when one of the goals on 
the international agenda is to ‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’ 
(UN 2014a), which implies reducing extreme poverty to zero while at 
the same time dealing with other forms of poverty. Extreme poverty 
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cannot be eradicated if states maintain, as they currently do, policy 
frameworks and development strategies that contribute to the creation 
and re-creation of massive poverty. As Albert Einstein observed, doing 
the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result can 
be considered a form of insanity.5 
However, this is the case with respect to the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus, applied in countries where most of the poor are concentrated. 
As is well known, some of its tenets include a downsizing of the role 
of the state and an exclusive orientation towards the private sector for 
economic growth. It also favours systematic reductions in government 
spending as well as privatization and deregulation of public goods and 
services such as education, health services or access to drinking water and 
sanitation. The role of the state in enhancing productivity is ignored.6
Many of the countries that displayed slow or no progress on poverty 
reduction are found to have adopted neoliberal political, institutional 
and macroeconomic frameworks. This was despite ample evidence 
showing that structural adjustment and austerity policies have produced 
poverty everywhere, particularly in the South (Alvarez Leguizamon 
2005; Cimadamore and Cattani 2007). Neoliberal policies have 
been supported by the most powerful nation-states and by influential 
international organizations. 
Ironically, one of these has even carved in stone at its Washington 
headquarters its institutional mission: ‘Our Dream is a World Free of 
Poverty’. However, as a result of structural adjustment policies (among 
other policies) the number of poor people remains high, despite the 
discourses and interventions motivated by the MDGs process. 
Meanwhile, countries as historically and economically diverse 
as Japan, South Korea, China, Brazil and the northern European 
countries implemented policies of a different type. Regardless of the 
many political differences among them,7 these countries acted as 
‘developmental states’ (Chang 2002; Ringen et al. 2011; UNRISD 
2010; UNDP 2013). This means that government takes a strong 
interventionist role, directing private (or public) investment along the 
lines of a defined industrial policy and using the government budget 
in an anti-cyclical fashion. Most of these countries adopted large-scale 
programmes of social protection for income support, and in some cases 
applied active labour market policies. In other words, they followed 
Keynesian-type policies instead of the recipes that emerged from the 
Washington Consensus. Nor did they expressly follow the MDG 
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agenda. The results of these policies were generally positive in terms of 
absolute poverty reduction (e.g. in China), as Figure 1.2 shows. Such 
approaches, however, are not found in the ‘menu’ offered by current 
mainstream international policy consensus. 
Heterodox approaches can be conceived as viable alternatives 
to orthodoxy. There is a growing recognition of rapidly intensifying 
income inequities globally, between countries, and nationally, within 
countries (Milanovic 2011; Fukuda-Parr 2010; Piketty 2014; Jomo this 
volume) that constitute perhaps the single most important impediment 
to a successful campaign towards poverty eradication and prevention. 
The link of persistent acute poverty to inequality is illustrated by the 
following facts: 
• In just seventeen years, the richest 5 per cent of human beings have 
gained a greater share of global household income (3.49 per cent) 
than the poorer half had left at the end of this period (2.92 per 
cent).
• The ratio of average incomes of the richest 5 per cent and the poorest 
quarter rose from 185:1 to 297:1 in this period (1988–2005).
• Had the poorer half held steady, its 2005 share of global household 
income would have been 21 per cent higher (3.53 per cent instead 
of 2.92 per cent).
• Had the poorest quarter held steady, its 2005 share of global 
household income would have been 49 per cent higher (1.16 per 
cent instead of 0.78 per cent).
• Had it been allowed to gain the 3.49 per cent of global household 
income that was in fact gained by the richest 5 per cent, the poorer 
half would have doubled its share to 7.02 per cent in 2005. Severe 
poverty could already have been overcome by 2005 (CROP 2013: 
Table 1, p. 6).8
These trends suggest that, at the country level, income redistribution 
policies need to accompany poverty alleviation or eradication strategies. 
This has not been the case; neither in neoliberally oriented economies 
nor in the developmental states. Some of the countries that have shown 
considerable success in decreasing acute poverty, such as China, have 
in fact witnessed vastly increased income inequality. Measures to 
improve primary income distribution, through wage policy, secondary 
income distribution or progressive tax policy, were not in place. This 
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was one of many reasons for the enormous increase in income and 
wealth disparities.
The second issue with both neoliberal and Keynesian-oriented 
policies is their eco-blindness. They are based on a macroeconomic 
growth model that is resource intensive and not compatible with 
planetary sustainability. Disregard for sustainability over the past 
decade has intensified environmental catastrophes such as global 
warming, climate change and the loss of biodiversity (Klein 2014). 
Thirdly, and most crucially, it must be recognized that poverty, as 
well as its eradication and prevention, is a manifestly political issue. 
They are all directly related to the use and distribution of existing and 
future resources, and the location of power in making these decisions 
(see Rogers and Balázs, and Boltvinik and Damián this volume). Policies 
that do not analyse the impact of power relations on the creation and 
re-creation of poverty can have only limited and superficial success.
Faulty policy and eco-blindness are among the factors that have 
hampered the effectiveness of MDGs at the national level, but the 
effectiveness of policies to reduce or eradicate poverty – even if well 
conceived and perfectly delivered at the country level – is highly 
dependent on the international environment. Political, institutional 
and macroeconomic frameworks inconsistent with effective measures 
against poverty have been maintained at the international level despite 
ample evidence showing that they produce and reproduce poverty 
(Montes this volume). Therefore, even though the international 
community has been mobilizing towards the common objective of 
poverty eradication over the past fifteen years, substantial results at 
a global level have not been reached. This is particularly visible in 
regions where severe poverty is concentrated, as shown above (Figures 
1.1 and 1.2). 
Goal 8 of the MDGs was directed at the international ‘partnership’, 
i.e. the conditions of trade, international investment and official 
development assistance (ODA). ODA flows did indeed increase,9 and 
the higher budget allocations of the OECD Development Assistance 
Countries (DACs) are often associated with the momentum and 
commitments generated by the MDGs. However, regarding 
international trade and investment regimes, there was a marked 
lack of progress, such as in the Doha Round of trade negotiations, 
or even retrogression, such as in the area of international investment 
agreements (see Montes this volume and Montes 2015). The MDGs’ 
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unsatisfactory performance on poverty reduction must also be attributed 
to an international economic system that is skewed against the interests 
of developing countries and the concerns of people living in poverty.10 
The MDG agenda did not alter this. 
The SDGs and a look ahead
The MDG approach concentrated on lifting a certain proportion 
of people out of poverty while retaining a model of development that 
continues to produce poverty and tolerate massive violations of human, 
social and economic rights. Unparalleled success in poverty reduction, 
concentrated primarily in one country – China – allowed prominent 
members of the international community to declare success at a global 
level. However, the number of people living in acute poverty remains 
very high, and, as mentioned above, the World Bank itself is forecasting 
that the number of extreme poor will be around 700 million persons 
in 2020, and over 400 million in 2030, 81 per cent of whom will be 
living in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the number of people who 
have escaped from poverty is arguably cancelled out by the number of 
persons who have become impoverished owing to the financial crisis, 
misguided macroeconomic policies or rising food prices as a result of 
commodity market speculation. 
Available evidence on poverty trends and our policy analyses suggest 
that continuing with the same set of policies and measures will not 
suffice to eradicate extreme poverty, or even to achieve a substantial 
reduction in acute and other forms of poverty by 2030. A critical analysis 
of the outcome of the MDG agenda, a probing review of the causalities 
of poverty and the most effective policy approaches to address it, and 
a more radical vision of eradicating, rather than merely alleviating, 
poverty would, in our view, be appropriate as inspiration for the post-
2015 development agenda. What that new agenda can take from the 
current MDG discourse, however, is the immense drive and consensus 
at a normative level for the moral obligation to address poverty.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are likely to replace 
the MDGs if the negotiations during 2015 go smoothly. The SDG 
proposal, presented in August 2014 by the Open Working Group of the 
General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) (UN 
2014a),11 assumes that a greener type of growth will benefit the poor 
and create new incentives and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods 
for all. Within this framework, the OWG proposal characterizes poverty 
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eradication as ‘the greatest global challenge facing the world today 
and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development’. This 
definition implicitly acknowledges that poverty is currently causing the 
death and suffering of millions of human beings, despite the fact that 
there are enough resources in the world for humanity to be free from 
poverty and hunger (Ziegler 2014). 
Both on the normative and on the conceptual and analytical levels, 
the SDG agenda necessitates a serious and participatory debate on 
the definition of poverty and, in particular, extreme poverty. Extreme 
poverty – the type of poverty targeted to be eradicated – is defined in 
the OWG draft as income below $1.25 (2005 US currency purchasing 
power) per person per day. A more comprehensive definition of poverty 
is needed, sensitive to the multidimensional nature of poverty (Wisor 
et al. 2014; OPHI n.d.; CROP 2013; Rogers and Balázs this volume). 
Meanwhile, the extremely low line needs to be revised upwards in order 
to be consistent with progress towards the goal of ending poverty in all 
its forms everywhere and ensuring that all people can live in dignity 
(see Boltvinik and Damián this volume; similarly Paes-Sousa and 
De Martino Jannuzzi this volume). Child poverty (both income and 
multidimensional) should be specifically targeted and closely monitored 
in order to break the vicious circle of intergenerational poverty and its 
reproduction. Chronic and severe poverty also needs to be prioritized 
and monitored from the inception of the SDGs process. 
With respect to policy, and in order to overcome the errors of the 
MDGs, the SDG agenda needs to incorporate the analyses and lessons 
of recent and past history. To some extent it does. The formal SDG 
proposal recommends macroeconomic policies prioritizing full ‘decent’ 
employment and equitable distribution of economic resources, as 
well as social protection floors. For this to become stringent, Targets 
8.3 (‘promote development-oriented policies …’), 8.5 (‘achieve 
full and productive employment for all …’) and 8.6 (substantially 
reduce youth unemployment), and Target 1.3 on social protection, 
need to be operationalized following the ILO12 or other similar 
models. Macroeconomic policies stimulating employment should be 
implemented as soon as possible in order to achieve the employment 
targets of Goal 8. The implementation of ‘nationally appropriate social 
protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable’ (UN 
2014a: SDGs Goal 1.3) would represent a substantial improvement if 
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resulting social protection and basic income measures reach the poorest 
and are sufficiently resourced to move all affected, including hard-to-
reach individuals and communities, to at least the national poverty 
line. These policies and measures are central to poverty reduction and 
eradication, and need to be amply funded and sustained over time in 
order to move people out of poverty and make sure that their children 
are able to escape the intergenerational poverty trap.
A critical look ahead needs to evaluate the multiple relationships 
between Goal 1 of the SDG proposal and the other goals. Goal 1 
is directly and indirectly related to all the goals, but success in the 
eradication of poverty is especially dependent on immediate and 
substantial progress towards Goals 2 (‘end hunger, achieve food 
security and improved nutrition …’), 8 (promote sustained inclusive 
growth, full employment and decent work), 10 (‘reduce inequality’), 
16 (on inclusive societies with access to justice for all) and 17 (‘global 
partnership for sustainable development’), and their respective targets. 
Among the goals addressing the international economic system, Target 
17.14 (‘enhance policy coherence for sustainable development’) should 
be better specified and operationalized. It is crucial to the achievement 
of Goal 1, particularly in regions where the trend shows that policy and 
institutional frameworks are dysfunctional, and policies cancel each 
other out.13 Target 16.4 (‘by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial 
… flows’) is also particularly relevant, because it is prerequisite to 
strengthening fiscal capacities in developing countries (see Montes 
this volume; see also Kar and Spanjers 2014; UN 2014a). This target 
would need to be reached well before 2030, with the cooperation of all 
countries that maintain bank secrecy and tolerate tax havens facilitating 
not only illicit flows, but also tax evasion and abuse.
Monitoring and evaluation need to be radically improved, based 
on lessons extracted from the MDG era. Poverty indicators have to 
be monitored within the context of macroeconomic, labour and social 
policies in order to observe the trend in areas where anti-poverty 
policies have so far proved ineffective. Universities’ involvement 
in the measuring and monitoring process can increase the level of 
transparency, accuracy and independence from national governments 
and international bodies responsible and accountable for reaching the 
goals. 
The SDGs approach represents a fresh and updated version of earlier 
framings of both poverty reduction and environmental management. 
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But one thing seems quite clear: without understanding and addressing 
the systems and paradigms that produce and perpetuate both poverty 
and unsustainability, even the best-intentioned SDGs are likely to have 
only superficial effects, and there is the risk that they might achieve 
nothing more than replicating the shortcomings associated with the 
MDGs (CROP 2013; see also Koehler this volume).
What is this volume offering its readers?
This book was conceived as a response to the sunny picture, and 
to help direct the Millennium Declaration and MDGs’ promises 
and commitments towards becoming a reality. The CROP Scientific 
Committee met in Bergen in 2012 to evaluate the MDGs and stimulate 
reflection on the post-2015 development agenda. The results and 
conclusions of those debates are reflected in this book. 
The contributions are diverse in their positions. They are shaped 
by the plurality of the authors’ theoretical and political positions, 
and nuanced by varying degrees of optimism and pessimism. Despite 
their heterogeneity, however, all the contributions address the three 
questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, presenting a variety of 
analytical viewpoints and scientific trajectories. 
The concern with poverty is central to all chapters, as is the interest 
in alternatives and a new vision of development. The contributions 
converge around a set of three distinct but interrelated themes, and are 
therefore clustered as follows:
• Part I: The Global Poverty Challenge 
• Part II: Devising and Refining Development Goals 
• Part III: Policy and Societal Alternatives 
Part I of the book concentrates in particular on the notion of poverty, 
which is flawed at best and misleading at worst. For Jomo, Rogers 
and Balázs, and Boltvinik and Damián, the definition of poverty is 
methodologically wrong. At a primary level, this has implications for 
poverty measurement – as outlined also in this first chapter. Poverty 
increased in absolute numbers in Africa, and remains a salient  structural 
feature in most societies (Cimadamore, Koehler and Pogge this chapter); 
it is not correctly measured (Jomo), and it is not an appropriate measure, 
notably if equity (Jomo) and empowerment (Rogers and Balázs) are 
factored in. This argument is corroborated by the emphasis on dignity 
offered by Boltvinik and Damián in Part III of the book. 
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Jomo argues that rising inequality and poverty in many developing 
countries have dented the overall achievements in poverty reduction. 
The MDG 1A incidence of poverty indicator has become the single most 
important development indicator for the MDGs. The chapter raises 
concerns about how poverty has been measured for MDG reporting 
purposes, given methodological and other shortcomings in the poverty 
estimates. As the original poverty line was defined principally in terms 
of the cost of securing enough food, comparing the poverty indicator 
to the MDG 1C hunger or prevalence of undernourishment indicator 
is revealing. The significant differences between regional and country 
poverty and hunger trends during the MDG reporting period raised 
concerns about both indicators. The chapter underscores the ‘poverty 
of the conventional poverty policy discourse’. As poverty is slated to 
continue to be the most-watched indicator of success in the post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals, the chapter highlights the urgent 
need to review and reconsider poverty measurement and analysis, as 
well as policies. 
The chapter by Rogers and Balázs valorizes the knowledge of 
people living in poverty-stricken communities, and compares their 
observations with hard data findings. The chapter’s core observation 
is that ‘the decisions and actions of those with money is a primary 
cause of inequality, poverty, and impeded development’. Drawing on a 
major global survey, Rogers and Balázs present qualitative information 
contributed by people who experience poverty, identifying mechanisms 
by which the unequal distribution of wealth adds up to generate 
poverty. Their perceptions tally with evidence from key academic 
studies, demonstrating the explanatory power of those observations by 
the poor themselves. The chapter examines the implications of these 
findings for crafting a set of post-2015 SDGs and connected policies, 
which would be more effective at reducing poverty and promoting 
sustainable development. 
The misleading concepts and measurement of poverty in turn lead 
to a problematic formulation of development goals. This is the focus 
of Section II of the book. Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy analyse 
the trajectory and evolution of global development goals from the 
International Development Goals of the OECD, through the MDGs 
to the SDGs, and articulate key implications of this path for the SDG 
process. They point out that the SDGs have recaptured the ‘spirit of 
integration of economic, social and environmental variables’. The chapter 
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provides an analytical comparison of these three goal sets, illustrating 
which of the Open Working Group (UN 2014a) proposal’s goals and 
targets relate to economic, social and environmental dimensions and 
their governance. The chapter argues that decisions regarding the SDGs 
have two equally important dimensions: the formulation of development 
goals – as is under way – and their implementation. A meaningful 
implementation of the SDGs would, however, require translating the 
proposals at the goals level into operational policy decisions, as well as 
identifying relevant targets and indicators for an innovative and effective 
governance and monitoring process. 
This aspect is the focus of the chapter by Paes-Sousa and De 
Martino Jannuzzi. They assess social protection policy in Brazil, 
starting from the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) strategy launched in 2003. 
They argue that social transfers succeeded in taking 22 million people 
out of extreme poverty (less than US$1.25 per day), but that public 
policy would now need to give more attention to a broader group of 
income poor and to the newly emerging lower middle class. Brazil – 
which has been visible in the shaping of the SDGs in connection with 
the Rio+20 Summit and its follow-up – needs to formulate domestic 
policy for an ‘updated development objective’ for the eradication 
of all forms of poverty, building on the international debate on 
SDGs. 
In his analysis of the conceptualization of goals, Montes shows 
how the practice of international cooperation systemically disregards 
the internationally agreed meaning of sustainable development. 
The MDG approach unduly focused on individual-level social 
development, discounting the economic and genuinely environmental 
aspects of sustainable development, which are unattainable without 
macroeconomic development and structural change. Montes examines 
the manner in which mechanisms in international trade and finance 
and premature external ‘openness’ have hindered development in 
developing countries. He argues that poverty eradication is an overly 
narrow objective of development, because it does not recognize that 
it requires the movement of a significant proportion of the population 
from traditional, subsistence-sector jobs to productive employment 
in the formal sector. Moreover, the simplifying poverty eradication 
approach draws attention away from the international system, whose 
structure serves mainly ‘the economic and political interests of 
powerful factions in developed countries’. Such systematic analytical 
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and policy neglect of the poorly structured international system has 
adverse medium- and long-term economic, social and environmental 
implications. This analysis logically makes the case for a different type 
of development goal.
At the country and sectoral levels, Campos, Duarte and Soares 
examine a specific MDG – Goal 2, which aimed to ‘ensure that, by 
2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete 
a full course of primary schooling’. In Brazil, the goal focused on the 
expansion of compulsory education for children aged seven to fourteen, 
with considerable success. However, this made children over fifteen who 
had not received a primary education at the appropriate age even more 
vulnerable to social exclusion and poverty. Campos, Duarte and Soares 
argue that the post-2015 development agenda now needs to address the 
unintended (negative) consequences of policies, prioritize secondary 
education, and urgently address the poverty risk of uneducated youth.
Regarding the role the MDGs have played, several of the chapters 
illustrate how the misconception of poverty in the MDG agenda has had 
a direct impact on policy. For Rogers and Balázs, ignoring the role of 
power defeats any poverty eradication strategy. Similarly, Boltvinik and 
Damián discuss poverty eradication policies from a political economy 
point of view, arguing that an erroneous analysis cannot even begin to 
tackle poverty. For Montes, the overvaluation of poverty eradication 
as a central development goal has led the development community 
to completely disregard the international system that produces and 
reproduces poverty, a view shared by Cimadamore, Koehler and Pogge 
in this chapter. 
Part III of the book is hence devoted to alternative policies and 
visions. Boltvinik and Damián discuss the main forces determining 
global poverty trends, namely periodic economic crises and the 
process of automation. They compare Keynesian and neoliberal 
variants of capitalism, arguing that Keynesian policy approaches 
mitigate capitalism’s tendency to produce poverty, while neoliberalism 
reinforces it. Against this analytical framework, the chapter examines 
the relevance of the MDG poverty target. It argues that poverty 
reduction goals are futile, methodologically and, more importantly, 
analytically. This is because automation continuously decreases the 
number of jobs required to produce a potentially increasing number 
of goods and services.14 As jobs decrease, the income in the hands 
of the vast majority of consumers also decreases, making the sale of 
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goods produced impossible. The chapter therefore makes the case for 
a mechanism that decouples income from paid jobs, in the form of a 
‘Universal Sufficient and Unconditional Citizens’ Income (USUCI)’. 
This argument is directly relevant for the SDGs discussion, which in 
Goal 1 contains the recommendation for a universal social protection 
floor. 
Deacon too reviews the discussion within and around the UN with a 
view to the development agenda after 2015. He makes the case that the 
continuing global politics of poverty alleviation and eradication need to 
shift towards ‘a new global politics of building social solidarity’. Like 
Boltvinik and Damián, but from a political rather than an economic 
angle, this supports the case for a social protection floor initiative. As 
its ethical underpinning, Deacon highlights the increased attention 
given to the concept of freedom from poverty as a human right. He 
also argues for a renewed focus on state-led development, and the 
need to reconcile the interests of the middle classes with those of the 
poor in order to create solidarities. This proposal, coming from a social 
solidarity tradition rather than a direct critique of capitalism, supports 
Boltvinik and Damián’s case for the USUCI.
Koehler reviews the history of development agendas, in order to 
place the MDGs in the context of development decades pursued by 
the UN and the international community since the 1960s. She posits 
that the MDGs were a success in terms of raising the visibility of 
poverty and social development as global political concerns, but a 
failure in that the majority of the targets were not met. She argues 
that the MDGs had conceptual shortcomings, but more importantly 
lacked an explicit policy design and vision. The main conclusion is 
that policy is central to a successful development agenda, and it is 
therefore crucial to reinstate the role of public policy, sidelined in the 
neoliberal agenda. In short, Koehler emphasizes the role of the state in 
eradicating poverty and hunger, and argues for it to become part and 
parcel of the SDGs. 
When examining common ground across the chapters and sections 
of the book, one observes that all the contributions address the lessons 
of the MDGs for the SDGs. Several contributions track the genesis 
and evolution of national (Paes-Sousa and De Martino Jannuzzi) or 
international development agendas (Montes; Koehler), and situate 
conceptual the progress and shortcomings of the emerging SDGs in 
that context (Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy).
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In terms of the evolving social contract, Deacon and Paes-Sousa 
and De Martino Jannuzzi argue for a broadening of the notion of the 
poor, to reach also the middle classes, implicitly making the case for a 
new social contract or what Deacon aptly terms ‘social solidarity’. Both 
chapters see the need to align domestic policy with international policy 
recommendations in the new development agenda. Campos, Duarte 
and Soares draw attention to a new group of highly vulnerable people 
– uneducated youth – who were left out by the MDG effort and now 
face competition from a younger generation that did benefit. Montes 
makes that point more strongly, arguing that the development agenda 
serves particular interests.
Several authors are adamant about the demand for more clearly 
formulated public policy (Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy), and 
for a return to enlightened, rights-based and democratic state-led 
development (Deacon, Koehler). With respect to concrete policy 
recommendations, several of the chapters make a strong case for social 
protection (Deacon) or a minimum income guarantee (Boltvinik and 
Damián) – very much anticipating a key proposition of the SDGs. 
Concluding summary
This introductory chapter has sought to provide a critical overview 
of the MDG agenda on extreme poverty. It provides a critique of the 
MDGs’ underlying poverty concept as well as its role in reducing 
global poverty. It has also aimed to frame the analysis, insights and 
ideas for a new development agenda contained in the following 
chapters. 
Thus, the volume hopes to offer a diverse and hopefully thought-
provoking contribution to poverty discourse and analysis. Perhaps it 
can modestly help to instigate a fundamental reframing of the notion 
of poverty and provide pointers towards the type of policies necessary 
to eradicate all forms of poverty, and to achieve this in a sustainable 
manner. This is what we would work towards analytically, aspire to 
ethically, and strive for politically.
Notes
1 www.un.org/en/events/
observances/decades.shtml. See also 
Jomo, Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy, 
Roberts and Balázs, Montes, and Koehler 
in this volume, and Koehler 2015.
2 United Nations Millennium 
Declaration. Resolution 55/2adopted 
by the General Assembly, www.un.org/
millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, 
accessed 23 February 2015.
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3 See CROP Brief no. 13, www.crop.
org/Publications/BriefsSeries/default.
aspx, accessed 24 February 2015.
4 There is an agreed division 
of labour in terms of which agency 





6 On the centrality of productivity for 
economic development, and its neglect in 
the MDG agenda, see Montes this volume 
and Gore (2013).
7 Developmental states have been 
criticized for a lack of democracy – from the 
violation of labour rights and core labour 
standards, to human rights violations in 
terms of civil and political rights. There is 
therefore a movement to define democratic 
developmental welfare states which 
combine a human rights base with the 
aspirations of welfare states, and the role 
of government for economic development 
and restructuring. See Mkandawire (2004); 
Robinson and White (1998); UNRISD (2010); 
Koehler this volume. 
8 See also see Oxfam (2014) in a 
similar vein.
9 ODA from the OECD Development 
Assistance Countries increased from 
US$82 billion in 2000 to US$134 billion in 
2013; the EU institutions’ flows increased 
from US$8.5 billion to US$15 billion, not 
quite doubling over the period. OECD aid 
statistics, www.compareyourcountry.org/
oda?cr=20001&cr1=oecd&lg=en&page=1, 
accessed 26 February 2015.
10 Again, China is one of the 
exceptions. Its progress on poverty 
reduction has much to do with its 
transformation into a major exporter of 
manufactures, which enabled a transition 
from agricultural to manufacturing 
employment.
11 See Koehler this volume for the full 
list of proposed SDGs. 
12 For the principle of decent work, 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work can serve 
as a preliminary orientation. It includes 
freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; the elimination of all forms 
of forced or compulsory labour; the 
effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation; www.
ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/
textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm.






accessed 26 February 2015.
13 The European Commission (EC 
2014), for example, is promising policy 
coherence for development, to overcome 
the fact that policies in the areas of trade 
or energy undermine and contravene 
development cooperation efforts.
14 On the role of automation and 
policy responses, see also Roubini 
(2015).
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Jomo Kwame Sundaram1
Global poverty trends
World leaders agreed to the Millennium Declaration at the UN 
Millennium Summit in September 2000. This was later reformulated 
as eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and approved by 
UN member states. The first MDG seeks to halve the proportion of 
people in the developing countries living on less than one (1985 PPP 
[purchasing power parity] dollar) a day between 1990 and 2015. 
There has been some success in reducing global poverty rates in 
the past three decades. According to recent estimates of the World 
Bank (World Bank 2013), the proportion of people in the developing 
countries living on less than 1.25 (2005 PPP dollars) per day has 
decreased from 52 per cent in 1981 to 21 per cent in 2010. Curiously, 
this represents one percentage point less than half the poverty rate of 
43 per cent that prevailed at the time when the MDGs were adopted. 
Thus, one can celebrate the achievement of the target of halving global 
poverty five years ahead of 2015!
However, the extent of the achievement in absolute terms is more 
modest as the number of people living in extreme poverty has declined 
by about 700 million in three decades. According to the World Bank, 
the number of extreme poor in the developing world declined from 
1,962 million in 1981 to 1,011 million in 2011.2 The 1994 Cairo 
Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 Copenhagen 
Social Summit had committed the international community to more 
ambitious targets, which were significantly revised downwards in the 
MDGs. For example, halving the number of poor would have been 
more ambitious than halving the share or percentage of the poor.
The distribution of people living in poverty within and across 
regions has changed significantly over the last three decades. While 56 
per cent of the world’s extreme poor lived in East Asia and the Pacific 
(including China) in 1981, the sub-region was home to 18 per cent 
of the global poor in 2010. China’s share of global poverty declined 
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from 43 per cent in 1981 to 11 per cent in 2010. In contrast, India’s 
share of global poverty rose from 21 per cent to 35 per cent during 
the same period.3 This has contributed to the rise in the share of the 
world’s extreme poor in South Asia from 29 per cent in 1981 to 42 per 
cent in 2010. The share of sub-Saharan Africa in global poverty tripled 
from 11 per cent to 36 per cent between 1981 and 2010! Thus, sub-
Saharan Africa accounts for more than one third of the world’s extreme 
poor compared to one ninth over three decades ago. The changing 
regional distribution of poverty reflects broad changes in economic 
performance. More importantly, the rise in the global share of poverty 
despite rapid growth in these regions underscores the consequence of 
the concurrent rise in inequality (Oxfam 2014). 
To what extent can we really celebrate the achievements in reduction 
of global poverty? Rising inequality and poverty in many developing 
countries have dented the overall achievements in poverty reduction. 
Many analysts have also noted methodological and other shortcomings 
in the poverty estimates. Thus, one needs to be circumspect before 
claiming too much success in the global fight against poverty.
Methodological issues in estimating poverty
The main problem in estimating poverty involves the utilization of the 
poverty line as a meaningful measure of poverty. Considerable evidence 
suggests that the poverty line seriously misrepresents the actual extent 
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2.1 Number of people living on less than $1.25/day (source: World Bank (2013))
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from 1990 to 2010, while global hunger has not decreased to the same 
extent despite the fact that the poverty line is supposed to be principally 
determined by the money income needed to avoid being hungry. 
The poverty line was originally – and controversially – defined 
with reference to the purchasing power of a ‘dollar a day’ in 1985 US 
currency. Before its latest (2008) revision, the World Bank’s estimate 
of poverty for 2004 was under a billion. This was drastically revised 
upwards by over 40 per cent in 2008 when the 2005 survey data 
became available and the international poverty line was redefined 
with reference to the purchasing power of $1.25 a day in 2005 US 
currency. Such a high margin of adjustment raises serious questions 
about the accuracy of all poverty estimates, as well as related 
projections and estimates, and of the utility of making policy using 
such poverty numbers. 
If the poverty line is fixed where the World Bank set it for 2005, at 
$1.25/day, which is equivalent to $38/month, then the number of poor 
was 1,923 million in 1990 and 1,128 million in 2010 – equivalent to 
a 41 per cent reduction over twenty years – hardly enough to halve 
the number, but enough to halve the proportion of poor people in 
developing countries, mainly thanks to the massive reduction of poverty 
in China, where the reported number of extreme poor declined from 




























































































V12 – Prevalence of undernourishment
V15 – Prevalence of food inadequacy
2.2 Prevalence of chronic undernourishment in the world, 1990–2012 (%)
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Although the World Bank poverty line was originally – and contro-
versially – defined as a ‘dollar a day’, the line has not been adjusted to 
the United States inflation rate. As Thomas Pogge4 has pointed out, 
much depends on the starting point. If one starts from the original 





























































































VA01 – Number of people undernourished
Number of people with inadequate access to food





























































































V12 – Prevalence of undernourishment
V15 – Prevalence of food inadequacy






























































































VA01 – Number of people undernourished
Number of people with inadequate access to food














































































































2.6 Prevalence of chronic undernourishment in developing countries by 
region, 1990–2012 (%)
Note: * Includes data for Sudan, which are not included in the fi gure for 
sub-Saharan Africa, following the partition of the country when South Sudan 
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291 281 28.8 35.4
176 220 17.4 27.7
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2.7 The changing distribution of hunger in the world: numbers and shares of 
undernourished peoples by region, 1990–92 and 2014–16 (source: FAO, IFAD 
and WFP, 2015. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Meeting the 2015 
international hunger targets: taking stock of uneven progress. Rome, FAO.)
Note: The areas of the pie charts are proportional to the total number of 
undernourished in each period. Data for 2014–16 refer to provisional estimates. 
All fi gures are rounded. 
* Includes data for Sudan, which are not included in the fi gure for sub-Saharan 
Africa, following the partition of the country when South Sudan became an 
independent state in 2011. 
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and then corrects for US inflation in the 1985–2005 period,5 one gets 
an equivalent poverty line of $1.815/day (in 2005 dollars), or $55.18/
month, which is clearly much higher than the $1.25/day for 2005 used 
by the World Bank.6 The number of poor would then be 2,698.42 
million in 1990 and 2,146.68 million in 2010 – for a mere 20.5 per 
cent reduction over twenty years, nowhere near enough to halve the 
proportion, let alone the number, of poor in developing countries. 
Global poverty estimates by the World Bank underscore the 
methodological problems of its poverty measurement. Sanjay Reddy 
(2011) shows that the 2008 revision of the Bank’s 2005 global poverty 
estimates, based on a new $1.25 (2005 purchasing power parity or 
PPP) poverty line, has only reaffirmed their unreliability. Reddy argues 
that the Bank’s poverty line is not only flawed in conception, but also 
not very useful, if not downright problematic, for policy purposes. As 
various aspects of the Bank’s approach can hardly be justified, much less 
weight should be given to the Bank’s poverty estimates in monitoring 
progress on the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to 
reduce poverty and hunger rates by half from 1990. He argues that 
its conceptual and methodological problems require adopting an 
altogether different method involving international coordination by the 
key institutions involved. 
The single largest item in the basket of goods and services presumed 
to constitute the poverty line is food. Hence, the poverty line is often 
popularly understood as the income needed to avoid being hungry. 
Thus, the divergence between poverty and hunger trends over the 
period 1990–2010 should be a cause for concern. The graphs showing 
the two trends for the world – or even for all developing countries – are 
less different, but the trends for the regions are much more dramatically 
divergent, as the graphs show. This is not the place to discuss the 
relative merits and demerits of the poverty and hunger indicators used 
to monitor progress in achieving the first Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG1).
The MDG1c hunger indicator has been defined in terms of the 
‘Prevalence of Undernourishment’ (PoU) indicator, understood as 
chronic hunger defined in relation to the minimum dietary energy 
(caloric) intake for a minimal normal (‘sedentary’) activity level 
corresponding to a physical activity level (PAL) coefficient of 1.55. 
The PoU has been traditionally estimated by assuming an ‘average’ or 
‘regular’ distribution of physical activity levels in the population. Such 
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an estimate would constitute a conservative or minimum lower bound 
for a population not engaged in much physical activity. The lower 
PoU line thus provides the most conservative estimate of the number 
of people suffering from chronic undernourishment, while the new 
‘Prevalence of Food Inadequacy’ (PoFI) indicator, based on a minimal 
PAL of 1.75, is a less conservative, but more plausible, estimate if none 
of the hungry can afford to have a sedentary lifestyle.
Trends in inequality also have a bearing on poverty trends. Not 
only are there wider income gaps between rich and poor countries, but 
within-country income inequalities have also increased in the majority 
of countries during this period. For example, between the early 1980s 
and 2005, income inequality rose in fifty-nine of the 114 countries for 
which data are available, and declined in forty countries (UN 2010).
Poverty challenge
By almost any standards, including the 1994 United Nations 
Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 Copenhagen 
Social Summit and the 2000 Millennium Declaration, there has been 
modest, but insufficient, progress globally in reducing poverty and 
deprivation over the last three decades. If we leave out the spectacular 
reduction of poverty in China and other parts of East Asia over this 
period, the record for the rest of the world looks even more dismal. 
Wide-ranging deficits in the human condition remain endemic and 
ubiquitous in most poor countries, but also in some rich countries, 
especially for certain vulnerable groups. 
What is particularly disturbing is that these disappointing outcomes 
on many crucial dimensions have persisted despite several growth 
spurts at the global level and even more sustained growth in several 
large developing countries. This shameful failure has continued despite 
pious declarations and professed commitments by the global community 
to the worthy goals of the Millennium Declaration. This situation is 
likely to deteriorate owing to subdued growth in developing countries, 
as the global economy remains anaemic following the financial crisis 
of 2008/09. While global economic recovery is still tepid, it is certain 
that job recovery and the advancement of decent work conditions lag 
considerably, with severely adverse consequences for real incomes and 
living conditions. 
The United Nations’ Report on the World Social Situation 2010: 
Rethinking Poverty sought to contribute to rethinking poverty and its 
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measurement, as well as policies and programmes to promote poverty 
reduction. It affirmed the urgent need for a strategic shift away from 
the market fundamentalist thinking, policies and practices of recent 
decades towards more sustainable development and equity-oriented 
policies appropriate to national conditions and circumstances. The 
report noted that:
• The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day declined globally 
from 1.9 billion in 1981 to 1.4 billion in 2005 according to the World 
Bank. This decline was largely due to rapid growth of employment 
and incomes in China despite fast-rising inequalities. However, the 
absolute number of poor people actually went up during this period 
in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle 
East and North Africa, as well as Central Asia. 
• The recent global financial, food and fuel crises, as well as the ongoing 
implications of climate change, threaten efforts to reduce extreme 
poverty, even undermining some gains achieved since the 2000 
Millennium Summit. The negative economic and social impacts of 
these crises threaten the lives of people living in poverty as well as 
many more living in precarious or vulnerable situations, and call 
into question the sustainability of past poverty reduction. 
• The experience of poverty is multidimensional, consistent with the 
wider definition of poverty adopted by the 1995 World Summit 
for Social Development. This implies that understanding poverty 
should include consideration of the causes and consequences of 
deprivation, social exclusion and lack of participation. With this 
broader definition, the situation today may be even worse than a 
monetary income poverty line alone would indicate, as suggested by 
the Multidimensional Poverty Index.7
• Experience has shown that current conventional policy approaches 
to poverty eradication are insufficient, if not ineffective, and require 
serious rethinking by policy-makers. The obstacles to reducing global 
poverty remain formidable, numerous and complex, and have 
been exacerbated by the economic crisis. We need to prioritize 
sustainable development and structural transformation – involving 
sustained growth of output, employment and incomes, with inclusive 
development benefiting people living in poverty.
Why and how has this predicament come about? Rethinking Poverty 
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summarized key flaws in mainstream thinking on poverty measure-
ment, analysis and policy:
• Dominant mainstream perspectives on poverty and deprivation have 
contributed to considerable misunderstanding and poor analysis, in 
turn leading to poor and ineffectual policy prescriptions.
• Neither microeconomic economic liberalization reforms nor 
macroeconomic stabilization programmes have ignited rapid and 
sustained growth, as promised by the conventional wisdom favoured 
by the international financial institutions and most donors. Policies 
since the 1980s have generally failed to address these issues and 
often made things worse as the policy prescriptions slowed growth 
and increased inequality in most countries.
• Policy prescriptions, often imposed on recipient countries through 
aid conditionalities, have further constrained developing countries’ 
policy space. Failure to spur growth and loss of revenue due to 
various tax incentives have also reduced developing countries’ fiscal 
space. Reduction of policy and fiscal space has greatly reduced 
developing countries’ resilience, especially in the face of external 
shocks or natural disasters, with dire consequences for poverty and 
destitution.
• Those economies which have done well over the last three decades, 
in terms of both growth and poverty reduction, have generally 
adopted pragmatic, heterodox economic development policies. 
While invoking market-friendly rhetoric, they have used public 
policies and investments to induce private investments, especially in 
desired economic activities, e.g. those creating many employment 
opportunities, directly or indirectly, as well as those offering 
increasing returns to scale. 
• While growth has been necessary for poverty reduction, the creation 
of decent employment opportunities has been crucial for raising 
incomes and poverty reduction (United Nations 2007). Extensive 
social provisioning and protection as well as other redistributive 
policies have been sustained by ensuring growth, thus raising average 
incomes as well as the fiscal basis for greater social spending. 
• Social policies have involved increased targeting, ostensibly to 
achieve greater cost-effectiveness. Social policies targeting the poor, 
or the ‘poorest of the poor’, have often proved to be expensive and 
politically unsustainable, while missing out many of the deserving 
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poor. Instead, universal social policies have generally proved to be 
much more effective as well as politically sustainable.
• Special programmes, such as micro-finance, issuing land titles and 
‘good governance’ reforms, have generally not significantly reduced 
poverty.
• Without significant job creation and sustained per capita income 
growth, other policies to help the poor will have limited impact. 
Growth can become more stable with consistently counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies and better capacity to deal with 
exogenous shocks. Also crucial are measures reducing inequality 
and accelerating structural change. 
Rethinking poverty analysis and policies8
The inadequacy of much contemporary thinking about poverty 
as well as its amelioration seems to parallel the poor understanding 
of macro-financial stability, which has contributed to the ongoing 
global financial and economic crisis. Erik Reinert (2011) criticizes the 
‘terrible simplifications’ in economic theory contributing to such poor 
understanding and analyses of financial crises and persistent poverty. 
He argues that similar economic reasoning has contributed to these 
parallel failures. 
Reinert focuses attention on what Hyman Minsky termed 
‘destabilizing stability’, referring to long periods of stability leading to 
greater vulnerability and, eventually, financial crisis. Long periods of 
economic progress in core countries have led to increasingly abstract 
and irrelevant economic theories. A similar failure in economic 
theorizing in the first half of the nineteenth century led to turning 
points – referred to by him as the ‘1848 moment’ – resulting in more 
relevant economic theories. He also identifies key variables that need to 
be reintroduced into economic theory for poor countries to develop the 
productive structures for sustained economic development to eliminate 
poverty. 
The only sustainable basis for mass poverty reduction involves 
economic growth, development policy and employment creation. 
Lance Taylor (2011) argues that without sustained growth in per capita 
output and significant job creation, policies seeking to directly reduce 
poverty in a sustainable manner will not succeed. Instead, he proposes 
growth-promoting policies, and insists that the growth process will 
also be more stable and sustainable with consistently counter-cyclical 
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macroeconomic policies, especially in dealing with exogenous shocks 
from abroad.
Macroeconomic prices, such as exchange and interest rates, can 
be managed to support developmental objectives. Taylor advocates 
pursuing industrial and trade policies to promote desirable economic 
activities, especially to encourage increasing returns to scale. Also, 
measures promoting appropriate developmentally proactive financial 
development are crucial for development. Particularly for the poorest 
countries, making more productive use of foreign aid can be crucial 
owing to the severe resource constraints they face. The overriding policy 
concern should be to ensure that national economies have sufficient 
policy space to achieve sustained growth and structural change. 
The nature of the growth process, rather than economic growth per 
se, is critical for poverty reduction as growing inequalities can prevent 
the benefits of growth from reaching the poor. Jayati Ghosh (2011) 
reviews recent trends in poverty reduction in China and India, suggesting 
that appropriate structural change accompanying growth can generate 
productive non-agricultural employment, thus reducing rural and 
urban poverty. Meanwhile, fiscal means have to be ensured to finance 
the provision of basic needs and essential social services. Government 
mediation of market processes and of global economic integration can 
be crucial for determining economic and social outcomes.
Recognizing that poverty reduction is influenced by economic growth 
and income distribution as well as distribution changes, Mushtaq Khan 
(2011) suggests that governance impacts both economic growth and 
distribution. The mainstream ‘market-enhancing’ governance paradigm 
seeks to enhance market efficiency through ‘good governance’ reforms, 
ostensibly to trigger or sustain more rapid economic growth. Structural 
and fiscal constraints prevent significant improvements in governance 
capabilities while market failures remain significant and are unlikely 
to be greatly reduced by governance reforms. Like stabilizing property 
rights, good rule of law and significantly reducing corruption, achieving 
good governance goals requires fiscal capacities and state capabilities 
not available in most developing countries. 
More recently, ostensibly ‘pro-poor’ good governance reforms claim 
to have enhanced the scale and efficiency of service delivery to the 
poor. Khan challenges the claim that the good governance approach 
enhances economic growth more broadly. He argues that neither 
theory nor evidence strongly supports the claim of significant poverty 
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reduction by advancing the ‘good governance’ agenda. Instead, he 
suggests that alternative governance approaches to addressing poverty 
are more likely to accelerate poverty reduction. Developing countries 
therefore need to focus on alternative governance capabilities that will 
better address market failures. 
In recent years, those promoting neoliberal reforms to reduce 
poverty have strongly supported the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ (BoP) 
approach that presumes that the poor are all ‘resilient and creative 
entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers’. Aneel Karnani (2011) 
argues that this romanticized view of the poor has hurt them in at 
least two ways. First, it has resulted in too little emphasis on legal, 
regulatory and social mechanisms to protect the poor, who are, by and 
large, vulnerable to various marketing gimmicks and generally unable 
to take advantage of economies of scale in consumption. Secondly, it 
romanticizes and overemphasizes microcredit while under-emphasizing 
the crucial importance of large modern enterprises that can provide 
stable and decent employment opportunities for the poor. Besides its 
touching faith in market miracles, the approach does not acknowledge 
the critical role and responsibility of the state in poverty reduction.
While micro-finance has enabled some innovative management 
and entrepreneurial strategies, its overall impact on poverty reduction 
remains moot. Anis Chowdhury (2011) critically reviews the debate 
on micro-finance as a poverty reduction tool. Some criticisms – such 
as of the high interest rates typically charged for microcredit, despite 
the high rate of implicit subsidization and the social opportunity cost 
of such subsidies – are already well known. 
Micro-finance provides credit for contingencies and for smoothening 
consumption while borrowers may also benefit from learning-by-
doing and from developing greater self-esteem as a consequence. By 
‘democratizing’ the credit market, the micro-finance movement has 
not only curtailed the power of moneylenders, but also constrained 
creditors’ excesses in dealing with poor borrowers. However, to make 
any significant dent on poverty, the focus of public policy should be on 
growth-oriented, equity-enhancing programmes, such as broad-based 
productive employment creation.
Poor people not only lack current income, but also the economic 
assets with which to generate incomes. For billions of rural poor and 
urban squatters, access to land may not be well recognized legally. While 
legislation may provide more secure land tenure for the poor, and thus 
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reduce poverty, this outcome is hardly assured by simply strengthening 
property rights or by the rule of law. Policies that have not taken into 
account the complexities of strengthening property rights have backfired, 
sometimes even reducing poor people’s security of tenure. 
Ruth Meinzen-Dick (2011) has reviewed links between property 
rights and poverty reduction, including the gender distribution of 
property rights. She highlights the ambiguous nature of property 
rights, the implications of multiple claims on property, and how this 
complicates property rights reform. Meinzen-Dick also explores the 
implications of strengthening property rights for the poor, particularly 
how understanding legal pluralism can lead to more effective policies 
and interventions to strengthen poor people’s control over assets.
Economic security depends on the ability to cope with shocks, 
uncertainty and hazards, and to recover from adverse developments. 
Over the last decade, conditional cash transfer programmes have been 
promoted in many parts of the world, often with reference to the 
Brazilian and Mexican experiences. However, universal cash transfers 
may be a better way of improving economic security, as conditions are 
likely to be perceived as instrumental, patronizing and not consistent 
with a genuine recognition of rights. Meanwhile, rapid globalization, 
climate change and other sources of economic insecurity increasingly 
threaten livelihoods. 
Guy Standing (2011) reviews evidence of outcomes of various non-
cash transfers, such as food aid or vouchers, vis-à-vis various types of 
cash transfer schemes implemented in developing countries. In contrast 
to food aid and vouchers, which have distortionary effects on domestic 
production and consumption patterns, cash transfers promote work and 
dignity as well as satisfying various principles of social justice, besides 
being more efficient and cost-effective. He concludes that the experiences 
with cash transfers strengthen the case for universal unconditional 
cash transfers as the best way of ensuring basic incomes for all.
Need to rethink poverty policy
Although the current monetary poverty-line approach provides a 
useful definition of absolute poverty and allows for various types of 
comparison, it has considerable shortcomings that could be significantly 
overcome by multidimensional poverty measurement. The ongoing 
economic crisis has served as a reminder that poverty is not an attribute 
of a fixed group, but rather a condition that all vulnerable persons risk 
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experiencing. It is essential for people to be well fed, healthy, educated 
and housed to be more productive and, in turn, to contribute to society. 
Approaches to poverty reduction should therefore be developmental 
and holistic, integrating economic and social policies to achieve 
equitable, welfare-enhancing development outcomes.
RWSS 2010 critically examined the conventional policy framework 
and poverty programmes in the context of persistent poverty, rising 
inequality and lacklustre growth in many developing countries. 
Current approaches are largely based on pro-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies accompanied by microeconomic interventions targeted at 
the poor. Most do not emphasize the need for governments to play 
a truly developmental role, but presume government responsibility 
for reducing poverty. This would entail an integrated approach to 
economic and social policies designed to promote employment growth, 
reduce inequality and promote justice in society. 
Poverty, and its reduction, always occur within a macroeconomic 
context. Countries that adopted stabilization measures and structural 
adjustment programmes generally lowered average economic growth 
as well as increased inequality and, often, poverty during the 1980s 
and 1990s, especially in Africa and Latin America. In general, macro-
economic stabilization measures led to declines in public investment 
and increased the volatility of economic growth and employment. 
The mixed record of poverty reduction calls into question the 
efficacy of conventional approaches involving economic liberalization 
and privatization. Reductions in public investment in health, education 
and other social programmes disproportionately affect people living in 
poverty. They were also adversely affected by increased output and 
employment volatility, especially since unskilled workers tend to be 
the first to lose their jobs, and because job recovery generally lags well 
behind output recovery (see also UN 2011).
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that targeting the poor, so 
much favoured by conventional approaches, is not only expensive, but 
also excludes many who are deserving. Furthermore, many poverty 
programmes favoured by some donors have not been very effective 
in actually reducing poverty, although some have undoubtedly served 
to ameliorate the crushing burden of poverty, especially during times 
of crisis. For example, microcredit has helped ‘smooth’ consumption 
by the poor, but its contribution to poverty reduction has been more 
modest.
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In light of the preceding observations, policies for poverty reduction 
should therefore include:
• Macroeconomic policies for the rapid, sustained growth of output, incomes 
and employment. Countries should be able to pursue consistently 
counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies to achieve stable 
growth and to boost employment and incomes to reduce poverty; 
fiscal and monetary restrictions should not be unnecessarily 
stringent. Macroeconomic stabilization should not be limited 
to controlling inflation, trade and fiscal deficits – as has been the 
case in recent decades. Instead, it should be consistently counter-
cyclical, not only to reverse downturns, but also to check against 
booms generating unsustainable bubbles. Macroeconomic policy 
can play an important counter-cyclical role, especially if resources 
are accumulated during boom periods, and then deployed to fund 
expansionary policies during downturns. Macroeconomic policies 
can be supportive by accommodating counter-cyclical measures and 
development activities, especially by supporting measures to promote 
employment and reduce poverty. Public social expenditures should 
be safeguarded and even increased – counter-cyclically – during 
economic downturns.
• Social policy must consider the determinants of poverty as well as asset and 
income inequality. Social policy and spending can be important in 
breaking the intergenerational transmission of inequality and poverty. 
Many country experiences show that employment and universal 
social protection are central to poverty reduction. Expansion of 
social policies and programmes (e.g. to provide a social protection 
floor) is usually essential to protecting society’s more vulnerable 
members against livelihood shocks and risks, to enhance the social 
status and rights of the marginalized, and to protect workers against 
ill health, unemployment and destitution, in an integrated manner. 
The current global crises and their social impacts in developed 
and developing countries further underscore the importance of 
providing a universal social protection floor, i.e. for the poor as 
well as the non-poor (UN 2011). While there has been progress in 
advancing education and health in developing countries over the 
last decade, serious gaps remain. There are important discrepancies 
in access between children from rich and poor households, in urban 
and rural areas, as well as other major determinants of well-being. 
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Public social expenditures, particularly investments in education 
and health, are critical for human resource development. 
• Promotion of participation, inclusion and voice of poor people is crucial 
to overcoming some of the political and structural determinants of 
poverty and its perpetuation. The importance of participation for 
poverty reduction is based on the fundamental premise that people, 
including those living in poverty, not only have the right to influence 
decisions that affect their lives, but are also crucial participants in 
transforming and improving their conditions. It is therefore crucial 
to remove barriers to participation and to proactively promote the 
social inclusion and voice of poor people. 
The reshaping of the global development discourse over the last 
decade and a half in terms of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) has had profound and far-reaching consequences. The 
MDG1a incidence of poverty indicator has become the single most 
important indicator of development for the MDGs. While this chapter 
has not addressed whether the attention given to this indicator is 
appropriate, it raises some serious concerns about how poverty has 
been measured for MDG reporting purposes. As the original poverty 
line was defined principally in terms of the cost of securing enough 
food, comparing the poverty indicator to the MDG1c hunger or 
prevalence of undernourishment indicator is revealing. The significant 
differences between regional and country poverty and hunger trends 
during the MDG reporting period must surely raise concerns about 
both indicators. The chapter has also raised other problems with the 
MDG-related poverty discourse, underscoring the inadequacy of the 
conventional poverty policy discourse. As poverty is likely to continue 
to be the most watched indicator in the post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals, it is important to urgently take this opportunity 
to review and reconsider poverty measurement, analysis and policies.
Notes
1 I am grateful to Anis Chowdhury for 
his support and collaboration since 2008, 
especially in preparing Poor Poverty (Jomo 
and Chowdhury 2011), RWSS 2010 (United 
Nations 2010) and RWSS 2011 (United 
Nations 2011), which this chapter draws 
upon, and in helping update some recent 
poverty data. I am also appreciative 
of the work of Carlo Cafiero, who was 
principally responsible for the new hunger 
estimation methodology in SOFI 2012 
(FAO 2012) and contributed to the new 
graphs included here. Finally, I must thank 
Thomas Pogge for his improvement of 
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the discussion on US inflation adjustment 
here. Of course, none of them should 
be held responsible for this chapter, for 
which I take sole responsibility.
2 Source: PovcalNet, iresearch.
worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1. 





6 One can use PovcalNet, iresearch.
worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm, to 
see what a difference this makes.
7 The Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI) is published by the Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) 
and the United Nations Development 
Programme. See www.ophi.org.uk/
multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-2014/.
8 The companion volume to Rethinking 
Poverty is entitled Poor Poverty: The 
Impoverishment of Analysis, Measurement 
and Policies. As the subtitle implies, Poor 
Poverty considers various dimensions 
of poverty in rather different ways. The 
volume shows how poverty measurement, 
analysis and policies have been 
compromised and undermined. Together, 
the two volumes offer important challenges 
to recent thinking on addressing poverty, 
raising important questions about poverty 
analysis and poverty reduction policies in 
recent decades. 
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Introduction
… the gap between the rich and poor is observed to be increasing 
with time. The causes given to us [in India] were corruption and 
exploitation of the poor by the rich in various forms. 
(Rogers 2012)
In a series of Field Hearings held in communities around Bhopal, 
India, meeting conveners were told by people that their poverty was 
caused by decisions and actions of the privileged (Rogers 2012). People 
in various poverty-stricken communities across Asia and Africa provided 
similar explanations. Academics and policy analysts tend to ignore this 
evidence, generating studies instead on the perverse incentives created 
by provision of assistance, the entrenched culture of poverty, spatial 
clustering of reduced opportunity, the natural probabilistic distribution 
of income, the education gap, the technology gap, health disparities, 
deficits in social capital, and even alleged innate differences in IQ.
But what if the people who spoke at these Field Hearings are right?
In this chapter we consider the possibility that the people living 
in these poverty-stricken communities are telling us something 
fundamental: that the decisions and actions of those with money are 
primary causes of inequality, poverty and impeded development. By 
this interpretation, we would predict the following:
1 We expect to see positive correlations between poverty and economic 
inequality – over time and space. 
2 We expect that reductions in poverty would occur when reductions 
in economic inequality (e.g. redistributions) take place.
3 We expect to observe clear mechanisms by which those with wealth 
perpetuate or enhance levels of inequality and poverty. 
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In this chapter, we first present qualitative information contributed 
by people who experience poverty, identifying mechanisms by which 
the unequal distribution of wealth adds up to generate poverty. We 
then look at a number of key studies through this lens, concluding 
that there is clear evidence for the three predictions above, and thus 
that such interpretation has important explanatory power. Finally, 
we suggest the implications of this for crafting post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals which would be more effective at reducing poverty 
and promoting sustainable development.
Bringing in community perspectives
Those who have the most to lose often have the least power to 
influence research and policy processes. But is it legitimate to bring the 
perspectives of non-researchers – the subjects themselves – into research 
addressing policy-related questions? A relatively recent literature on 
transdisciplinary research, participatory assessments and participatory 
action research suggests that it is not only legitimate but necessary to 
meaningful research. Literature on policy analysis increasingly shows 
that by bringing in the public through participatory and deliberative 
approaches, policy-making can be successfully influenced by those 
who are living in poverty, marginalized or excluded. In recent decades 
participatory methods have become popular in poverty analysis and 
assessments initiated by NGOs, governments and multinational 
agencies, and have also occupied the mainstream of development 
practice to some degree. However, they have only partially succeeded 
in giving voice to those in poverty. 
Approaches such as Participatory Assessments (PAs), Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA), Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory 
Action Research (PAR) have become, according to Chambers, a 
growing family of methods that enable local people to share, enhance 
and analyse their knowledge, and to plan and act (Chambers 1997). 
In such approaches, local realities are captured through local people’s 
perspectives, and are debated in constructive dialogues among 
stakeholders along issues of common concern. This requires a complete 
reversal in attitude by the researcher, moving away from the ‘cult of 
expertise’ that reproduces social inequalities. According to Chambers, 
‘self-critical epistemological awareness’ is needed for the researcher to 
act as a facilitator in local knowledge settings (ibid.). The emphasis in 
participatory arrangements is on how to create communicative arenas 
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open to all stakeholders, and particularly to powerless lay members 
of local communities, in order to arrive at collective and mutual 
understanding (Meppem and Gill 1998). Collaborative actions are 
generated through engagement with all aspects of the research, from 
problem structuring to reporting (Balázs et al. 2005).
Transdisciplinary research, like participatory research, brings disci-
plinary researchers and local actors together in a collaborative process. 
Meaningful cooperation requires strong social and communication 
skills to integrate different perspectives and action domains. According 
to Pohl and Hadorn, transdisciplinary research is defined by the need 
to grasp the complexity of problems, to take into account the diversity 
of life-world and scientific problem perceptions, to link abstract and 
case-specific knowledge, and to develop knowledge and practices that 
promote what is perceived to be the common good (Pohl and Hadorn 
2008). In this context, transdisciplinary research proves to be useful 
in producing normative and practice-oriented knowledge to solve 
complex life-world problems.
Most participatory research focuses on public health, education, 
food security and poverty reduction, offering effective and acceptable 
policy instruments for national and local contexts. Such participatory 
policy-focused research helps to uncover how social reality is lived 
and resisted on the grassroots level; therefore policies are considered 
more transformative than are simple technocratic interventions. 
Criticisms of participatory arrangements most often point to the 
lack of principled theory, which implies that practitioners do what 
they believe will work in various contexts. Structural inequalities and 
existing institutional and power relations are often blamed, because 
local realities cannot be readily reconciled with the ideal of broad and 
equal participation (Bodorkós and Pataki 2009). Binary opposites 
such as local/global and state/civil society need to be overcome in 
order for participatory arrangements to be relevant (Mohan and 
Stokke 2000).
According to Pretty, in such arrangements participation must be 
considered a right – not a tool to achieve research goals (Pretty 1995). 
Participation in interactive forms builds on self-mobilization and results 
in participatory learning processes where groups take control over local 
decisions, determining how resources are used or how they can have 
a stake in maintaining practices. A central criticism of participatory 
arrangements relates to the role of research itself, and to the defined 
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role of the researcher, who at some point must inevitably implement 
the value-laden process of problem structuration and synthesis of the 
research. 
Another potential problem is the influence of local representation 
that shapes participatory research; in other words, how to break away 
from prevailing local structural inequalities through a participatory 
process which is designed around consensus-building (Chambers 
1997). According to Bodorkós and Pataki, hindrances in creating 
communicative spaces equally open to all can be traced back to the 
difficulties of changing historically rooted, paternalistic relationships 
between local people and local establishments, and the lack of a 
sense of self-efficacy and self-confidence of marginalized people in 
expressing their wants (Bodorkós and Pataki 2009). Bina Agarwal’s 
work on participatory exclusion argues that hierarchical and patriarchal 
structures within communities create an environment where ‘the poor’ 
may appear to be consulted, but actually cannot express their genuine 
views, as that would subsequently endanger their situation in the 
community (Agarwal 2001).
The most prominent and extensive research that emphasized the 
participatory assessment methodology is the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project, 
undertaken by the World Bank in the 1990s (Narayan 2000; Narayan 
and Petesch 2002; Narayan et al. 2000). The twenty-three-country 
study compiled interviews from over 60,000 people (in some cases taken 
from other sources) through Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs). 
Key findings that emerged from the project include the following:
People living in poverty feel they have been bypassed by new 
economic opportunities. Access to markets and/or links to higher levels 
of society are hindered by their powerlessness and lack of resources 
for fair participation. But they view well-being holistically: poverty is 
much more than income alone. For them, the good life or well-being 
is multidimensional, with both material and psychological dimensions. 
People in poverty care about many of the same things all of us care 
about: happiness, family, children, livelihood, peace, security, safety, 
dignity and respect (World Bank 2000). 
Healthcare is reported as unavailable or too expensive. Education 
received by young people is inadequate. Gender inequity is widespread, 
domestic violence pervasive and gender relations stressed: loss of 
traditional male ‘breadwinner’ and female ‘caretaker’ roles (because of 
changing economic circumstances) is traumatic for both genders, and 
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family breakdown, domestic violence and increased alcoholism among 
men are often mentioned (ibid.).
According to the findings, insecurity has increased and violence is 
on the rise, both domestically and in society. A majority of people living 
in poverty feel they are worse off and more insecure than in the past. 
Corruption is a key issue: they want governments and state institutions 
to be more accountable to them. From their perspective, corruption, 
irrelevance and abusive behaviour ruin the formal institutions of the 
state (ibid.). 
The Equity and Sustainability Field Hearings
The Equity and Sustainability Field Hearings project updates 
results of the ‘Voices of the Poor’ project, focusing more directly on 
equality and equitable development. A global collaboration between 
academics, NGOs and local communities, the project has worked 
to ensure that voices from poor and marginalized communities are 
included in discussions such as the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals process (Rogers et al. 2014). As argued in Whose Reality Counts? 
(Chambers 1997), sustainable well-being is only possible if shaped 
from the bottom up. Instead of conducting research on how to achieve 
sustainable societies – which assumes that researchers know the goals of 
such a process – the Field Hearings seeks input from local community 
members on what their goals would be. 
In early 2012, following a broad call for partners, Initiative for 
Equality1 embarked on this global project along with eighteen local 
academic and civil society organizations (Rogers 2012). Field Hearings 
were conducted in thirty-four communities in Bangladesh, China, India, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, the Philippines, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda, Hungary and Scotland. Project participants jointly developed a 
questionnaire or reporting template in English, which local partners then 
translated and modified to be appropriate for their own communities. 
Using public meetings, focus groups or individual interviews (depending 
on what worked best for each community), respondents were asked to 
assess trends in their community (for health, education, the economy, 
politics, conflict, families, happiness, circumstances for women and 
other areas); speculate about the causes of these trends; propose 
changes needed for their community to become sustainable; describe 
how privilege and deprivation work in their community; and articulate 
their wishes for the future of their family and community. 
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The preliminary results, based on interviews, focus group discus-
sions and public hearings with over 2,700 individuals, provided a sur-
prisingly uniform view of inequality and how it operates in the lives 
of those living in poverty (ibid.). The gap between wealthy and poor 
was seen by most Field Hearings participants as increasing. Many 
expressed concern that growing inequality wipes out any gains made 
in economic development. Almost every community worried about 
the growing lack of economic security: jobs are difficult to find and 
may not last. Economic opportunities are scarce and generally avail-
able only to those with connections. Young people do not feel hopeful 
about their economic future. 
The wishes articulated by most respondents were straightforward, 
basic and sustainable – not acquisitive (ibid.). They want stable 
incomes and a secure future, with food, healthcare and education for 
their children; responsive and accountable governments that work to 
create opportunities for all, regardless of ethnicity or economic class; 
and access to opportunities and decision-making.
What did community members have to say about poverty and 
inequality? Those with wealth are viewed as having access to 
political decision-making, which they use to create further economic 
opportunities for themselves (ibid.). Some cited racial or ethnic 
discrimination as a root cause of these problems, while others blamed 
‘selfishness’ by the rich, or the relationship between political power 
and business opportunities. Corruption and a lack of accountability 
and transparency on the part of government officials were said to 
deprive lower income groups of economic opportunities, even when 
funds have been allocated on their behalf. This is seen as a primary 
way in which inequality is perpetuated. Furthermore, lack of trust and 
unity among community members blocks the collaboration necessary 
for effective problem resolution and new approaches to development 
and sustainability. 
Global and regional poverty
This, then, is what participatory research tells us. How does this 
tally with hard data on poverty and inequality?
Globally, the total poverty headcount and rate are down from those 
of several decades ago. According to data released in 2012 by the 
World Bank’s Development Research Group, 1.29 billion people or 
22 per cent of the developing world’s population lived on $1.25 or less 
Box 3.1 Perspectives from Field Hearings community 
participants (Rogers 2012)
‘The level of inequality has increased drastically over the years, 
which has led the well-being of people at poverty level to a much 
worse situation.’ (Bangladesh) 
‘The privileged group believes it is their divine right to possess 
all they want. Deprived groups are left in a helpless situation and 
cannot escape it without monetary help, which is only accessible 
from wealthy people. Unfortunately, privileged and rich people 
are only concerned about their own situation and what they 
“need”.’ (Kyrgyzstan) 
‘They complained that the rich are not creating a favourable 
environment for the poor to graduate from one level to another 
economically … The participants also complained about the 
greedy mind of the politician, on accumulating riches on their 
own at the expense of the poor people.’ (Malawi) 
‘They do not feel they have chance to influence the decision-
making.’ (China)
‘Corruption, poor governance, wrong economic policy, and 
political unwillingness are responsible for the wealth inequality 
and income disparity. This also works as an obstacle to economic 
progress and social harmony and happiness.’ (Nigeria) 
‘Negative discrimination, as a direct link to human rights 
violations, appears in every aspect of life; especially in 
employment and education, as well as in the relationship with 
the public service providers.’ (Hungary) 
‘They attribute this to the ability of the rich to access better 
services such as health and education; engagement of the rich 
in activities that make worse the conditions of the poor such 
as land grabbing, and degradation of wetlands which would 
support the livelihoods of the poor; public opinion by the poor 
often being ignored in planning and decision-making; and unfair 
competition.’ (Uganda)
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a day in 2008, down from 1.94 billion or 52 per cent in 1981 (World 
Bank 2012). Preliminary estimates indicate that this number may have 
fallen to 1.2 billion people by 2012 (Ravallion 2013). 
Much of this reduction of extreme poverty took place in China, which 
had 663 million fewer people living on less than $1.25 a day in 2008 
than in 1981 (World Bank 2012). However, even the picture in China 
is not completely rosy. While rural poverty was falling, studies showed 
that urban poverty rose during the massive influx of rural migrants 
to work in urban areas. Even so, it is likely to be an underestimate of 
urban poverty because these migrants are not counted in the urban 
census (Meng et al. 2005). 
Excluding China, the total extreme poverty headcount has not 
improved. The headcount in all other developing countries was around 
1.1 billion people in 2008, roughly the same as in 1981, though the 
number had risen and then fallen since 1999 (World Bank 2012). More 
people fell into poverty in South Asia over this period, despite India’s 
rapid economic growth over the past decade (Broad and Cavanagh 
2012). The Asian Development Bank has found that extreme poverty in 
Asia is not adequately captured at $1.25/day (Asian Development Bank 
2014: 10). At the $1.25/day poverty line there are about 733 million 
people in extreme poverty in Asia, but using the more realistic $1.51/day 
cut-off raises the extreme poverty rate to 49.5 per cent or 1.75 billion 
people (ibid.: 11). The share of the population living on less than $2 
a day in South Asia has declined since 1990 to about 40 per cent in 
2011, but not sufficiently to reduce the absolute number of poor, which 
rose steadily between 1987 and 2011 (Bigsten and Levin 2005; ESCAP 
2014: 14). Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, an additional 933 million 
people are living on $1.25–$2 a day since 1990 (ESCAP 2014: 14).
Sub-Saharan Africa reduced the $1.25-a-day poverty rate to an 
estimated 47 per cent of total population in 2008, and has experienced 
falling absolute numbers of the extreme poor since 2005, reversing 
a long-run increase since 1981 (World Bank 2012). Resource-rich 
African nations experienced high rates of economic growth, especially 
from 2000–11 (Africa Progress Panel 2013). Several African countries 
successfully reduced the poverty rate; however, others saw level or 
worsening poverty rates (ibid.).
The Middle East and North Africa region as a whole made 
substantial reductions in both the poverty rate and headcount over 
the past two decades. According to the World Bank’s PovCal data 
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calculator (World Bank 2013a), the number of people in the Middle 
East and North Africa region living on under $2/day was 52.9 million 
in 1990 (23 per cent) and 39.9 million in 2010 (12 per cent). 
In Latin America the poverty rate now appears to be significantly 
lower. An initially high poverty rate, estimated at around 65 per cent 
in 1950, fell to only 25 per cent by 1980 (Berry 1997). From 1982 
through 1993, however, the overall number of persons living in poverty 
in Latin America increased from 78 to 150 million (Londoño and 
Szekely 1997). The resumption of moderate economic growth in the 
1990s resulted in some progress in reducing poverty (particularly in 
urban areas). The World Bank’s PovCal data calculator (World Bank 
2013a) indicates that the number of people in Latin America living on 
under $2/day was 97.6 million in 1990 (22 per cent) and 60.6 million 
in 2010 (10 per cent). 
Updated figures from the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) are not directly comparable because 
they calculate poverty using a food basket approach (what it costs 
to feed oneself in each country) rather than the common $1.25/day 
metric (ECLAC 2014: 54); however, these figures can be compared 
as to relative trends. ECLAC’s figures show that poverty has fallen by 
15.7 percentage points since 2002, with extreme poverty also falling 
significantly (ibid.: 15). By country, poverty levels measured in 2012 
ranged from 4.3 per cent in Argentina to 45.3 per cent in El Salvador 
(ibid.: 17). A multidimensional analysis shows that deprivation of 
essential needs (housing, sanitation, energy, education) affects from 
around 5 per cent of the population for Chile to around 70 per cent 
for Nicaragua – thus there are many who are not categorized as poor in 
terms of income, but are clearly suffering from deprivation (ibid.: 17).
In eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the poverty rate 
increased from 4 per cent to about 33 per cent during the transition 
from communism to capitalism from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, 
representing an increase in headcount from 15 million to over 100 
million at a poverty line of $4/day (Milanovic 1995). According to the 
World Bank’s PovCal data calculator (World Bank 2013a), the number 
of people in the region living on under $4/day has now declined from 
130.9 million in 1990 (28 per cent) to 55.7 million in 2010 (12 per 
cent).
While it seems straightforward to present global poverty rates over 
time, there are serious conceptual problems with these numbers. Most 
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fundamentally, the very concept of poverty as an expression of monetary 
income can be challenged. Poverty and well-being are now understood 
to be multidimensional concepts, including financial assets, access 
to natural resources, political access, social status and acceptance, 
location and surrounding environment, health, education, security, 
vulnerability, self-determination and capabilities, empowerment, and 
social capital (Alkire and Foster 2011; Chambers 2007; Rogers et al. 
2012). A simple measure of monetary income (or consumption) is a 
very weak proxy for all of these. Furthermore, the same income, even 
at purchasing parity, means different things in different places. A small 
income goes much farther in a country where adequate public social 
services are provided or in a natural environment where food, clean 
water, housing materials and fuel are freely and equitably available 
(Broad and Cavanagh 2012). The consumer price index used to 
calculate purchasing power does not give enough weight to food costs, 
which are a higher proportion of expenditures for the poor (Cimadamore 
et al. 2013). Moreover, there are many economic components that do 
not show up as income at all, including the amount of labour required 
to earn the income, work outside the monetized economy (often by 
women), leisure time, and so forth. 
The numbers of people in poverty are often presented as averages, 
but these numbers may hide large movements in the opposite direction 
(Kanbur 2005). For example, in Mexico during 1990–94, the decrease 
in national poverty was composed of a drop in urban areas, but an 
increase in some rural regions. Population growth also affects absolute 
poverty: in Ghana, for example, while the incidence of poverty was 
falling at around 1 per cent per year from 1987 to 1991, the total 
population was growing at almost twice that rate, thus the absolute 
number of poor grew sizably (ibid.). Finally, the poverty headcount is 
very sensitive to the numbers used to define poverty. For example, the 
number of people below $1.25/day dropped by 32.5 per cent between 
1990 and 2008, but numbers below $2.50 dropped by only 5.3 per 
cent (Cimadamore et al. 2013). Sensitivity tests also confirm that 
changes in poverty rates are sensitive to the choice of the poverty line 
(Naschold 2005). 
Global and regional inequality
What do the hard numbers tell us about inequality trends during the 
past few decades? 
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Global inequalities between individuals are very high. Calculating 
global inequalities between the world’s individuals, using purchasing 
power parity rates to assure comparability, results in a Gini coefficient 
estimate of 70 (Milanovic 2009). Another way of describing global 
inequality is to divide the income of the world into two halves: the richest 
8 per cent of the people will occupy one half, and the other 92 per cent 
of the population will occupy the other half (Milanovic 2012). From 
1988 to 2005, the ratio of the richest 5 per cent to the poorest 25 per 
cent rose from 185:1 to 297:1 (Cimadamore et al. 2013). The richest 
5 per cent of individuals gained an additional 3.49 per cent of income, 
while the poorest 50 per cent dropped from 3.53 per cent to 2.92 
per cent and the poorest quarter dropped from 1.16 per cent to 0.78 
per cent (ibid.). 
As dramatic as these income inequality measures are, studies which 
include metrics for wealth, such as financial assets, real estate and 
savings of various kinds, show an even greater level of inequality globally 
(Ortiz and Cummins 2011). The International Labour Organization 
estimates that the global Gini index based on wealth was 89.2 in 2000, 
significantly higher than the Gini based on global income (ILO 2008). 
According to UNU-WIDER, the top 10 per cent of adults own 85 per 
cent of global household wealth (Davies et al. 2008). As Piketty’s now 
famous equation, r > g, suggests, when the rate of return on capital, 
r, significantly exceeds g, the growth rate of the economy, then wealth 
will be the more significant determinant of inequality (Piketty 2014). 
Looked at on the regional or national level, inequality has variously 
risen, fallen or remained constant. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
inequality rose in forty-eight out of the seventy-three countries for 
which sufficient ‘high quality’ data is available (Cornia and Court 
2001). Forty-six out of seventy-three countries analysed had Gini 
coefficients higher than 0.35–0.40, the threshold beyond which growth 
and poverty alleviation can be perceptibly affected, while only twenty-
nine countries had such high inequality in the early 1980s (ibid.). In 
contrast, inequality remained constant in sixteen nations, including 
Brazil, India, Bangladesh and Indonesia, and inequality fell only in 
nine of the seventy-three sample countries.
For advanced economies (OECD countries), inequality has generally 
been on the increase. The Gini coefficient stood at an average of 29 in 
OECD countries in the mid-1980s, but by the late 2000s it had risen 
to 31.6 (OECD 2011). It rose in seventeen of the twenty-two OECD 
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countries for which long-term data series are available (ibid.). Recent 
data show that the average income of the richest 10 per cent of the 
population is about nine times that of the poorest 10 per cent (ibid.). 
In the Asia-Pacific region, income inequality grew between 1990 
and 2011 in nearly half the countries with comparable data (ESCAP 
2014: 14). The Gini coefficient in China increased from 32.4 to 42.1 
as reforms led to economic growth (Dollar 2007; ESCAP 2014: 14). In 
India the Gini rose from 30.8 to 33.9 as growth has bypassed the rural 
areas where the large majority of the poor live (Cornia and Court 2001; 
ESCAP 2014: 14). Indonesia’s Gini rose from 29.2 to 38.1, while Gini 
indices for Malaysia (46.2) and the Philippines (43.0) remain among 
the highest in the region (ESCAP 2014: 14).
Inequality has variously risen, remained level or fallen in the nations 
of sub-Saharan Africa, starting from initially high levels (Cornia and 
Court 2001). Many of the resource-rich African countries are highly 
unequal by international standards. Data developed by the Brookings 
Institution for Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia (between 1998–
2003 and 2005–09) show that the income share taken by the richest 
decile has increased substantially in each case, while the share going to 
the other deciles has declined (Africa Progress Panel 2013). 
The Middle Eastern and North Africa region has seen some very 
steep increases in inequality, although this varies from country to 
country. According to Ortiz and Cummins (2011) using the World 
Bank’s PovCal data calculator (World Bank 2013a), Algeria rose from 
a Gini of 38.7 in 1990 to 58.7 in 2005, while Turkey stayed level at 
just under 44.
Inequality has first risen then declined in Latin America over 
the past few decades. Following the economic crises of the 1980s, 
inequality rose from already high levels in virtually all countries of Latin 
America (Cornia and Court 2001; ECLAC 1997). Income inequality 
has recently fallen in Chile and Mexico, but the richest in these two 
countries still have incomes more than twenty-five times those of the 
poorest (OECD 2011). Brazil managed to reduce inequality from a 
Gini of 60 in 1993 to 54 in 2009 (Birdsall et al. 2011: 11), although 
it is still far more unequal than any of the OECD countries (OECD 
2011). Of the thirteen countries with information available in 2011 or 
2012, twelve reported a declining Gini coefficient (ECLAC 2014: 81). 
Despite this trend, inequality in Latin America still ranks at the top of 
all regions (Birdsall et al. 2011: 3).
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The increase in inequality was universal in eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, with as much as a twenty-point increase in the Gini 
coefficient in several countries (Cornia and Court 2001). For example, 
in Russia the Gini increased from 25.9 in 1989/90 to 40.9 in 1994, 
immediately after the dismantling of the former communist system. 
In contrast, in Poland, despite a similar level of 25.5 in 1989/90, the 
Gini had increased to only 32 by 1995 (Milanovic and Ersado 2008). 
Between 1990 and 1995 the share of the top decile (region-wide) 
increased from about 20 per cent of total income to about 25 per cent, 
while the share of the bottom decile dropped from about 4.5 per cent 
to 3 per cent of total income (ibid.). Since 1995 the distributions have 
remained relatively stable or inched slightly upwards (UNU-WIDER 
2008). 
Prediction 1: Positive correlations between poverty and inequality
During the Equity and Sustainability Field Hearings, people living 
in poverty told us that the decisions and actions of those with money 
are a primary cause of poverty and impeded development. If they are 
right, we would expect to see positive correlations between poverty 
and economic inequality over time and space. However, in order to 
analyse the data to look for this relationship, we must first disentangle 
the influence of other related factors – the most notable of which is 
economic growth. Growth in per capita income is widely acknowledged 
to reduce poverty rates, all other things being equal (Ravallion 2005a). 
When researchers have attempted to untangle the relationship between 
poverty rates, economic growth (or lack thereof) and distributional 
inequalities, what have they learned? 
In the 1950s, Simon Kuznets found for a cross-section of countries 
that inequality first increased and then decreased as per capita income 
increased (Kuznets 1955). The now-famous ‘Kuznets Curve’ was 
believed to demonstrate that for poverty reduction to take place 
in developing countries, it was necessary, at least at first, to accept 
growing inequality. However, more recent and comprehensive studies 
have found no evidence that economic growth must be accompanied 
by rising inequality (Berg and Ostry 2011; Deininger and Squire 
1998; Ostry et al. 2014; Piketty 2006; Ravallion and Chen 1997). 
Rapid growth was associated with falling inequality as often as it was 
with growing inequality, or with no changes at all (Bigsten and Levin 
2005).
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Although growth can reduce poverty, growth that is ‘distribution-
neutral’ (i.e. does not alter the fraction of total income obtained by 
different segments of the population) gives greater gains to the rich. 
For example, for any growth rate, the income gain to the richest decile 
in India will be about four times higher than the gain to the poorest 
quintile; while it will be nineteen times higher in Brazil (Ravallion 
2005a). Growth along with changing levels of inequality can either 
reduce or increase poverty rates, depending on the relative rates of 
growth and inequality. In the formerly communist transition economies, 
Milanovic and Ersado (2008) found that growth was often strongly 
anti-poor, as the acceleration of growth generally left the income share 
of the poor lower. (This does not necessarily indicate that their average 
income had gone down, though, since a smaller share might have been 
counterbalanced by a higher overall income.)
Several studies indicate that high inequality in itself may reduce 
growth rates and thus block poverty reduction (Aghion et al. 1999; Berg 
and Ostry 2011; Cornia and Court 2001; Deininger and Squire 1998; 
Keefer and Knack 2002; Ostry et al. 2014). Rent-seeking and predatory 
activities tend to rise, and work incentives for the poor are diminished. 
Rural economies with land concentration in a few hands face very high 
shirking and supervision costs owing to lack of incentives for untenured 
agricultural workers, and tend to have lower yields per hectare than do 
more equitable agrarian systems. High inequality has also been shown 
to limit progress in education, reproductive health and human capital. 
High levels of income inequality between classes and among social, 
ethnic, religious and occupational groups can also increase political 
instability, crime and social problems, thus negatively affecting growth. 
From a business perspective, such social tensions tend to erode the 
security of property rights, augment the threat of expropriation, drive 
away domestic and foreign investment, and increase the cost of business 
security and contract enforcement (Cornia and Court 2001).
Empirical data from the past several decades show that, considered 
in conjunction with growth, higher levels of inequality raise poverty 
rates while greater equality reduces poverty. For a study of fifty 
developing countries, the median rate of decline in the proportion of 
the population living below $1 per day was 1.3 per cent per year in 
countries with both rising average income and rising inequality, but it 
was seven times higher – about 10 per cent per year – in the countries 
that combined growth with falling inequality (Ravallion 2005a). Among 
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contracting economies, when inequality was rising while average living 
standards fell, the poverty rate rose by a dramatic 14 per cent per year 
on average, while with falling inequality the poverty rate rose by less 
than 2 per cent per year (ibid.).
Empirical studies have also found that higher inequality is associated 
with higher poverty at a given mean income (Fields 2001; Ravallion 
2005b). Besley and Burgess, for example, find a significant positive 
coefficient for inequality when they regress the log headcount index for 
the $1/day poverty line on both the log mean income and a measure of 
inequality (Besley and Burgess 2003).
Ravallion assembled data on about 170 ‘spells’ spanning two surveys 
for each of about seventy developing countries in the 1990s (Ravallion 
2005b). For each survey, he calculated a measure of poverty and a 
measure of inequality. There is a relatively strong positive (unconditional) 
correlation, with a correlation coefficient of 0.31. Poverty incidence 
does not change, on average, if inequality does not change. Looking 
just at the subset of growing economies, the relationship is even steeper 
(ibid.). Higher inequality tends to have more impact on poverty when 
the incidence of poverty is lower. However, even if one confines the 
analysis to countries with above-average initial poverty rates (greater 
than 15 per cent), there is a significant positive correlation between 
rising relative inequality and rising poverty (ibid.). Across the fifty 
observations for eastern Europe and Central Asia, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.62 – even higher than for the full sample. The countries 
for which poverty rose the most in eastern Europe and Central Asia 
were those for which inequality rose the most (ibid.). 
Over the past three decades, China has had high levels of economic 
growth, falling poverty rates, and periods of growing inequality (ibid.). 
On the face of it, this would contradict the hypothesis. However, 
the periods of more rapid growth did not coincide with more rapid 
increases in inequality. Indeed, the periods of falling inequality (1981–
85 and 1995–98) had the highest growth in average household income. 
Secondly, the provinces that saw a more rapid rise in rural inequality 
saw less progress against poverty, not more (ibid.).
Naschold estimated the effect of growth versus changes in income 
distribution on poverty by calculating point elasticities from the 
cumulative distribution of per capita consumption from individual 
household surveys, using the PovCal software and the latest available 
household survey for each country (Naschold 2005). The Gini elasticities 
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all had the expected positive sign, meaning that poverty increases as the 
distribution of income becomes more unequal (and vice versa).
In the 1990s, several observers noted the close relationship 
between trends in inequality and trends in poverty in Latin America 
(Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000). For example, Birdsall and Londoño 
commented that, in Latin America, at least half of the rise in poverty 
in the 1980s (50 million additional poor) was due to the deterioration 
in income distribution (Birdsall and Londoño 1997). During the 
1990s, income distribution worsened, exacerbating the negative effects 
of limited growth on poverty reduction. The impact of deterioration 
in income distribution during the period 1982–92 was so large that it 
eclipsed the effects of the subsequent recovery in the growth rates of the 
region (ibid.). Berry asserted that ‘little poverty would exist if the income 
share of the bottom few deciles were not so low’ (Berry 1997). Other 
analysts acknowledged that economic growth in the 1990s had done far 
less to ameliorate poverty than stagnation in the 1980s did to deepen it 
(Tokman 1997). In the past decade, poverty and inequality have been 
declining across Latin America. For reasons which appear to be related 
to better education and stronger social protections programmes, of 
the seventeen countries for which good data are available, twelve have 
experienced significant declines in inequality (Birdsall et al. 2011: 2). 
There is evidence that economic inequality is rising along with 
economic growth in resource-rich African countries, thus harming 
the potential for poverty reduction (Africa Progress Panel 2013). 
Using household surveys to track consumption, poverty and income 
distribution at two points in time, the Brookings Institution looked at 
the relationship between growth, inequality and poverty reduction in 
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia. In each of the countries there 
was a significant gap between the anticipated poverty reduction effects 
of growth, and the actual outcomes (ibid.). In two cases – Ghana and 
Tanzania – poverty fell, but by less than expected on the basis of the 
reported growth. In Tanzania, growth based on the initial pattern of 
income distribution would have been expected to bring another 720,000 
people out of poverty. In Zambia, poverty increased despite the fact 
that the reported increase in consumption was predicted to lift another 
660,000 people out of poverty. In the same four-year period in Zambia, 
the richest 10 per cent saw their share of consumption increase from 
33 to 43 per cent, while the consumption share of the poorest 10 per 
cent fell from 2.6 to 1.4 per cent. In Nigeria, the consumption record 
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pointed to a predicted increase in poverty, but the actual increase was 
far higher than anticipated, by some 6.7 million people. 
Increased inequality explains the apparent discrepancy between 
anticipated and achieved poverty reduction in Africa. The wealthiest 
10 per cent captured a large part of the increase generated by growth, 
while the poorest 40 per cent saw their share of income decline. In 
other words, economic growth is driving an increasingly unequal 
pattern of wealth distribution and weakening the link between growth 
and poverty reduction (ibid.). 
Prediction 2: Reductions in poverty with reductions in inequality
It is clear from the above that poverty is worsened by growing 
inequality. But can existing poverty be reduced by reductions in 
inequality? Heltberg explains that a reduction in inequality may reduce 
poverty for a given level of income, accelerate the poverty-reducing 
impact of economic growth, and contribute to a larger rate of growth 
(Heltberg 2005). Although Heltberg does not mention it, reductions 
in inequality may also be effective at poverty reduction by enhancing 
the ability of poor people to influence political decision-making, and 
thereby push for fairer rules that will reduce inequality and poverty 
even farther. 
We can demonstrate the direct impact of increased distributional 
equality on poverty reduction fairly precisely by analysing actual 
instances of poverty reduction through increased distributional equality, 
by considering hypothetical transfers of specific dollar amounts from 
the very wealthy to the very poor, and by using simple mathematical 
models to contrast the poverty reductions achieved through growth 
with those achieved through redistribution.
Real-world instances of poverty reduction show that lowering ine-
quality can have a significant positive impact. Hanmer and Naschold 
separate a sample of 121 poverty observations into two groups: those 
with Ginis above 0.43 and those below 0.43 (Hanmer and Naschold 
2000). They found that the high-inequality countries needed growth 
rates around three times as high in order to achieve the same rate of 
poverty reduction as the low-inequality countries. White and Anderson 
looked at 143 growth episodes from around the world, breaking down 
changes in the income taken by the lowest quintile into the effects of 
growth and those of distribution (White and Anderson 2001). They 
found that in a substantial number of cases the change in income 
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distribution played a significant role, and in over one quarter of the 
cases, distribution was more important than overall growth in explain-
ing income growth of the poor.
Looking at the projected impact of hypothetical transfers from 
the very rich to the very poor, it is clear that this, too, could have an 
enormous impact on reducing poverty. Pogge and Sengupta explain 
that if the poorest two-fifths of the global population had gained the 
2.9 per cent of global household income that was actually gained by the 
richest 5 per cent between 1988 and 2008, the income of the poorest 
one fifth would have nearly doubled already – a gain not expected for 
another ninety-two years under a realistic growth scenario (Pogge and 
Sengupta 2014). Likewise, we could bring everyone up over the $2/
day level, a task requiring $300 billion per year, if we took just 1.2 
per cent of the income of the richest 10 per cent of humanity (Pogge 
2013). In a similar vein, Oxfam researchers recently pointed out that 
the richest 100 billionaires in the world added $240 billion to their 
wealth in 2012, enough to end world poverty (at the $1.25/day level) 
four times over (Slater 2013).
Using simulations to contrast the poverty reductions achieved 
through growth with those achieved through redistribution leads to a 
similar conclusion. Using real data for a large number of countries, 
Dağdeviren and colleagues simulated the effects of hypothetical 
poverty reduction through distribution-neutral growth versus an equal 
redistribution of each period’s growth increment (Dağdeviren et al. 
2005). They concluded that redistribution is far more effective for 
poverty reduction than are distribution-neutral increases in growth.
We developed our own mathematical simulation2 to show precisely 
how much more efficient redistribution is at reducing poverty rates as 
compared with growth of the economy. Results are presented for three 
examples. 
Example 1: Reducing poverty in a very poor country Using numbers 
which approximate those of Bangladesh in 1995/96, a redistribution 
of 3 per cent of the income from the top quintile (reduced from 40.2 
to 37.2 per cent) to the bottom quintile (raised from 9.3 to 12.3 per 
cent) results in a reduction in extreme poverty from 20 to 0 per cent. 
Attempting to reduce poverty by a similar amount through growth of 
the economy requires an expansion in total income of approximately 
45 per cent. (Model parameters included population (117.487 million; 
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DESA 2011), mean income (US$662.40/year; UNU-WIDER 2008), 
distribution of income by quintiles (9.3, 12.9, 16.4, 21.3, 40.2; Ortiz 
and Cummins 2011), an extreme poverty rate estimated as under $365 
per person per year; Ravallion et al. 2009; Sachs 2005) – a number 
which results in about 23.5 million people in abject poverty.)
Example 2: Reducing poverty in a very rich country Using numbers 
that approximate those of the USA around 2011, a redistribution of 
2 per cent of the income from the top quintile (reduced from 50.05 
to 48.05 per cent) to the bottom quintile (raised from 3.4 to 5.4 per 
cent) results in a reduction of the poverty rate from 15 to 0 per cent. 
However, attempting to reduce poverty by a similar amount through 
growth of the economy requires an expansion in total income of 
approximately 110 per cent – i.e. more than doubling the economy. 
(Model parameters included population (311.59 million; World 
Bank 2013b), mean income (48,820 PPP international dollars; ibid.), 
distribution of income by quintiles (3.4, 8.7, 14.7, 23.15, 50.05; Ortiz 
and Cummins 2011), and a moderate poverty rate estimated as under 
$10,000 per person per year3 – a number which results in about 46.7 
million people in poverty; Bishaw, 2012.) 
Example 3: Reducing poverty globally Using numbers approximating 
those of the entire world around 2007/08, a redistribution of 1 per cent 
of the income from the top quintile (reduced from 82.8 to 81.8 per 
cent) to the bottom quintile (raised from 1.0 to 2.0 per cent) results in a 
reduction in the poverty rate from 20 to 0 per cent. Attempting to reduce 
poverty by a similar amount through growth of the economy requires an 
expansion of total income of approximately 110 per cent – i.e. more than 
doubling the world’s economy. (Model parameters included population 
(6.73666 trillion; World Bank 2013b), mean income (10,615 PPP 
international dollars; ibid.), distribution of income by quintiles (1.0, 2.1, 
4.2, 9.9, 82.8; Ortiz and Cummins 2011), and estimated poverty rate of 
under $730 per person per year (Ravallion et al. 2009) – a number which 
results in about 1.35 billion people in poverty.)
Prediction 3: Mechanisms by which the wealthy perpetuate 
inequality and poverty
Our Equity and Sustainability Field Hearings learned that people 
living in poverty view those with wealth as having greater access to 
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political decision-making, which they then use to divert resources and 
create further economic opportunities for themselves (Rogers 2012). 
What do analysts have to say about the mechanisms by which the 
wealthy enable and protect their own opportunities at the expense of 
the poor? A review of recent academic and journalistic analyses reveals 
a multitude of well-recognized mechanisms.
• Cuts in social spending (ECLAC 1997; Edwards 1995; Kanbur 
2005; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000; OECD 2011; Ortiz and 
Cummins 2013; Rosenthal 1996): Dismantling of public welfare 
provisions, including the recent ‘austerity’ measures, have had 
a huge impact on people with inadequate incomes by reducing 
food, education, housing, healthcare, pension and other benefits 
that contributed to their well-being. During periods of economic 
stagnation, the need for these programmes grows larger, and thus the 
benefits per person are often reduced even when the total spent on 
government programmes remains large. Ironically, unless explicitly 
accounted for, public services can be reduced considerably and yet 
not show up in income- or expenditure-based measures of poverty 
incidence.
• Lack of progressive taxation (Africa Progress Panel 2013; 
Buchheit 2013; Garofalo 2012; Hujo 2012; OECD 2011): 
Closely related to cuts in social spending is the lack of, or reversal 
of, progressive taxation that makes such spending possible. In 
developed countries, which have seen a move away from highly 
progressive income tax rates and the elimination of net wealth taxes 
from the mid-1990s to 2005 (according to the OECD), the reduced 
redistributive capacity of tax-benefit systems was sometimes the 
main source of widening household income gaps. At the opposite 
extreme, very poor countries such as the Democratic Republic 
of Congo are losing revenues as a result of weak management of 
concessions, aggressive tax planning by companies, tax evasion and 
corrupt practices. Meanwhile, numerous tax benefits and loopholes 
provide a congenial environment for big business, resulting in little 
or no taxes paid by some of the world’s largest companies.
• Shifts from public to private sector (Megginson and Netter 
2001; Milanovic 1995, 1999; Milanovic and Ersado 2008; 
Stiglitz 2002: 58): The transfer of resources and functions that 
were once public into the private sector – including healthcare, 
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pensions, education, industries, physical infrastructure, water, 
police, prisons, and even military functions – is known to result 
in greater poverty. In the transition economies of eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet states, a massive expansion of poverty took 
place between 1990 and 1995 as this transfer occurred. Increased 
poverty appears to come about through the loss of public sector 
jobs, which tend to have a more equal wage scale, and through 
the need to pay for services that were earlier provided by the 
state. (Milanovic and Ersado (2008) note that privatization of 
certain small-scale businesses resulted in more jobs for the poor.) 
In addition to privatization in the USA and in eastern European 
transition economies, many developing nations, including India, 
China (which is nominally communist) and nations in sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America, have followed the trend as well 
(Megginson and Netter 2001: 322–8). 
• Growing wage inequality (Cornia and Court 2001; Milanovic 
1995; OECD 2011): In developed countries, according to the 
OECD, the single most important driver of growing inequality has 
been greater inequality in wages and salaries. The earnings of the 
richest 10 per cent of employees have grown rapidly relative to the 
poorest 10 per cent, with the largest gains going to the top 1 per 
cent. Since the 1980s, there has been a widespread shift towards 
greater wage flexibility, reduced regulation, erosion of minimum 
wages, lower unionization, dilution of the wage bargaining power 
of trade unions and higher labour mobility, all correlated with the 
recent rises in overall inequality observed in OECD, Latin American 
and transition economy countries. 
• Transfer of income from wage share to capital share (Cornia 
and Court 2001; ILO 2014b; UNICEF and UN Women 2013): In 
recent years, ‘jobless growth’ has characterized labour markets across 
the world. Between the 1980s and the mid-2000s, an estimated 
three-quarters of countries experienced a fall in the wage share of 
national income, as high as 13 per cent in Latin America and 10 
per cent in the EU (UNICEF and UN Women 2013: 22). Between 
2000 and 2008, the unadjusted labour share of income declined in 
all regions except central and eastern Europe and Central Asia (ILO 
2014b: 155). Analyses have identified the rise of capital share (and 
reduction of labour share) of total income as a key component of 
overall increases in inequality. 
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• Decline of trade unions (ILO 2014b; UNICEF and UN Women 
2013): Decline in labour union membership and collective 
negotiation coverage has played a role in falling wages and benefits, 
and weakening of labour standards, regulations and institutions.
• Informalization of employment (ILO 2012b, 2014b; UNICEF 
and UN Women 2013): Employment has become increasingly 
informalized, even where growth rates have been high. Rates of 
non-agricultural informal labour averaged 40 per cent, ranging 
from 6 per cent through over 82 per cent in forty-seven developing 
countries which were analysed (ILO 2012b: 11; ILO 2014a: 12), 
exposing workers to risky labour contracts, insecurity and lack of 
protection or benefits, especially among women, people living in 
poverty and the unskilled.
• Job insecurity (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000; UNICEF and 
UN Women 2013): Those in poverty have greater job insecurity, 
especially during times of economic stagnation, because they can 
be hired and fired as needed by businesses. Coupled with eroding 
wages and the gap between the formal and informal work sectors, 
this leaves people in poverty far less able to protect themselves 
during economic downturns.
• Unequal access to credit (UNICEF and UN Women 2013): 
Inequalities in access to credit aggravate disparities. The largest 
companies and most wealthy individuals have easy access to large, 
cheap credit, while those in poverty have only intermittent access 
to small, short-term loans at great cost. Because returns to capital 
increasingly exceed returns to labour, unequal access to credit 
multiplies inequalities further.
• Asset inequalities (Edwards 1995; Korzeniewicz and Smith 
2000; Lustig 1995; Morley 1994; Piketty 2014: ch. 7; Ramos 1996; 
UNICEF and UN Women 2013): Clearly, people living in poverty 
own far less land, property, resources and financial assets. This drives 
continued poverty through lack of collateral for loans, and lack of 
ability to gain returns on investment. Asset or wealth inequality is 
the outcome of intentional policies, including repealing inheritance 
taxes, reducing progressive taxation rates in the higher brackets, and 
blocking land reform efforts, as well as systemic assumptions in our 
economies that reward capital assets over labour.
• Loss of land, water and other resources (Africa Progress Panel 
2013; Broad and Cavanagh 2012; De Schutter 2011; Korten 
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2001; Perkins 2004; Stiglitz 2002): Compounding the initial lack 
of assets of people in poverty, neocolonial practices across Asia, 
Africa and Latin America have diverted land and resources away 
from the control and benefit of local communities, and instead 
into profitable businesses for outside companies and the local elites 
who facilitate their activities. Policies of the World Bank and the 
IMF over the decades have greatly enabled this trend. For instance, 
the development of profitable cash crops in place of subsistence 
farming wreaked havoc with the ability of local communities to 
feed themselves, while extraction of mineral resources has enriched 
multinational companies while destroying the environment on which 
local communities depend for their sustenance. In recent years, large 
agricultural landholdings have been acquired by outside interests in 
scores of countries, from Angola to Zambia (Land Matrix 2015).
• Resources directed towards urban, capital-intensive sectors 
(Africa Progress Panel 2013; Cornia and Court 2001): Resources, 
international and national, public and private, are much more 
frequently directed at urban areas and capital-intensive sectors. For 
example, increased mineral exports in Tanzania generated growth 
in average income of 70 per cent over the past decade, but this 
growth has been directed towards capital-intensive sectors such as 
mining, telecommunications, financial services and construction, 
and towards urban centres, leaving other sectors behind. Likewise, 
growth in Ghana has done little to reduce poverty in the northern 
region. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of poor rural people 
in northern Ghana increased from 2.2 million to 2.6 million, even 
as the overall number of those living in poverty nationally fell by just 
under one million. In Nigeria, while oil exports have resulted in GDP 
growth of over 5 per cent a year, the unemployment rate has climbed 
from 15 per cent in 2005 to 25 per cent in 2011. The rural–urban gap 
also rose in certain Asian countries during the 1990s. The increase of 
inequality between regions in China accounts for half of the overall 
increase in income inequality observed in that country since 1985. 
There are other mechanisms as well, both long-standing and rela-
tively recent, which ensure that the rich get richer while the poor get 
poorer. These include well-known systemic phenomena such as regu-
latory capture and the relationship between wealth and political cam-
paigns and lobbying (Johnston 2005); the corruption which thrives 
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during the process of privatization of public assets (Bjorvatn and 
Sbreide 2005; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996; Stiglitz 2002; Tangri 
and Mwenda 2001); economic globalization and liberalization, which 
allows the biggest players globally to enter local markets and crowd out 
small-scale entrepreneurs (Stiglitz 2002); the use of military and police 
forces to open markets, create lucrative opportunities and protect busi-
ness interests (Ikelegbe 2005; Johnson 2001; Klein 2008); the cumu-
lative increase of disparities through intergenerational inheritance of 
wealth (Piketty 2014); the rise of purely financial transactions which 
result in enormous wealth for those who are successful at this game 
(Dore 2008; Epstein 2005); and finally, the long-term accumulation 
and centralization of capital (Piketty 2014). 
Conclusions from the analysis
In this chapter we have considered a new interpretation, suggested 
by people living in poverty themselves: that the decisions and actions 
of those with money are primary causes of inequality, poverty and 
impeded development. The results of our literature review, simulation 
and ‘Field Hearings’ participatory assessment can be summarized as 
follows:
• Globally, the extreme poverty headcount is down, but this is prima-
rily due to China’s efforts; in the rest of the world, extreme poverty 
is not much different from what it was in 1981, despite decades of 
economic growth. 
• Globally, inequality levels have greatly increased, although this 
varies from region to region.
• Higher levels of inequality are clearly correlated with higher levels of 
poverty, thus supporting our first prediction.
• Steps that reduce inequality (i.e. redistribution of income or wealth) 
lower poverty more efficiently than does economic growth, thus 
supporting our second expected finding.
• Numerous clear-cut mechanisms by which inequality and poverty 
are perpetuated by the policies and activities of those with money 
have been identified, thus supporting our third expected finding.
In short, our proposed interpretation has important explanatory 
power and needs to be addressed directly if we intend to end poverty 
and engage in meaningful sustainable development. 
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According to World Bank economist Branko Milanovic, more than 
two-thirds of global inequality between individuals is accounted for by 
location (country) rather than by economic class (Milanovic 2012). 
But this analysis – with its implication of manifest destiny for certain 
regions – is misleading because economic class still determines who has 
the opportunity to engage in the activities that generate the enormous 
disparities between nations, as well as how these opportunities 
are enabled and protected. The Africa Progress Report 2013, for 
example, documents in great detail the financial transactions between 
multinational corporations and the elites in mineral-rich African states 
that lead to huge profits for a few and continued impoverishment for 
the rest (Africa Progress Panel 2013).
An ideological or theory-driven analysis of wealth, inequality and 
poverty – whether Marxist, neoliberal or something in between – is more 
inflammatory than helpful in the global discussion about sustainable 
development. What is essential is a realistic look at the hard data, facts 
and implications relating poverty to inequality. With that now in hand, 
we next take a look at what this might mean for effective Sustainable 
Development Goals, which are currently shaping up in the multilateral 
context.
Implications for Sustainable Development Goals
What are the implications of these findings from research on 
poverty, wealth and power for crafting Sustainable Development Goals 
that would be effective at reducing poverty and promoting sustainable 
development in the post-2015 era? To date, there has been an attempt 
to achieve poverty reduction without altering fundamental systemic 
drivers of inequality or diminishing the privileged status of national 
and international elites. Our analysis above shows that this approach 
has been self-defeating, because it continues to generate increasing 
inequality, which then locks in poverty.
The goals of our Equity and Sustainability Field Hearings 
respondents – those most in need of sustainable development 
– included stable incomes and a secure economic future, with food, 
healthcare and education for their children; responsive and accountable 
governments that work to create opportunities for all, regardless of 
ethnicity or economic class; and access to opportunities and decision-
making (Rogers 2012). These goals are completely compatible with 
the concepts of sustainable development and equity, and could readily 
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be framed within a new set of post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). How could the new SDGs respond to these wishes and 
effectively address inequality and poverty?
In the following, we make some proposals based on the literature, to 
tackle the poverty–wealth–power nexus:
• The new SDGs must confront inequality directly through a strongly 
worded stand-alone goal on equality, with strong supporting targets 
and indicators. This has been recommended by the Inequalities 
Consultation Advisory Group, one of the Global Thematic 
Consultations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and others 
(Save the Children 2012; UNICEF and UN Women 2013). 
Indeed, the Field Hearings network led the successful drive to 
include Goal 10 of the Open Working Group’s outcome document, 
which explicitly addresses inequality (UN Open Working Group 
2014). On the other side of the same coin, Oxfam calls for an end to 
extreme wealth as one component of the need to address inequality 
and poverty (Slater 2013). 
• Equality must also be incorporated into all the other goals and targets. 
Since poverty is multidimensional and entangled with all aspects of 
life, it is necessary to address all types of inequalities (violence and 
security, gender, health, education, discrimination, human rights, 
and many others) in order to address poverty effectively (Save the 
Children 2012; UNICEF and UN Women 2013).
• Furthermore, in order to make the targets meaningful with respect 
to equality, all monitoring data must be disaggregated by social and 
economic groups (which might include the lower income or wealth 
groups, women, excluded minorities, and others who experience 
significant disadvantages). Otherwise, significant inequalities can 
hide beneath apparently improving averages (Save the Children 
2012; UNICEF and UN Women 2013). 
• The following crucial issues must be the subject of strong targets 
under the primary goal on overcoming inequalities (Goal 10) and 
other relevant goals, in order to address the main goals of our Equity 
and Sustainability Field Hearings respondents: 
(1) Stable incomes and a secure economic future 
– Establish a ‘social protection floor’ below which no one is 
allowed to fall, funded through public spending; this should 
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be made more explicit in the targets under Goal 1 on poverty 
reduction (UN Open Working Group 2014; ILO 2012a; 
Jones 2009; Ortiz and Cummins 2011; UNICEF and UN 
Women, 2013)
– Policies and programmes generating full employment, 
including favouring high-employment industries, and public 
works programmes if needed to make up the gap (Ortiz and 
Cummins 2011; UNRISD 2010)
– Protection of labour rights, organizing and collective 
bargaining, worker safety; organizing the informal sector; 
addressing unpaid work; protection against exploitation, 
trafficking and slavery (Cornia and Court 2001; UNICEF 
and UN Women 2013; UNRISD 2010)
– Asset (especially land) redistribution has been shown to be 
effective at bringing people out of poverty without backsliding; 
at an international level this should include the return of land 
as well as appropriate compensation for resources extracted 
(Cornia and Court 2001; Dağdeviren et al. 2005; Jones 2009; 
Ortiz and Cummins 2011; UNICEF and UN Women 2013; 
UNRISD 2010)
– Land grabs and resource extraction benefiting only outsiders 
and the elites must be stopped, as they are one of the primary 
mechanisms impoverishing local communities; resource 
extraction businesses must include contractual guarantees of 
local benefits (Ortiz and Cummins 2011; UNICEF and UN 
Women 2013) 
– Global economy requires protection of local communities 
and businesses from harmful practices and impacts of direct 
foreign investment, non-productive financial transactions, 
monopolistic practices, etc. (Cornia and Court 2001; 
UNICEF and UN Women 2013) 
(2) Food, healthcare and education
– Public sector spending should include provisions for meeting 
universal education, health, child and elder care, pensions, 
physical infrastructure including water and sanitation, 
policing and other primary needs (Cornia and Court 2001; 
Jones 2009; Ortiz and Cummins 2011; UNICEF and UN 
Women 2013; UNRISD 2010)
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(3) Responsive and accountable governments
– Broadly inclusive democratic participation in decision-making 
is crucial to poverty elimination because it allows greater 
political influence by those experiencing poverty. Targets under 
Goal 16 on inclusive societies (UN Open Working Group 
2014) must include political access and empowerment, publicly 
funded elections, a free news media, rights to participation by 
all, rule of law, transparency and accountability of governments, 
effective anti-corruption policies and enforcement (Jones 2009; 
Ortiz and Cummins 2011; UNRISD 2010)
(4) Access to opportunities and decision-making
– Targeted action such as quotas, affirmative action and special 
expenditures and protections for disadvantaged groups that 
have been excluded for various reasons (Jones 2009; UNRISD 
2010)
– Equitable and democratic ownership and control of financial 
and business enterprises; this could be accomplished through 
cooperative ventures, municipal development corporations, 
state-owned banks and industries, or other arrangements 
(Alperovitz 2005) 
– Credit access is critical for those living in poverty, who are 
generally without collateral, to invest and build up equity in 
property and businesses (Dağdeviren et al. 2005; Ortiz and 
Cummins 2011; UNRISD 2010)
(5) Resources to fund the above activities
– Taxation must be direct and progressive, including inheritance 
taxes; loopholes, tax evasion and offshore schemes must 
be ended (Cornia and Court 2001; Jones 2009; Ortiz and 
Cummins 2011; UNICEF and UN Women 2013; UNRISD 
2010)
– Debt relief, particularly of sovereign debts that were incurred 
for the benefit of the few (Ortiz and Cummins 2011) 
– New international sources of development finance to redis-
tribute wealth between countries; suggestions have included 
taxing the arms trade, global environmental taxes (carbon-
use tax), and taxing speculative short-term currency flows 
(the so-called ‘Tobin tax’) (Ortiz and Cummins 2011) 
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People who bear the brunt of poverty and inequality are telling us 
something vital, and their observations are corroborated by hard data. 
It’s time to hear them clearly, and respond effectively.
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Notes
1 Initiative for Equality (IfE) is a global 
network of advocates, academics and 
community members working together 
to ensure that poor, socially excluded and 
marginalized communities are empowered 
to participate in sustainable development 
dialogues, decision-making and follow-
up monitoring for accountability (www.
initiativeforequality.org/). 
2 These examples were obtained by 
running a straightforward mathematical 
calculation (using MatLab) as follows:
 We specify the values for 
population, mean income and distribution 
of income to quintiles as mentioned in 
the text. 
 We assume that, within each 
quintile, the income is distributed to each 
1 per cent of the population according 
to a straight-line slope reflecting the 
percentage increase between the share 
of income for that quintile and the next 
highest. For the top quintile, the slope 
is the same as for the fourth quintile. 
This assumption is a gross simplification, 
but in the absence of actual data it is a 
reasonable estimate. 
 For calculations involving only 
growth of the economy, we assume that 
the additional income is distributed 
exactly as originally specified; thus, each 
quintile receives the same fraction of the 
income as before, but the total absolute 
amount increases by the specified 
percentage growth.
 For calculations involving only 
redistribution, we assume that the overall 
economy does not grow, but that fraction 
of the income received by the top quintile 
is reduced by the specified percentage 
redistribution, while the fraction of 
income received by the bottom quintile 
is increased by that same specified 
percentage.
3 This reference provides statistics 
on the numbers of people in poverty 
in the USA; the poverty line cut-off 
used by the US government is actually 
a calculation based on numbers of 
people in the household. We use the 
approximation of $10,000/person/year 
in our model in order to obtain the 
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Maria Ivanova and Natalia Escobar-Pemberthy
Sustainable development has been an overarching goal for the 
international community – countries and international organizations 
– for over twenty years. The Brundtland Commission Report 
introduced the concept into the international political discourse in 
1987 and governments adopted it officially at the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit (UN 1992; WCED 1987). It has, however, remained mostly a 
‘creatively ambiguous’ aspiration (Kates et al. 2005). The 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, set out to 
review accomplishments along the three dimensions of sustainable 
development – environmental, economic and social – and catalyzed a 
process to create a new set of global goals, Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), to guide governments on a more concrete pathway for 
achieving sustainable development. 
While the debate about whether Rio+20 was a success or a failure 
might not be settled (Ivanova 2013), many observers agree that one of 
the most important outcomes of the conference was the agreement to 
set Sustainable Development Goals (Correa do Lago 2013; Griggs et 
al. 2013; Melamed and Ladd 2013). The vision first articulated by the 
governments of Colombia and Guatemala, which others continue to 
develop, is for these goals to frame the core of a revamped sustainable 
development vision – the nexus between basic human needs, economic 
growth, environmental sustainability, social equity and governance 
instruments. Despite the existing debates around the balance 
between economic growth and environmental sustainability (Ekins 
2002; Martens 2010), discussions about the SDGs aimed to create 
both a comprehensive (covering all three dimensions of sustainable 
development) and universal (applicable to all countries) set of goals. In 
August 2014, the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Goals, comprising seventy governments negotiating the substance and 
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scope of the SDGs, presented an official report to the UN General 
Assembly launching a debate about the specific goals and targets in 
a process that is scheduled to conclude by the seventieth session of 
the UN General Assembly in September 2015 (UN General Assembly 
2014).
The decision to design Sustainable Development Goals constituted 
an important signal that policy processes must integrate environmental, 
economic and social concerns at the national and international levels. 
However, even after the Open Working Group submitted its proposal, 
questions remained about the relationship between this new approach 
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the goals that 
governments agreed upon in 2001 to guide them in eradicating poverty 
and attaining key development indicators. The MDGs successfully 
motivated the international community to support action towards a set 
of common aspirations and generated political momentum to continue 
global goal-setting, and are set to expire in 2015. As the international 
community finalizes another set of global goals, what are the main 
lessons from the MDGs process? How could the SDGs be implemented 
to avoid some of the flaws associated with the MDGs process? How 
will the SDGs integrate the MDGs process and achievements in a 
post-2015 context? These are some of the questions that governments 
and scholars have been grappling with (CROP 2013; ECE et al. 2012; 
Evans and Steven 2012; Griggs et al. 2013; Iguchi et al. 2012). 
In this chapter, we reconstruct the different stages in the creation of 
global development goals since the 1990s and articulate key implications 
for the Sustainable Development Goals process in light of the steps 
taken so far by the United Nations and the proposal presented by the 
Open Working Group to the UN General Assembly. In 1995, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
called for new strategic instruments to improve development assistance 
and provided the core elements for goals for sustainable development. 
The MDGs emerged from those ideas and the current SDGs are 
conceived as the next iteration of powerful, impactful global goals. The 
power of goals to give meaning, purpose and guidance translates into 
political attention at a planetary level. On the other hand, the perils of 
global goals include a narrow focus that neglects areas not covered by 
the goals, potentially distorted risk and investment preferences, and 
misleading measurement practices (Dervis 2005; Hulme 2009; Kusek 
et al. 2003). Any new stage in the process of defining international 
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goals needs to accord specific attention to the strategic definition of 
the goals so as to boost the motivation of the actors involved, promote 
improvement of the capacity of countries to undertake the necessary 
measures, minimize structural constraints, and, ultimately, ensure 
implementation.
We begin the analysis with an overview of the historical evolu-
tion of global development goals demonstrating the continuity of the 
process and its cumulative nature. Section 2 analyses the strengths and 
challenges in the design and implementation of a goal-setting develop-
ment strategy of global character. Section 3 outlines the contempo-
rary political process for the design of Sustainable Development Goals 
and some of the distinctive, integrative features of the goals proposal 
in comparison to previous global goal-setting efforts. Our argument 
is that decisions about the SDGs have two equally important dimen-
sions: the articulation of goals and the implementation of these goals. 
The political process around the articulation of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals has recaptured the spirit of integration of economic, 
social and environmental variables. The political process around the 
implementation of the SDGs would need to do so as well. To this 
end, the process of translating the current proposals into policy 
decisions and identifying relevant targets and indicators would be 
critical and would require innovative and effective governance at all 
levels. 
The evolution of global development goals
The evolution of a common international development agenda 
dates back to the end of the Second World War. Governments began 
conceptualizing development as a strategy to not only reduce poverty 
but to guarantee security and stability in the international system 
(Duffield and Waddell 2006; OECD 1995). Given that it was a human 
development strategy, the expectation was that global development 
goals would contribute to peace, security and to the stability of the 
international system by providing for basic needs, the absence of 
which could cause conflict and instability (Binagwaho and Sachs 
2005). In an initial stage, OECD identified poverty reduction as ‘the 
central challenge’, proposing a global partnership around the goals 
that had been defined by United Nations summits and the increasing 
concerns around poverty, debt and the environmental consequences 
of globalization and economic growth (Boutros-Ghali 1995; Michel 
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2005). The 1995 OECD report ‘Development partnership in a new 
global context’ recognized the need to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of international aid, not only as a way to reduce poverty 
but also as a strategy to guarantee the stability of the international 
system (Hulme 2009). The OECD member states, however, went a 
step farther, and in 1996 the High Level Meeting of the Development 
Assistance Committee adopted a more strategic approach, a ‘set of 
concrete, medium-term goals, all based on the recommendations 
of major United Nations conferences, to be pursued on the basis of 
agreed principles’, defined in the report ‘Shaping the 21st century: 
the contribution of development co-operation’. The report included 
a specific list of strategies around the three dimensions of sustainable 
development and set timelines for their attainment – from 2005 to 
2015 (see Table 4.1).
TABLE 4.1 Indicators to measure the success of a global development partnership, 
OECD DAC
Economic Well-being Social Development Environmental Sustainability 
and Regeneration
• Reduction by 
one-half in the 
proportion of 
people living in 
extreme poverty 
by 2015
• Universal primary education 
in all countries by 2015
• Demonstrated progress 
toward gender equality 
and the empowerment of 
women by eliminating gender 
disparity in primary and 
secondary education by 2005
• Reduction by two-thirds in 
the mortality rates for infants 
and children under age 5 and a 
reduction by three-fourths in 
maternal mortality, all by 2015
• Access through the 
primary health-care system 
to reproductive health 
services for all individuals of 
appropriate ages as soon as 
possible and no later than the 
year 2015
• The current 
implementation of 
national strategies for 
sustainable development 
in all countries by 2005, 
so as to ensure that 
current trends in the 
loss of environmental 
resources are effectively 
reversed at both global 
and national levels by 
2015
Source: Michel (1998)
In preparation for the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, and as a way 
to broaden the international efforts towards poverty reduction, the UN 
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Secretary-General, the Secretary-General of the OECD, the managing 
director of the IMF and the president of the World Bank agreed on 
producing a joint report to offer guidelines in the goal development 
process. ‘A better world for all’ presented a set of seven International 
Development Goals (IDGs) as a ‘common framework to guide our 
policies and programmes and to assess effectiveness’ (IMF et al. 2000). 
Twenty indicators articulated the seven goals at a more detailed level 
(see Table 4.2). The institutions designed their development plans 
based on integrative measures of development rather than an exclusive 
focus on income (Hulme 2009), and promoted the idea of prioritizing 
quality of life over economic growth. Importantly, the IDGs sought 
to provide goals for all developing countries. Designed by the donor 
community, however, they were never completely accepted by 
developing countries, which were especially concerned with issues such 
as economic growth, development and increasing inequality (Fukuda-
Parr and Hulme 2011; IMF et al. 2000; UNDP 2003). 
The transition from the IDGs into the 2000 UN Millennium 
Assembly was not an easy process. In April 2000, the UN secretary-
general’s report ‘We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in 
the 21st century’ called for a new international development agenda 
(UN Secretary-General 2000). The IDGs informed the subsequent 
political discussions and provided the core framework of what would 
become the MDGs, but financing, baselines for indicators and differing 
perspectives among developed and developing countries remained 
contentious (Hulme 2009). The initial proposal was followed by 
the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Millennium Declaration 
as a new mandate for the definition, financing and implementation 
of international development as a global strategy (UN 2000). This 
process led to the articulation and approval of the Millennium 
Development Goals in 2001 as a global strategy to improve human 
development, incorporating concerns of both donor and aid recipient 
countries but creating a framework applicable exclusively to developing 
nations. 
The MDGs comprise eight global goals that lie at the core of the 
international development agenda (see Figure 4.1). Ambitious, yet 
concrete, the MDGs offer a multidimensional perspective on poverty. 
They represent a set of global goals that incorporate different policy areas 
ranging from education and health to gender equality, environmental 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































present in the original articulation of the IDGs as evidenced in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2. 
The eight goals are further disaggregated into a set of targets 
and indicators providing the necessary monitoring and assessment 
instruments (Manning 2009; Waage et al. 2010). They include 
economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development but reflect them as independent factors, do not establish 
links among them, and do not recognize that attaining some of the 
targets is a prerequisite to progress in several of the goals (ECE et 
al. 2012). In the case of environmental sustainability, for example, 
environmental degradation and natural resource management also 
affect poverty, health and development. The twenty-one targets 
establish ‘learning goals’, intermediary benchmarks that allow for 
planning, monitoring and evaluation, and change of course, but they 
retain the silo approach rather than an integrated agenda.
The SDGs proposal has attempted to account for these deficiencies. 
While maintaining the same core as the IDGs and MDGs in policy 
areas such as poverty reduction, education, health and environmental 
sustainability, the proposal adopts a more integrated approach to 
poverty reduction and sustainable development. Moreover, it expands 
the scope of goals and targets substantively, making them relevant to all 
countries. For example, while both the IDGs and the MDGs focused 
only on poverty reduction under the economic well-being category, 
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4.1 Millennium Development Goals
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and innovation. The social development category retains the main 
focus from previous global goals, and while it decreases the number 
of health goals, it increases the number of health-related targets, 
which cover a wide range of issues. Through the significant number of 
targets, the focus on women’s and girls’ empowerment evolved from 
simply the provision of education to a number of measures such as the 
elimination of discrimination and violence against all women and girls 
everywhere, the promotion of women’s full and effective participation 
and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making, 
and reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources and 
access to ownership. Importantly, through a new target, reproductive 
health, which was eliminated as a goal in the MDGs owing to political 
pressures, is integrated into the SDGs. Governments are urged 
to ‘ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services, including for family planning, information and education, 
and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and 
programmes by 2030’. The proposal also features a new goal within 
the social development category – the reduction of inequality within 
and among nations. 
Perhaps the greatest evolution from the IDGs and MDGs is in the 
environmental sustainability category. There are now seven discrete 
goals that recognize the importance of various ecosystems and the 
services they provide; they emphasize the need for ‘urgent action 
to combat climate change and its impacts’, add a focus on energy, 
sustainable production and consumption, and cities. 
In the area of global partnership, the SDGs also expand by 
articulating two ambitious goals: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for 
all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels’, and ‘strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the 
global partnership for sustainable development’. The SDGs, therefore, 
extended into the area of governance across levels identifying a number 
of targets for countries (see Table 4.2). 
Creating a set of global Sustainable Development Goals was 
a political process building on previous international efforts and 
integrating the lessons learned. It has been connected to the process of 
rethinking the development agenda post-2015, but also independently 
driven by the constituencies engaged in the sustainability agenda. In 
2010, the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
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MDGs requested that the UN secretary-general initiate a process on 
the future of the development agenda after the 2015 deadline of the 
MDGs. Governments, international agencies, academics and NGOs 
established formal and informal dialogues to examine possibilities 
for enhancing the international development agenda after the 
MDGs, the so-called post-2015 development agenda. To this end, 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon created the System Task Team 
to serve as a consultation mechanism with stakeholders. It brought 
together more than sixty UN agencies and international organizations 
that provide ‘analytical inputs, expertise and outreach’ (ECE et al. 
2012) to define new stages in international efforts for development. 
The Division of Development Policy and Analysis within the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs coordinated this global 
conversation. 
At the same time, at the 2012 United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development – Rio+20 – governments recognized 
the need to reaffirm sustainable development as the foundational 
principle for the global development agenda beyond 2015. ‘A 
realistic development agenda can no longer neglect the link among 
the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. 
Long-term development will thus require integrated policy making, 
where social equity, economic growth and environmental protection 
are approached together’ (ibid.). The government of Colombia 
(later in partnership with Guatemala) urged governments to create 
a mechanism for political commitment to sustainable development, 
through goals that consider the balance between economic growth, 
social development and the use of environmental resources as well as 
the specific needs and characteristics of individual countries (República 
de Colombia 2012). Over forty governments were convened by 
Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support a proposal for 
a comprehensive development agenda that includes and addresses 
the economic, social and environmental dimensions (Castro 2012; 
Uribe 2013). 
The outcome of Rio+20 initiated an intergovernmental process 
to define a set of Sustainable Development Goals to contribute 
to the ‘full implementation of the outcomes of all major summits 
in the economic, social, and environmental fields’ (UN 2012b) 
according to the three dimensions of sustainable development and 
the connections between them. As defined, these goals constitute an 
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instrument for the international community to prioritize the issues 
required for improving socio-economic development and responsible 
environmental management, as did the mandate of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration and the objectives defined in Agenda 21. In particular, 
the draft proposal submitted by Colombia to Rio+20 included 
references to such topics as poverty, consumption patterns, human 
settlements, biodiversity, forests, oceans, hydrological resources, 
food security and energy, including renewable resources (República 
de Colombia 2012). However, as the Rio+20 outcome document 
also reflected, additional work was required in defining priorities 
and establishing the specific elements for goals that would advance 
sustainable development. 
A major point of contention during the Rio+20 negotiations was 
whether the process of SDGs articulation was to be expert-driven 
or political. While an expert-driven process was expected to bring 
technical knowledge into the design of indicators and progress 
methodologies, a political process would guarantee the commitment of 
governments and international organizations to the implementation of 
the goals. The Rio+20 outcome document called for an Open Working 
Group under the aegis of the UN General Assembly and open to all 
stakeholders. On 22 January 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted 
decision 67/555 establishing the Open Working Group, which would 
comprise thirty representatives from the five UN regional groups, 
nominated by member states (see Table 4.3). Selecting thirty countries, 
however, proved more difficult than expected, as most member states 
requested that they be engaged in the process. The final composition 
of the group therefore grew from thirty to seventy countries as several 
countries agreed to share seats, creating a constituency-based system 
of representation and breaking the usual political negotiating blocks 
(G77, European Union, etc.). The mandate of the Open Working 
Group was twofold. The group had to articulate the scope and form of 
the SDGs and provide the required mechanisms for full participation of 
stakeholders from civil society, the scientific community and agencies 
from the UN system. Although the composition of the group was 
political, government representatives were urged to engage experts, 
take into account lessons from the MDGs, and ensure that the new 
set of goals included all three dimensions of sustainable development, 
mainstreaming the environment at the core of the goals both collectively 
and individually. 
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TABLE 4.3 Membership of the SDGs Open Working Group
Africa Group Asia Pacific Group Latin America and 
the Caribbean Group 
GRULAC





5. United Republic of 
Tanzania
6. Congo
7. Zambia / Zimbabwe
 8. Nauru/Palau/Papua 
New Guinea








13. Bangladesh/Republic of 
Korea/Saudi Arabia
















Kingdom of Great 














Following its mandate, the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals held thirteen discussion sessions between March 
2013 and July 2014. Using inputs from member states, the UN system 
and major groups, governments discussed different policy issues from 
a technical perspective. A technical support team prepared issue briefs 
on topics ranging from poverty eradication to sustainable agriculture 
and population dynamics. As requested, the group presented a report 
to the 68th session of the UN General Assembly in 2014. The proposal 
comprised seventeen goals and 169 targets seeking to establish an 
integrated sustainable development agenda across economic, social 
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and environmental dimensions at all governance levels (see Table 4.2). 
Markedly, the proposal includes a stronger environmental perspective. 
While the MDGs had one general and rather elusive goal, ‘attain 
environmental sustainability’, the SDGs feature seven environmental 
goals articulated in concrete terms and with concrete impacts on 
economic, social and environmental factors across countries. 
Debates, however, persist on the structure, content and 
implementation hurdles for the SDGs at both the global and national 
levels. Particularly, concerns have emerged about the large number of 
goals and targets and about the way in which countries should approach 
the process of articulating concrete goals at the national level and of 
ensuring implementation (Schwabe 2014). While some countries 
propose a universal approach in which all targets apply to all countries, 
others advocate a ‘dashboard’ approach in which each country selects 
which goals and targets to implement along with their baselines and 
deadlines. Furthermore, scholars, NGOs and policy-makers have raised 
concerns about the way in which the goals will be approached by the 
UN system (Bernstein et al. 2014; Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals 2014; Third World Network 2014). The institutional 
role of the United Nations in the implementation and monitoring process 
will be central to the success of a new development agenda. In relation 
to that, the Secretary-General’s report about the 2015–30 agenda, ‘The 
road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and 
protecting the planet’, proposes a new agenda around the concept of 
sustainable development, focusing on rights and the planet. Six elements 
– dignity, people, prosperity, planet, justice and partnership – are defined 
to reinforce the sustainable development agenda and to guarantee that 
the vision defined by the UN and its member states reaches the country 
level and public opinion (UN Secretary-General 2014). Finding a way 
to connect the SDGs with the broader UN development agenda will 
guarantee that the SDGs fulfil their purpose ‘to envision a more holistic 
and integrated agenda for advancing human well-being that is equitable 
across individuals, populations and generations; and that achieves 
universal human development while respecting the Earth’s ecosystems 
and critical life support systems’ (UN 2013a).
Power and perils of global development goals
The power of the Millennium Development Goals lies in their 
simplicity and brevity (Open Working Group on Sustainable 
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Development Goals 2013a). Some of the main challenges include 
a narrow focus, the possibility of distorted risk and investment 
preferences, and the potential to generate misleading measurements. 
Ultimately, at the country level, performance against a set of goals is 
a function of effort and ability (Ordóñez et al. 2009) but it is also 
shaped by structural constraints and the political economy of 
development. Effort is determined by motivation, and ability by 
resources. They are therefore variables that countries can manipulate. 
Structural constraints and political economy are much more 
difficult to influence and need to be taken into account when setting 
expectations about implementation and delivery. The MDGs have 
provided a structure to focus advocacy and spur motivation as well as 
to target investment and thereby improve ability (Bourguignon et al. 
2008; Haines and Cassels 2004; Manning 2009; Michel 2005). They 
have not addressed structural constraints, however, and have not 
had significant influence on the political economy dynamics in 
countries. 
The ultimate purpose of the MDGs was to engender substantial 
improvements in the quality of life of the most vulnerable populations 
(Binagwaho and Sachs 2005). To this end, they set out to motivate 
action and improve the ability of countries to deliver on core 
development indicators. Several of the goals stand out because 
they have directed attention, effort and action towards relevant 
activities needed to attain an improved level of development. 
The simplicity of the MDGs offered a clear and concise message 
that was easy to communicate. Indeed, the MDGs emerged as the 
main point of reference for the international development agenda 
and ‘galvanized action and political will towards a core set of 
development priorities’ (Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals 2013a), helping raise awareness about the 
moral unacceptability of poverty and about the need for a strong 
global partnership to achieve development. The use of concrete 
targets and indicators has proved to be an effective instrument for 
focusing the efforts of numerous actors, monitoring the evolution of 
the different strategies, and prompting global political mobilization 
around concrete targets for development (Manning 2009; Melamed 
and Scott 2011; Waage et al. 2010). Political commitment and action 
have been forthcoming, and improvements in some indicators are 
visible (see Box 4.1).
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Box 4.1 Progress in the implementation of the MDGs
• Extreme poverty has been reduced across all regions, including 
sub-Saharan Africa. In total, the percentage of people living 
with less than $1.25 a day has gone from 47 per cent in 1990 
to 24 per cent in 2008, meaning that 0.8 billion people no 
longer live in these conditions. 
• The proportion of people with access to improved sources of 
water increased from 76 per cent in 1990 to 89 per cent in 
2010, achieving the target of halving the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water. 
• Parity in primary education between girls and boys has been 
achieved. Since 2000, most of the world’s children have been 
enrolled in school. Girls’ enrolment grew from 91 per cent in 
1997 to 97 per cent in 2010. 
• The number of deaths of children under five years old decreased 
from more than 12 million in 1990 to 7.6 million in 2010.
• The global incidence of malaria has decreased by 17 per cent 
since 2000.
Source: UN (2012a)
In addition, the use of targets and indicators motivating policy action 
helps to create a culture of monitoring and evaluation, which, despite 
the need for further improvement, has brought to the international 
community more and better data about poverty, education, health, 
gender equality, etc., particularly in developing regions in Latin America 
and Asia. Indicators of education enrolment, disease incidence, access to 
safe water, and gender empowerment, among others, are now carefully 
measured as part of states’ commitments to the MDGs. At the same 
time, various agencies within the United Nations, together with national 
governments and statisticians, and other organizations in charge of 
the development of data, formed the Inter-Agency and Expert Group 
(IAEG) on MDG Indicators to improve the methodologies and technical 
issues related to data production and to promote better documentation 
and standards in the compilation of data at the national level.
Nevertheless, debates on the achievements in specific issue areas 
persist, and a more critical assessment of the actual implications 
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the MDGs have had for development is necessary. While the UN 
recognizes important progress in the poverty rate, educational 
coverage, maternal health, disease prevention and access to safe water 
(UN Secretary-General 2013), independent analyses conducted by 
external organizations show a worrying lack of success in addressing 
the deeper issues of inequalities, environmental change, hunger and 
unemployment (CROP 2013) (see Box 4.2). Furthermore, inadequate 
capacity and structural constraints on enacting the necessary measures 
at the national level have hindered countries’ trajectories towards goals 
such as eradicating poverty, reducing child mortality and combating 
infectious diseases, and many of the MDGs remain unfulfilled. Indeed, 
the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit emphasized that 
‘without substantial international support, several of the Goals are likely 
to be missed by many developing countries by 2015’ (UN 2010). 
Box 4.2 Challenges in the implementation of the MDGs
• Reduction in unemployment is not sustained. Fifty-eight per 
cent of the employment in developing regions is classified as 
vulnerable, while women and youth are still holding insecure 
and poorly remunerated positions. 
• Important changes have been achieved in terms of maternal 
health, but progress is still slow. Problems with adolescent 
pregnancies and limited access to contraceptive methods still 
persist.
• The improvement of access to safe sources of water in rural 
areas is still poor. Nearly half of the population in developing 
regions also suffers from limited access to improved sanitation 
facilities. 
• 850 million people still live in hunger despite progress in 
poverty reduction and child under-nutrition. 
• The absolute number of people living in slums increased from 
650 million in 1990 to an estimated 863 million in 2012.
• Gender inequality persists at the education, employment and 
government participation levels. Violence against women 
continues, affecting the achievement of these goals. 
Source: UN (2012a)
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Traditional forms of development had been the primary focus for the 
MDGs, resulting in lack of recognition for the interconnections among 
the three dimensions of sustainable development, and in a superficial 
treatment of the environmental and social dimensions. Conceptualized 
as one of eight goals (MDG7), environmental sustainability was 
construed in terms that are too broad as a goal and too limiting as 
targets. The fact that only three environmental issues – biodiversity, 
water and urbanization – were addressed in the targets of this goal, 
and the absence of concrete initiatives around the incorporation of 
sustainable development in different policy areas, are examples of the 
weaknesses of MDG7 formulation. In the social sphere, issues such as 
security, human rights and governance were neglected. In addition, 
the MDGs do not consider the differing initial conditions of countries 
in terms of international development and do not recognize special 
situations within countries where the goals are adopted.
Nevertheless, the MDGs have become the overarching development 
strategy steering investment – through ODA or other funds – into sectors 
identified as important, by shaping risk and investment preferences. 
However, targets for several dimensions are imprecise, making it 
complex to measure and implement them. Precious resources can 
therefore easily be steered into developing measurements tactics rather 
than invested in development strategies. Even though the MDGs 
improved the culture of data collection and measurement, the emphasis 
in monitoring proved to be contentious. Despite the improvement 
in some of the targets and indicators, it is also argued that so much 
emphasis on monitoring has neglected action to address the structural 
reasons for the current problems. At the same time, focus on results or 
outcomes failed to account for the progress achieved by some countries 
that have not reached the targets but have moved forward considerably. 
Little to no attention has been accorded to the quality or sustainability 
of the results achieved. The lack of accountability mechanisms presents 
a significant shortcoming. Finally, and perhaps most contentiously, 
since they are applicable only to developing countries, the MDGs 
did not recognize the monetary and moral responsibility of developed 
countries and offered a weak approach to addressing the issues of social 
justice, equality, vulnerability and exclusion.
In this context, as governments debate the proposal for Sustainable 
Development Goals as a new set of global goals, and will then set out 
to implement them, the lessons from the MDGs will be important. 
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Furthermore, the key question is how to integrate the goals into the 
overall sustainable development agenda in a process that guarantees 
not only the implementation of the mandates of the international 
community, but the broader goals of human well-being and sustainable 
development. 
Sustainable Development Goals: the synergy agenda
In essence, the SDGs process debated the creation of a coherent 
vision that recognizes the interlinkages between the three dimensions 
of sustainable development. Governments participating in the Open 
Working Group, scholars and others engaged in the process suggested 
multiple topics around which the goals should be constructed (see Boxes 
4.3 and 4.4). The final proposal, presented to the 68th session of the 
UN General Assembly, incorporated some of these elements (see Table 
4.2). The concurrence with the post-2015 process raises the challenge 
of the integration of the SDGs into the global development discourse. 
Ultimately, the overall goal is the same: the attainment of long-term 
sustainable development (UN Secretary-General 2014). As the High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
expressed in its Monrovia Communiqué from 1 February 2013, the 
global development agenda should aim ‘to end extreme poverty in all 
its forms in the context of sustainable development and to have in place 
the building blocks of sustained prosperity for all’ (HLP-P2015 2013: 
5). In this context, the SDGs explicitly recognize that such development 
cannot be achieved without safeguarding the ability of the planet to 
maintain the conditions critical to human well-being (UN Secretary-
General 2014). Effective integration of the two processes would likely 
result in a rigorous agenda emphasizing the connection between 
poverty eradication and environmental sustainability, efficient use of 
resources, and meaningful contribution from multiple stakeholders. 
Fragmentation into multiple policy processes, on the other hand, can 
cause fatigue and reduced commitment to implementation from states 
and other actors (Committee for Development Policy 2012). 
There are several scenarios for synergy between the SDGs and 
the global development agenda. One option is the creation of a 
comprehensive set of goals that recognizes integration as a cross-
cutting principle, and comprises traditional human development 
goals alongside sustainable development goals. Another possibility is 
for each goal to incorporate multiple targets associated with each of 
Box 4.3 Topics included in the Open Working Group agenda
• Cities • Health
• Conflict prevention, peace,  • Human rights
 rule of law and governance • Oceans, seas, forests and
• Consumption and production  biodiversity
• Economic growth and  • Population dynamics
macroeconomic stability • Social protection
• Education and culture • Transportation
• Employment • Youth
• Energy
• Gender equality
Source: Open Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Goals (2013b)
Box 4.4 The proposal of the High-Level Panel of Eminent 
Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
• Goal 1: End poverty
• Goal 2: Empower girls and women and achieve gender 
 equality
• Goal 3: Provide quality education and lifelong learning
• Goal 4: Ensure healthy lives
• Goal 5: Ensure food security and good nutrition
• Goal 6: Achieve universal access to water and sanitation
• Goal 7: Secure sustainable energy
• Goal 8: Create jobs, sustainable livelihoods and equitable 
 growth
• Goal 9: Manage natural resource assets sustainably
• Goal 10: Ensure good governance and effective institutions
• Goal 11: Ensure stable and peaceful societies




the dimensions of sustainable development – economic, social and 
environmental. Alternatively, each goal could be associated with one of 
the dimensions of sustainable development independently (Le Goulven 
2013). Each one of these options would have different consequences 
for the design and implementation of the goals. 
The discussions of the Open Working Group focused on the 
possibility of creating a comprehensive set of goals that recognize 
integration as a cross-cutting principle, and comprise traditional human 
development goals alongside sustainable development goals. The 
current SDGs proposal thus offers a list of seventeen topics as potential 
global goals and significantly improved articulation of the connections 
between economic, social and environmental issues beyond the specific 
variables of poverty eradication, education, health and others included 
in the MDGs. The scope of the SDGs currently under negotiation 
includes governance mechanisms, values and lifestyles, and equality. 
The targets also draw attention to the process of data production 
and collection, emphasizing the role of science in the SDGs process. 
Ultimately, the challenge will be to design targets and indicators that 
can be measured and monitored universally while being relevant to and 
informed by different national realities.
Indeed, the SDGs, as proposed by the Open Working Group, truly 
exemplify the integration between the three dimensions of sustainable 
development while adding specific targets to create the necessary 
frameworks, policies and partnerships to ensure implementation. The 
fundamental connections among environment, economic well-being 
and social development are reflected in the range of targets associated 
with each goal. Table 4.4 illustrates this dynamic by showing the 
number of targets across the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions for each of the seventeen goals. Goal 17, referring to the 
means of implementation for global partnership, is a new one and has the 
largest number of targets, nineteen, incorporating finance, technology, 
capacity-building, trade, institutional coherence, partnerships and 
data, monitoring and accountability. 
Definition of adequate targets and indicators, measurement 
of progress, and support for implementation are elements critical 
to success (UNEP 2012). Concrete measurement strategies and 
mechanisms provide governments and international organizations 
with the necessary data and science-based information to evaluate 
advancement and take corrective measures as required. An adequate 
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baseline for measurement, adequate methodology for gathering data, 
and availability of information are other variables to consider in the 
design of the new set of global goals (Waage et al. 2010). Developing 
countries have advocated strongly for a transparent and open assessment 
process, including the creation of a stakeholders’ review process or a 
sounding/monitoring system that guarantees effective implementation. 
Australia and Switzerland emphasized the use of official statistics and 
the need to design a process of data collection that guarantees the 
TABLE 4.4 Integrating the dimensions of Sustainable Development through targets
SDGs Targets
SDGs Goal Economic Social Environmental Finance & 
Governance
Total
Goal 1: Poverty 2 2 1 2 7
Goal 2: Hunger 2 2 1 3 8
Goal 3: Healthy lives 8 1 4 13
Goal 4: Education 1 5 1 3 10
Goal 5: Gender equality 6 3 9
Goal 6: Water and 
sanitation
2 4 2 8
Goal 7: Energy 1 2 2 5
Goal 8: Economic growth 
and employment
4 5 1 2 12
Goal 9: Infrastructure 3 1 1 3 8
Goal 10: Inequality 2 5 3 10
Goal 11: Cities 1 3 3 2 10
Goal 12: Consumption 
and production
2 1 5 3 11
Goal 13: Climate change 1 2 2 5
Goal 14: Oceans 2 1 5 2 10
Goal 15: Terrestrial 
ecosystems/biodiversity
1 1 7 3 12
Goal 16: Peaceful 
societies
3 9 12





necessary input to measure the baseline and monitor implementation 
(Iguchi et al. 2012). These issues will be critical to the success of the 
SDGs as a new political agenda. 
Ultimately, the Sustainable Development Goals need to be simple 
yet comprehensive and, importantly, universal (HLP-P2015 2013; 
UN 2013a). The SDGs must communicate clearly to countries 
and stakeholders the meaning of sustainable development and the 
mechanisms to implement it. Obligations under the SDGs need to extend 
to all countries, regardless of their level of development, as all states 
are accountable for the implementation of the outcome of the Rio+20 
mandate. That is why universality in particular is a key characteristic of 
the proposed set of goals. Contextualized specific national and regional 
targets can be used to measure progress at the different levels, to 
complement the general approach of global goals (Nayyar 2012). The 
definition of the new framework also requires transparency, participation 
and engagement from all groups, including vulnerable populations. As 
indicated in Agenda 21 – and in Rio Principle 10 – twenty years earlier, 
all concerned citizens are entitled to, and should participate in bringing 
about, sustainable development (UNCED 1992). The proposal by the 
Open Working Group provides a solid foundation for the articulation 
of a new global vision and governments are now poised to take it to the 
level of implementation across scales and geographies. 
Conclusion
Global goals became an important development tool for the 
international community after the end of the Cold War. With 
increasing awareness of planetary interconnectedness and political 
interdependence, governments sought to create a common vision 
and strategy that would ensure economic welfare, environmental 
integrity and social justice. The historical evolution from international 
development goals to Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable 
Development Goals shows ‘the power of global goals and a shared 
purpose’ (UN 2012a) to bring together states and stakeholders on 
the same path of action (Hulme 2009; Michel 2005). Sustainable 
Development Goals are thus part of a long timeline of international 
cooperation mechanisms and constitute a key opportunity to revive 
and re-envision the original global strategy for sustainable development 
when the idea of an international development agenda based on targets 
and indicators was first proposed. 
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The original vision for the international development goals of the 
1990s might indeed be the right launching point for the integration 
across the three dimensions of sustainable development that is 
necessary. The process that started with the IDGs and moved into the 
MDGs and subsequently into the current debate is grounded in a set 
of common values that are still relevant – applicability, universality, 
transparency, comprehensiveness and inclusiveness (UN 2013a). 
The concerns and objectives of the development agenda during the 
1990s, which led to the International Development Goals, could still 
inform a contemporary approach that merges a stronger environmental 
dimension with traditional development priorities. 
Across the mechanisms derived from the process of goal-setting, 
different analysts have also debated the expansion of the human 
development discourse and its relation to sustainability and human 
security (Gasper 2011; Koehler et al. 2012). In this context, the 
Sustainable Development Goals represent a chance to design an 
international instrument that recognizes the multidimensional nature 
of the sustainable development challenge and the interconnections 
between different variables. While the MDGs have been successful 
in focusing attention on and motivating action towards a set of 
common global aspirations, there is a general consensus on the need 
to expand into a new framework ‘centered on human well-being, 
with measurable metrics, keeping in mind the need for the coherent 
and balanced integration of environmental, economic and social 
dimensions’ (UNEP 2012: 459). These new global goals would apply 
across the board and provide a common vision. Through differentiated 
targets and indicators, however, the SDGs could be responsive to 
the characteristics, capacities and priorities of different countries. As 
suggested by Colombia, a multilevel framework would be necessary, 
including internationally defined indicators as well as country- or 
region-specific indicators and additional measurements that guide 
national action to address local problems. 
Building on the political momentum of Rio+20 to design and 
implement the SDGs and the mandate to assess the MDGs experience 
to articulate a post-2015 development agenda, governments have an 
opportunity to move forward to a more transformative global agenda 
that restores the concept of sustainable development as the core of 
human well-being. Maintaining the instrumental value and simplicity 
of the MDGs while addressing sustainable development and the reality 
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of individual countries will be critical. Leaders, governments, business, 
academia and civil society have been challenged to identify different 
elements that are relevant in the construction of a new set of goals, 
and the UN General Assembly has the challenge of a more systematic 
approach to address the complexity of the sustainable development 
agenda. If they succeed, the mandate of Rio+20 and the broader goal 
of sustainable development will be fulfilled.
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O F  E X T R E M E  P O V E R T Y :  D E B A T I N G  T H E 
S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  G O A L S  I N 
B R A Z I L
Rômulo Paes-Sousa and Paulo de Martino Jannuzzi
Brazil’s socio-economic dynamics have changed substantially since the 
start of the century, with numerous studies highlighting their ability 
to combine economic growth with social inclusion. Brazilian social 
protection policy has contributed to this in two ways: by increasing 
revenue levels and stimulating human capital development among the 
poorer population.
Since the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) strategy was launched in 2003, 
the focus of Brazil’s social protection policy has shifted significantly 
from an initial emphasis on food and nutritional security to increasing 
revenue levels and access to other social protection programmes. In 
2010, at the close of President Lula’s second term, the Bolsa Família, 
a conditional cash transfer programme, covered 12.8 million families, 
i.e. more than 51 million people.
In 2011, President-Elect Rousseff launched Brasil Sem Miséria 
(Brazil without Extreme Poverty, BWEP), a strategy to eradicate 
extreme poverty by 2014. The new strategy deploys twenty ministries 
involved in 120 undertakings, targeting 16 million extremely poor 
Brazilians. BWEP aims at the promotion of rights in the core concept 
of its political narrative, thus promoting the following political goals: 
to raise per capita household income of the target population; increase 
their access to public goods and services; and increase their job 
opportunities. 
BWEP is founded first and foremost upon the Bolsa Família 
programme. The plan is based on the conception of poverty as a 
multidimensional phenomenon.1 BWEP aims therefore to combat the 
multidimensions of poverty by developing those human capabilities 
necessary for breaking the poverty cycle definitively. 
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BWEP is thus based both on the idea of poverty as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, and on the related concept of social development: it 
includes strategies to promote better access to the job market and to 
primary education. It is also grounded on the idea of social justice with 
a focus on the most dispossessed.
Although theoretically the Brazilian government endorsed a 
multidimensional conception of poverty, it has in actuality chosen a 
one-dimensional criterion to identify the extreme poverty line (those 
living on less than US$1.25 a day), using preliminary data from the 
2010 demographic census to estimate the social demands. This criterion 
nevertheless has the advantage of being consistent with both the Bolsa 
Família programme and the UNDP’s Millennium Development Goal 
indicators. Besides, at the time of BWEP formulation, as was illustrated 
by 2010 census publications, many social indicators were still highly 
correlated to income levels or monetary poverty rates. 
The use of the international extreme poverty line, computing 
indicators by 2010 census data, benefited the plan, as follows:
• it made international comparisons possible;
• MDS (the Ministry of Social Development) has accumulated 
knowledge that could be drawn upon when using the poverty line 
for the Bolsa Família programme; and
• it allowed for producing estimates at the municipal level.
However, as a result of Brazilian economic growth, the one-
dimensional conception of extreme poverty has become less helpful: 
while monetary extreme poverty has decreased, it is important to 
understand the dynamics of the other dimensions of extreme poverty. 
This has challenged Brazil to revise its one-dimensional concept 
of poverty; to produce credible evidence from its ambitious multi-
sectorial policy approach; and to describe the indicators of success for 
its new public policy interventions. In this chapter, we will describe 
the available alternatives for assessing the decline of monetary poverty 
in Brazil and discuss how the objectives of sustainable development 
can help the Brazilian government reshape its policy indicators for 
estimating the effects of its inclusive growth strategy. That process can 
also lead to the emergence of a more integrative and effective public 
intervention for poverty eradication.
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The reduction of monetary poverty and extreme poverty in Brazil 
(1981–2009): what comes next?
Different conceptual and analytical approaches have been used 
in international literature in the last ten to twenty years to study and 
measure the phenomenon of hunger, poverty and extreme poverty. A 
brief account of such approaches can make important contributions 
to the studies on new indicators to be adopted in the post-2015 
Development Goals Agenda after 2015. In spite of all achievements 
related to monetary poverty, much more remains to be done.
There are four main conceptual/analytical approaches to poverty: 
poverty as a lack of income for the consumption of a basket of basic 
goods and services (i.e. monetary poverty); poverty as a lack of basic 
needs – both monetary and non-monetary (multidimensional poverty); 
poverty as a relative, rather than absolute, deprivation of income or 
other socio-economic dimensions (relative poverty); and poverty as 
a self-perception of each individual (subjective poverty) (Feres and 
Vilatoro 2011).
Poverty as income insufficiency seems to be the most widely used 
approach (Alkire and Foster 2011). Under this approach, a family is 
considered poor if its available income or its total expenditure is below 
a set monetary value (i.e. poverty line), which is calculated according 
to the costs of all products and basic services necessary for the survival 
of all members within a family. The dominance of this approach is 
certainly due to the World Bank´s mission advocacy and its studies that 
led to the definition of the international US$1.25 a day per person.
The multidimensional approach to poverty, or poverty MPI, 
represents a complementary concept for monetary poverty, inasmuch 
as it also identifies the minimal list of goods and services (public and 
private) needed for survival, including access to safe drinking water, 
housing, sanitation, food in adequate quantity and diversity, and school 
attendance. International organizations adopt the multidimensional 
approach to poverty because it allows the identification of specific 
needs and targeted groups. This allows the incorporation of certain 
dimensions that are intrinsically associated with the measurement of 
poverty, such as low income. 
The UNECLAC – United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean – has adopted the multidimensional 
approach to poverty for thirty years, and researchers and international 
centres, such as the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 
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(Kageyama and Hoffmann 2006), have constructed measurements 
that follow this approach. 
In the Brazilian case, as will be evident later on this chapter, with 
the virtual elimination of extreme monetary poverty, and especially 
with the design of strategies to mitigate symptoms and determinants 
of poverty, there will certainly be a need to adopt a multidimensional 
indicator of poverty. Such a poverty index should reflect, besides the 
availability of income levels, the progressive access to social services 
and opportunities provided by BWEP actions and programmes. 
The concept of relative poverty is linked to the inequality of 
individuals and families in relation to access to goods and services 
or availability of income. This is different from the idea of monetary 
poverty or the poverty line, where a certain number of individuals do 
not have a certain level of income to buy a basket of products; and 
it is also different from the idea of multidimensional poverty, where 
a certain number of individuals do not have access to basic goods 
and services. Relative poverty, on the contrary, assesses how society 
distributes public and private resources, including income, goods 
and services, and how low-income citizens get access to resources. 
In general, the poor are those individuals who come from the lowest 
deciles in terms of income per capita or those with more precarious 
access to goods or services considering a certain relative threshold 
(based on positional measures such as median, quartiles, etc.). This 
approach is more suitable for developed countries, where minimum 
subsistence is guaranteed for a majority share of the population, and 
where, therefore, the emphasis of social policy is directed at reducing 
social inequalities between population groups (Atkinsons 2002). 
Besides these analytical approaches based on more objective 
indicators, there is also the subjective approach to poverty, based 
on self-perception of poverty. In the studies adopting the subjective 
approach to poverty in underdeveloped countries, poverty is measured 
according to the individual responses to questions on the ability to cover 
home maintenance and daily life expenses. Eurostat (1998) sponsored 
these studies in the most developed European countries; the scope of 
information to characterize poverty was broader, and encompassed 
questions on the level of satisfaction not only of basic needs, but also of 
other sociocultural aspirations (Jannuzzi 2001).
None of these approaches is more valid or legitimate than the 
others in measuring poverty or evaluating the target actions or plans 
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for overcoming poverty in any situation. The four approaches are 
complementary – each one has its own meritorious aspects and also 
its shortcomings and limitations. Naturally, depending on the design 
of a specific policy or programme, one or other approach may be more 
adequate. Monetary poverty indicators are sensitive measures of cash 
transfer programmes; on the other hand, a multi-sectorial strategy to 
overcome poverty requires a multidimensional perspective to evaluate 
its effects.
It is worth noting that poverty measurement depends not only on the 
adopted conceptual/analytical perspective, but also on methodological 
difficulties such as collecting information about income and other 
dimensions of living conditions in sample surveys. It is well known that 
refusals to participate in and non-responses to questionnaires, under-
reporting of income sources and income volatility add significant 
difficulties to the estimation of poverty and extreme poverty.
In fact, in the Brazilian case, different conceptual/analytical 
approaches as well as different methodologies to deal with survey data 
lead to different estimations of poverty and extreme poverty for 2009/10 
(Figure 5.1).2 The calculation of 21 million people in poverty (the 
largest number) was obtained from the concept of monetary poverty 
according to the World Bank criterion of US$2 dollars a day per capita, 
adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP); the lowest estimation is 
obtained by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 
(OPHI) methodology of multidimensional poverty: 5.2 million poor 
people. By using 2010 census data it is possible to obtain five different 
estimations – between 13 and 18 million – according to procedures 
of data processing with zero household income, and allocation and 
use of micro data of the surveys’ Universe or Sample (within the 
limit of R$70.00 monthly per capita). According to the definition of 
undernourishment adopted by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), there are 13 million malnourished Brazilians; according to 
the monetary poverty’s criterion of consumption, the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey identified 11.3 million people, which is similar to 
the number that were classified as being in Severe Food Insecurity and 
people considered in extreme poverty by living on under US$1.25 PPP 
per day.
As presented, the methodologies used for poverty measurement are 
complex. Yet which of these measures are more adequate to analyse 
the evolution of poverty over the course of the past decades, for the 
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purposes of monitoring the Millennium Development Goals and 
fighting against hunger? Which of these measurements better reflect 
the strategies adopted by the Brazilian government in its fight against 
hunger and poverty in the last two decades?
From a pragmatic perspective, considering the similar estimates of 
‘extreme poverty’ by the FAO and the National Household Sample 
Survey of 2009, and also the extension of the available historical 
series, the World Bank’s US$1.25 PPP income poverty indicator 
is the indicator we adopt for the analysis presented in this section.3 
Certainly, such an indicator has downsides: it does not adequately 
reflect the conception of poverty currently adopted by Brazilian 
public policy for the fight against hunger; it does not include, for 
instance, information about children’s access to the National School 
Feeding Programme, which has significant effects on poverty. It also 
does not include information on access to other specific programmes 
for distribution of food baskets or food supplements for pregnant 
women and newborns.
Typically, the indicator is an approximate measure that identifies 
families with insufficient resources to buy a monthly basket containing 
basic food that guarantees the minimum daily calorie intake to all its 
members.
In fact, analysis of the indicator between 1981 and 2009 is consistent 
with historical progress regarding access to basic food in Brazil during 
5.1 Estimates of poverty according to different concepts, methodologies and 
data calculation sources, Brazil, 2009/10 (sources: FAO, World Bank, OPHI, 
IBGE, Cepal)
Income poverty in Demographic Census – raw data
10,000,000 20,000,000
Raw data with null income treated
Survey data without filtering
Survey data with filtering
Survey data with imputation
Undernutrition according to FAO
Income Poverty – $2.00 ppp – World Bank
Income Poverty – $1.25 ppp – World Bank
Income poverty according to Family Budging Data
Income poverty according to ECLAC
Food Insecurity according to 2009 Household Survey
Income Poverty according to 2009 Household Survey
Multidimensional Poverty according to OPHI
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that same period (Figure 5.2). In a context of unemployment and no 
other governmental interventions for combating hunger (besides the 
National School Feeding Programme), the level of extreme poverty 
and starvation was fairly stable during the 1980s (around 15 per cent 
of the population). In 1986 there was a modest yet relevant decrease, 
which is explained by the better economic situation brought about 
by Plano Cruzado, which combined a minimum wage increase with 
stable food prices. The increase in inflation in the early 1990s, in 
addition to economic and employment retraction, as well as the 
interruption of food assistance programmes created ten to twenty 
years before, has certainly aggravated extreme poverty and hunger 
(extreme poverty has increased two percentage points, to 17 per cent 
of the population).
From 1993 onwards, with economic recovery, a successful monetary 
stabilization policy (i.e. Plano Real) and a stronger food supply (via 
increased food imports and higher agricultural productivity), the 
population that was subjected to unstable food supply gained better 
access to food. Between 1994 and 2002, the extreme poverty percentage 
remained around 11–12 per cent of the population.
Since then, under the influence of Lula’s social development 
5.2 Evolution of extreme monetary poverty ($1.25 dollar PPP), Brazil, 
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policies (i.e. Fome Zero and Bolsa Família, as mentioned above), the 
promotion of the internal market and its redistributive impacts, 
extreme poverty dropped to 6.1 per cent in 2009, a third of the figure in 
1991.
The decrease in extreme poverty and the expansion of the Bolsa 
Família programme are closely connected. Indeed, between 2003, when 
the Bolsa Família programme was created, and 2010, the programme 
expanded from 3.6 million to 12.5 million beneficiary households.4 
Furthermore, the figures for extreme poverty have decreased faster 
in the north-east and north of Brazil, which are also the areas with 
the greatest expansion of programme coverage. Bolsa Família has thus 
greatly impacted the fight against hunger.
In addition, the Fome Zero strategy increased access to water 
and food: for example, it has built cisterns in the semi-arid region, 
has distributed food to schools for free with the help of philan-
thropic organizations, and has strengthened families’ agriculture by 
expanding the network of food security equipment. This has thus 
contributed to reducing the risk of food insecurity and malnutri-
tion, and a 55 per cent reduction in infant mortality in the north-east 
region between 2000 and 2010 also reinforces this point (Martignoni 
2012).
5.3 Evolution of the extreme poverty monetary gap ($1.25 dollar PPP), Brazil, 
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The evolution of the indicator for the intensity of extreme poverty 
in the decade from 2000 is further evidence of the impact of the 
Bolsa Família programme in reducing extreme poverty. This indica-
tor can be understood as the relative distance of average income per 
capita of the extreme poor households from the US$1.25 PPP per 
capita line.5 As expected of a programme focusing on the poorest 
(Soares and Satyko 2009), and of income transfers for a larger 
number of families with children, the beneficial effects of the pro-
gramme have a strong impact on reducing the extreme poverty gap. 
While for twenty years, from 1981 to 2001, the indicator remained 
at the same level, with oscillations resulting from economic policies, 
between 2003 and 2009 the gap was reduced by 40 per cent, from 5.1 
to 3.6 per cent.
Another confirmation of the Bolsa Família programme’s impact 
on poverty reduction can be evaluated by the evolution of the income 
appropriation share of the poorest 10 per cent. During the 1980s 
there was a regressive movement in income distribution, penalizing 
the poorest 10 per cent. Since 2002, there has been a reversal of the 
historical trend, i.e. progressive increases; and by the end of 2009, 
the poorest 10 per cent received just under 0.8 per cent of national 
income.
5.4 Evolution of income appropriation of the poorest 10 per cent, Brazil, 1981–
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A 2011 paper, ‘Eradicate extreme poverty: a goal within the reach 
of Brazil’, from the Institute of Applied Economic Research, discusses 
additional effects of the Bolsa Família programme on poverty and 
inequality. It presents a historical series of indicators from 1995 to 
2009, based on the National Household Sample Survey. Since 2003, 
there has been a clear and steady downward trend in poverty, inequality 
and poverty’s intensity (i.e. relative distance from the line of R$70.00) 
(Osorio et al. 2011).
A similar discussion can be found in another paper from the same 
institute, in which the authors tested, through a simulation using 2009 
National Household Survey data, the possible effects of revoking Bolsa 
Família on beneficiary families. The revocation would raise the number 
in extreme poverty from 11.9 million to 17.8 million – that is, an addi-
tional nearly six million people in extreme poverty (Souza et al. 2011).
A more robust analysis of the importance and magnitude of the 
Bolsa Família programme – and other income transfer programmes in 
the world – is given by the World Bank. The authors analysed the 
evolution of poverty in Brazil and several other countries between 
2001 and 2009, using different poverty lines – US$4.00, US$2.50, 
and $1.25, adjusted by purchasing power parity; they also scaled the 
contribution of different factors and sources of income in their analysis. 
In the Brazilian case, and with reference to the extreme poverty line 
of US$1.25, the study points out that a significant poverty reduction 
was linked to a wage increase and social transference contributions. In 
terms of the other two poverty lines, labour income is again the main 
poverty reduction factor in the country, social transferences being a 
secondary yet still significant factor. In reality, the policy of recovering 
the purchasing power of the minimum wage and employment creation 
over the period are the reasons for the improvement in various life-
related aspects in Brazil (Azevedo et al. 2013).
The BWEP Plan is the last step towards the inclusion of the extreme 
poor, aiming at a minimum level of consumption of goods and services. 
Additionally, it offers a set of opportunities for sustainable development 
to the extremely poor. 
BWEP sets the goal of eradicating extreme income poverty. This is 
the adopted eligibility criterion, and also the indicator measuring the 
Plan’s success. Nevertheless, the BWEP public policy agenda is multi-
sectoral in nature. Despite the limitations of a one-dimensional model, 
the eradication of extreme income poverty is achievable.
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The goal of eradicating extreme poverty is feasible taking into 
account the commitment to eligibility and assessment parameters: the 
eradication of extreme monetary poverty leads to financially improved 
living conditions for the beneficiaries. BWEP’s multidimensional 
scope favours, however, a larger range of social protection and services 
promotion. So, once the associated target is achieved, BWEP will 
move towards the concept of multidimensional poverty, incorporating 
its criteria and indicators. In other words, the eradication of extreme 
financial poverty will help reduce de facto extreme poverty and also 
redefine poverty and the public policies addressing it.
Can sustainable development goals help future social protection 
policy in Brazil?
The game-changing proposal to adopt a set of global SDGs was 
formalized in the Latin America and Caribbean Preparatory Meeting 
for the Rio+20 Conference in Santiago (Chile) in September 2011, 
by the governments of Colombia and Guatemala (Colombia Rio+20 
2011). Since then, the debate and consensus-building around the 
SDGs has attracted a great deal of attention from international 
agencies, governments, NGOs and academics, as well as other actors. 
The SDGs, which consider poverty eradication, gender equality, food 
security, adaptation to and mitigation of climate change, and finance 
for development, inter alia, are now set to define the global policy 
development agenda for the next fifteen years.
These essential items of development policy are also present 
in the BWEP Plan. However, closer observation of these policy 
recommendations can help Brazil to respond to and surmount the 
challenges posed by the Plan (Paes-Sousa 2013).
As mentioned earlier, the criterion for selecting the potential 
beneficiaries of the Plan is one-dimensional: nominal income. This 
under-represents the contribution, or lack of it, of non-monetary 
income6 and other dimensions of poverty. In reality, Brazil has already 
eradicated extreme poverty as defined by monetary means alone. A 
comprehensive concept of poverty – including the broad range of goals 
identified by the BWEP – is required to push this new policy thrust 
towards a more advanced and effective sustainable human development 
model anchored in social protection. Brazil’s current and future 
challenges lie beyond the monetary dimension of poverty. They include 
long-standing demands for good-quality public services, such as better 
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health, improved education services and a more comprehensive and 
safer public transportation system. 
Having achieved success in taking 22 million people out of monetary-
based extreme poverty (living on less than US$1.25 per day), Brazilian 
public policies now must start to pay more attention to the poor and 
the new but lower middle class, rather than focusing solely on the 
extreme poor.7 However, the risk of falling back into extreme poverty 
still hangs over those who have recently ascended to a higher social 
stratum. Concepts such as resilience and sustainability are now critical 
for enriching the Brazilian anti-poverty policy framework. 
In one of the most urbanized countries among the emerging powers, 
84.3 per cent of Brazil’s population is distributed across 5,700 cities; 
and only 15.7 per cent live in rural areas. However, according to the 
2010 Population Census, there is a high concentration of extreme 
poverty in rural areas: 46 per cent of those living in extreme poverty 
live in rural areas. Focusing on the poorest sectors of the population 
dispersed in both small cities and rural areas is a challenge: the drivers 
can differ significantly. As a result the BWEP aims to promote their 
inclusion, at the state level; moving beyond the traditional approach 
adopted in the past, which saw municipal governments as the main 
policy brokers. 
Brazil has championed a broader view of goals and indicators 
for the post-2015 agenda. On the eve of achieving its main task, i.e. 
the eradication of extreme monetary-based poverty, it now faces the 
challenge of adopting a similar approach for its internal agenda, an 
agenda defined by broader goals and indicators consistent with a 
maturing of socio-economic policies. 
As an emerging power and a reference country for public policy, Brazil 
has effectively used its internal experience to shape its international 
message in relation to SDGs. Revising its internal policies, similarly, 
in the light of international discourse, can help Brazil to anticipate 
possible pathways towards an updated development objective for the 
eradication of all forms of poverty compatible with the next phase of 
the public policy agenda. 
Notes
1 Issues such as social justice, equity, 
capabilities, empowerment, democracy 
and moral principles were present in 
the formative debate of the BWEP. The 
concepts of Amartya Sen were very 
influential. For a better understanding 
of the philosophical perspective of Sen 
on social needs and public policies, see 
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Development as Freedom (1999), published 
by Oxford University Press.
2 All data in this section were 
obtained from FAO (2012).
3 This value conforms with what from 
2011 onwards in Brazil has been called 
the extreme poverty line, and it is also 
the parameter used in the Bolsa Família 
programme to allocate the basic benefit. 
It is near the estimated value for the 
international extreme poverty line given 
by the World Bank, which is US$1.25 PPP, 
and lies between other regional extreme 
poverty lines calculated by investigators 
such as Sonia Rocha. See also www.iets.
org.br/article.php3?id_article=915.
4 That expansion, in such a 
short period of time, would not have 
been possible without the city halls’ 
involvement in the programme’s 
administration, in hiring staff for the 
registration of potential beneficiaries, 
delivery of cards and monitoring of its 
conditional rules. In fact, the Census 
Bureau’s Annual Social Assistance 
System – SUAS Census – shows that the 
number of municipal officers involved 
in the operation of the Bolsa Família 
programme and social assistance 
programmes (Serviço de Proteção 
Integral à Família, social and educational 
activities, etc.) in SUAS public basic 
facilities more than doubled between 
2007 and 2011, when it reached nearly 
sixty thousand workers.
5 Thus, if a family has, for instance, 
a per capita income of $35.00, its income 
should be increased by another $35.00, 
or 100 per cent, to overcome extreme 
poverty.
6 Some examples of non-monetary 
income are house ownership and self-
production of food. 
7 The sector of the population with a 
per capita income of between US$1.25 and 
US$2.50.
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This chapter argues that the practice of international cooperation has 
clearly disregarded the internationally agreed meaning of sustainable 
development. Specifically the dominance of the MDG approach 
unduly focuses on individual-level social development, discounting 
the economic and genuinely environmental aspects of sustainable 
development, which are unattainable without macroeconomic 
development and structural change. It examines the manner in which 
mechanisms in international trade and finance and premature external 
‘openness’ hinder development in developing countries. These matters 
have been taken up under the topics of Means of Implementation 
and the Global Partnership for Development in the debates over the 
Sustainable Development Goals.
Systemic obstacles to development
In 2015, the international community was preoccupied with political 
discussions on the alternatives to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) after 2015 and the design of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), as mandated by the Rio+20 conference. It is timely to 
consider the question of whether development is a matter mostly of 
individual effort on the part of states or whether there are features of the 
international economic system that could serve as significant obstacles 
to the development ambitions of communities and countries. If there 
are obstacles in the international economic system, it is important that 
the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs wrestle with and 
exhibit significant progress in the elimination or reduction of these 
obstacles. 
The limited number of successfully developing countries since 
the 1950s has produced a debate over whether their success was 
mostly due to their effective avoidance of international obstacles to 
montes | 127
development. The following discussion does not have to take one 
position or the other. It confines itself to evaluating specific features 
of the international system on the basis of how they are conducive to 
enabling long-term investment towards economic diversification, a key 
requirement for sustainable development. 
Terminologies of previous development orthodoxies litter the 
development literature – ‘import substitution industrialization’, 
‘basic needs’, ‘structural adjustment’, ‘Washington Consensus’ and 
‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs). Each of these orthodoxies 
tended to be a reaction to perceived weaknesses or missing elements 
from the one immediately preceding it. For example, the ‘basic needs’ 
strategy responded to the view that import substitution strategies 
focused too much on modern, capital-intensive activities, and not 
enough on raising the average standard of living. The most recent 
orthodoxy, as exemplified by the MDGs, is that development is about 
poverty eradication. 
This chapter presents the view that poverty eradication is an overly 
narrow, possibly misleading, overarching objective of development. 
Poverty eradication is a desired outcome of development but its 
achievement is permanent only with the movement of a significant 
proportion of the population from traditional, subsistence jobs to 
productive, modern employment. The association of development 
with poverty eradication affords the donor community pride of place 
in economic policy-making in developing countries. But this place 
can be at the cost of absolving much of the responsibility of donor 
countries for supporting an enabling international environment for 
development in trade, finance and technology, even setting aside 
such issues as human migration. The poverty eradication approach 
favours ascribing development failures to errors in domestic policy-
making of the aid-receiving countries, drawing attention away from 
the treacherous features of the international system whose structure 
serves mainly the economic and political interests of powerful factions 
in donor countries. 
The group of donor countries overlaps practically on a one-to-one 
basis with the group of countries with dominant voting weights in power 
centres of global governance, such as the IMF. This group not only 
overlaps with the group of former colonial powers and the list of Annex 
I countries in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change with 
the largest accumulated discharges in CO2 over the last two centuries, 
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it overlaps substantially with the group of creditor countries and the 
headquarters sites of private sector creditors to developing countries. 
Aid recipient countries have to contend with instabilities in their 
exchange rates provoked by the monetary policies of donor countries. 
Episodes of developing country debt distress have seen the starkest 
instances of development reversals. The group of aid-receiving countries 
must navigate an unpredictable and arbitrary developing country debt 
process in the event of debt distress. In the MDGs, issues of global 
economic governance and burden-sharing are crammed into ‘MDG8’, 
the so-called global partnership for development, with a very selective 
and poorly defined set of targets.1 Even if more developing countries 
that are now aid recipients switch into becoming aid donors, such new 
donors will still have to contend with the instabilities and traps in the 
global system whose reform they have limited initiative over. 
Sustainable development requires not just higher levels of income, 
nutrition, education and health outcomes but in the first place involves 
higher levels of productivity and capabilities. Higher levels of produc-
tivity and capabilities are possible only with structural transformation 
of the economy. In turn, in most societies, such a structural transfor-
mation has been ‘associated with a shift of the population from rural 
to urban areas and a constant reallocation of labour within the urban 
economy to higher-productivity activities’ (UNCTAD 2011: 6). Struc-
tural transformation is possible only with substantial and sustained 
investment over decades in new activities and products, not just in 
anti-poverty programmes. In fact, as expounded in the UN (2011a), 
the need to respond urgently to climate change will require acceler-
ated introduction of new activities and products in developing coun-
tries because they have the largest mitigation potential and the greatest 
adaptation requirements. Fast-tracked climate action will require trans-
fers of financing and technology to developing countries (see ibid.: ch. 
VI). Climate change will also require achieving sustainable consump-
tion, particularly in developed countries, since their consumption is 
greatly served by exports produced in ‘dirty’ industries in developing 
countries. 
Where the international economic system is hostile to investment in 
new, productivity-enhancing economic activities is where its features 
create obstacles to development. For example, aid volatility has been 
shown to create as much as 8 per cent of lost macroeconomic per-
formance (Kharas 2008). Developed countries are host to the largest 
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financial centres, whose operations are intimately linked to tax haven 
jurisdictions, which are properly called ‘offshore financial centres’ 
(OFCs) (Economist 2013); the same Economist article, which reports 
that an estimated $20 trillion is ‘stashed away’ in OFCs, suggests that 
it is onshore financial centres, ‘from the City of London to Delaware’, 
which do not have an interest in shutting down tax havens. The Tax 
Justice Network (2014) estimates that such illicit flows from develop-
ing countries, which could instead have been additional government 
tax revenues or investment by the wealthy in their own countries, came 
to $991 billion, or almost $1 trillion, in 2012. 
Capital and technological investments are required to overcome 
the enormous productivity gap between developing and developed 
countries which characterizes the world economy. In 2008, the ratio of 
the average gross national income (GNI) per worker in the OECD as 
compared to those in the least developed countries (LDCs) was 22:1 
in favour of the OECD (UNCTAD 2010: 174). This imbalance has 
worsened by a factor of five in comparison to the earliest days of capitalist 
development. In the nineteenth century, taking the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom (UK) as the richest countries and Finland and 
Japan as the poorest, the productivity gap was only between 2:1 and 
4:1 (Chang 2003). 
Commodity dependence and instability in trade and finance
The international economic system is lacking crucial mechanisms 
for delivering long-term, stable resources required by developing 
countries to upgrade their capabilities. This is already partly reflected 
in the existence of MDG8, incomplete as it is, but has also been 
incorporated in many previous international agreements, for example 
in the Monterrey Consensus (UN 2003). For example, both the 
Monterrey Consensus (through paragraph 47, ‘Debtors and creditors 
must share the responsibility for preventing and resolving unsustainable 
debt situations’) and MDG8 (Target 8.B is ‘Deal comprehensively 
with the debt problems of developing countries’) recognize the need 
to overhaul the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Countries 
dependent on commodity exports have experienced sizeable increases 
in debt liabiliites during booms and have subsequently suffered debt 
servicing difficulties during the commodity busts. 
Dependence on commodity exports sustains the productivity gap 
between developed and developing countries. Abundant global liquidity 
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and growing trade imbalances fuelled a commodity boom in the 2000s 
which benefited many developing countries, including many LDCs. 
All previous global liquidity booms have ended with serious economic 
crises in developing countries (Akyüz 2012a, 2013). The more recent 
commodity price boom did not introduce an enduring improvement in 
macroeconomic balances, especially for low income countries (LICs). 
While in the 2000s LDCs experienced the strongest growth rates since 
the 1970s, more than a quarter of LDCs actually saw GDP per capita 
decline or grow slowly in the 2002–07 global boom (UNCTAD 2010). 
Even in the middle income region of Latin America, Izquierdo et al. 
(2007) present evidence of insignificant structural improvement in 
fiscal and current account balances. 
Previous commodity boom periods had similarly not been an occasion 
for structural change in LDCs. UNCTAD (2009: 145) suggests that 
between the 1970s and 1997, manufacturing as a proportion of GDP 
increased by less than two percentage points in LDCs as a group, a 
period which saw various episodes of commodity and global liquidity 
booms. When considering LDCs from Africa alone, and including 
Haiti, manufacturing fell from 11 to 8 per cent of GDP during the 
same period.
Developing countries extensively liberalized their trade regimes in 
the 1980s. In the aftermath, UNCTAD (2010: 174) found that some 
LDCs have more open trade regimes than other developing countries, 
and others are more open than even developed countries. These policies 
had been intended to facilitate economic diversification. Instead, more 
trade liberalization has been associated with a more concentrated 
structure of exports (see Figure 6.1). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the phenomenon of ‘reprima-
rización’, a restoration of reliance on primary exports, is unmistakable 
(see Figure 6.2). 
Based on an analysis of the clustering of major breaks in the growth 
process in the developing world, Ocampo and Parra (2006) contend 
that unstable macroeconomic performance in developing countries is 
mostly explained by external events in trade and financing emanating 
from the economic performance and policies in the developed countries. 
In the case of smaller economies, these are more susceptible to growth 
collapses (Ros 2005) and external shocks are a larger proportion of 
their achieved economic size. Changes in external conditions set in 
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6.2 Structure of exports, Latin America and Caribbean since 1980 (percentages 
of total value) (source: UNECLAC (2010 : 74, Figure II.12)) 
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(BOP) adjustments, widespread private bankruptcies, social conflict 
and extensive institutional and political changes and policy experi-
mentation, which amplify these breaks in the growth process. Ocampo 
and Parra (2006) suggest that the 1950s and early 1960s can be seen as 
a ‘golden age’ of development coinciding with a much lower incidence 
of international economic crises. 
International trade is a major source of instability. Figure 6.3 traces 
a pattern of large changes in world trade growth from the 1970s, which 
developing countries that have increasingly tied their fortunes to the 
global economy have to contend with. The figure also suggests that 
the swings are coincidental with, but much larger in amplitude than, 
changes in global growth rates in which developed countries still account 
for a large proportion over the period shown by the graph. These trade 
shocks have been amplified by induced financing, notably in Latin 
America after capital account liberalization (UN 2008: viii–x). 
In the case of LDCs, which have heavier dependence on commodity 
exports, commodity price volatility has significant impact on invest-
ment and growth (UNCTAD 2010: 191). But it is also important to 
highlight the impact of aid and financing volatility as a key driver of 
their external debt crises. Aid is as volatile as ‘private flows and the 
volatility increases with aid dependence’ (Akyüz 2008: 15–16; also 
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6.3 Growth rates of world trade and world GDP (source: UN (2010: 74, 
Figure IV.1))
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through the channel of macroeconomic volatility deadweight losses of 
15–20 per cent of the total value of aid, or about 1.9 per cent of GDP 
for the average aid recipient. Akyüz (2008: 16) deems aid for the most 
part to be more volatile than ‘either output or fiscal revenues’, citing 
IMF-commissioned studies by Robe and Pallage (2001) for volatility 
and procyclicality with respect to output (especially for African coun-
tries) and Bulíŕ and Hamann (2003), Bulíŕ and Lane (2004) and Hill 
(2005) with respect to fiscal revenues. 
Instability in private financial flows to developing countries is 
another significant source of external instability for developing 
countries. The scale of these flows is amplified by the ability of 
residents to move their assets abroad to avoid taxes or in the face of 
looming balance-of-payments difficulties. Figure 6.4 demonstrates a 
pattern of three distinct boom–bust periods measured through the 
pattern of net private capital flows to developing countries: the first 
ended with the Mexican debt crisis in 1982, the second with the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the third with the Lehman collapse 
in 2008. 
Since the1997 Asian financial crisis, major emerging economies 
have accumulated international reserves by purchasing developed 
country financial assets either from their export earnings (in the case of 
net exporters) or from external borrowing (in the case of net importers) 






























































































6.4 Net private capital flows to developing countries (percentage of GDP) 
(source: Updated from Akyüz (2012a: 68, Figure 2)) 
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These ‘investments’ by the developing country authorities reduce the 
ability of these countries to undertake counter-cyclical policies and 
build their domestic financial sectors. These ‘investments’ also impose 
an opportunity from forgone financing for domestic investment. This 
mechanism created the ironic pattern just before the 2007/08 crisis 
of developing country authorities being significant net investors in 
developed country economies (UN 2010). 
It is important to point out that macroeconomic volatility and 
periodic crises have a long-lasting impact on growth and employment 
in developing countries, in contrast to the case of developed countries. 
Figure 6.5 demonstrates this in the case of Turkey, but similar 
patterns are found for Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia (ibid.: ch. 
V). Growth volatility and investment volatility interact strongly and 
undermine efforts to spark sustainable private investment. These crises 
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6.5 Medium-term employment impact of crises in Turkey (source: UN (2010: 
31, Figure II.4)) 
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Investment volatility closely tracks variability in GDP growth rates 
(see Figure 6.6). In middle-income countries (MICs) where private 
investment has a larger macroeconomic impact, the causation could 
flow both ways, either originating from the instability of financing 
or the cyclicality of growth itself determining the timing of private 
investment. In the case of LICs and LDCs, the government impact 
on the macroeconomy is larger. Government spending can be highly 
volatile when governments are forced to respond in a procyclical manner 
to reduced export earnings or to meet fixed public deficit targets in 
structural adjustment programmes. Such abrupt changes in public 
spending in turn increase the perceived risk of private investment and 
cause private investment to fall.
The obstacles posed by the international economic architecture to 
development objectives could be summarized as follows: 
1 Economic development requires significant and long-term invest-
ment in new activities and the absorption of substantial segments 
of the population in these activities. Development requires a steady 
progression towards structural change. One important input to 
structural change is steady overall economic growth, which impels 
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6.6 Growth of GDP and investment volatility among developing countries, 
1971–2000 (source: UN (2010: 61, Figure III.5)). Investment volatility is measured 
by the coeffi  cient of variation (CV) of the annual growth rate of gross capital 
formation at 2000 prices in 1971–2006. The coeffi  cient of variation is defi ned as 
the standard deviation divided by the mean for the period. 
136 | s ix
2 Outcomes and policies in international trade and finance have 
undermined macroeconomic stability in developing countries. 
Periodic crises induced by the international economy have thwarted 
the needed investment. 
3 An enabling environment for long-term investment in developing 
countries will require two things: (1) the reform of international 
mechanisms, including possibly the introduction of missing ones, 
and (2) developing countries’ capacity to reduce and insulate 
themselves from harmful international influences. 
The Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development 
Goals (OWG 2014) for the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) includes some proposals for means of implementation and 
global partnership for development. For example, under Goal 10, 
‘Reduce inequality within and among countries’, Subgoal 10.5 calls 
for moves to ‘improve regulation and monitoring of global financial 
markets and institutions and strengthen implementation of such 
regulations’. Goal 17, ‘Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development’, includes 
items such as Subgoal 17.3, ‘enhance global macroeconomic stability 
including through policy coordination and policy coherence’. These 
kinds of text, as patchy and unspecific as they are, are the outcome of 
heavy and contentious negotiations between the G77 and China on 
one hand and developed countries (among others, the USA, Japan, 
Australia, Germany and new EU members such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic) on the other. A core group in the G77 and China had 
a fully fledged list of means of implemention and a global partnership 
for development for the negotiations, and some elements managed to 
become part of the OWG proposals (2014). 
Mitigating the impact of external deficits and instability
Instabilities in trade and financing coming from the international 
economy have a strong impact on investment and growth stability 
in developing countries. This section surveys proposals to mitigate 
these influences. For developing countries the sources of instability 
can be grouped into the following areas: (1) commodities, (2) trade, 
and (3) external finance, including ODA and private flows. These 
areas are the key sources of macroeconomic instability in developing 
countries. 
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OWG (2014) incorporates some relevant international outcomes from 
previous agreements, such as the Brussels Plan of Action for LDCs, the 
MDGs. For example, Subgoal 17.10, ‘promote a universal, rules-based, 
open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under 
the WTO including through the conclusion of negotiations within its 
Doha Development Agenda’, comes from the Millennium Declaration of 
2000 (Paragraph 13). Subgoal 17.11, ‘increase significantly the exports 
of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the LDC 
share of global exports by 2020’, comes from the Istanbul Programme 
of Action (UN 2011b: para. 65a). The core of Subgoal 17.12, ‘realize 
timely implementation of duty-free, quota-free market access on a lasting 
basis for all least developed countries consistent with WTO decisions, 
including through ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable 
to imports from LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to 
facilitating market access’, comes from paragraph 47 of WTO (2005), 
the WTO 2005 ministerial outcome. 
Commodities In the case of commodities, developing countries fall into 
different categories, according to differences in commodity needs and 
whether the country imports or exports them.
In the case of foodstuffs as internationally traded commodities, the 
main problems have been the following (Khor 2012; South Centre 
2007; FAO 2010): 
1 A pattern of decades-long insufficient investment in food production 
and in rural areas, which has in turn been linked to an overemphasis 
on external trade to cover domestic food requirements and low 
prospective returns on investment in the face of continuing 
agricultural subsidies in developed countries. 
2 A publicly subsidized shift to biofuel production since the early 
2000s, which has now significantly reduced the capacity for food 
production. 
3 Increasing dependence on events emanating from the financial 
markets for the determination of international prices of basic 
food. 
OWG (2014) reflects some of these concerns; how the agreed text 
will be fleshed out in the future is uncertain and also a matter of the 
determination of developing countries and support from international 
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civil society. Goal 2, ‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved 
nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture’, manages to have some 
notable Subgoals. For example, 2.4: ‘by 2030 ensure sustainable food 
production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that 
increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, 
that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme 
weather, drought, flooding and other disasters, and that progressively 
improve land and soil quality’, and 2.b, ‘correct and prevent trade 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets including 
by the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies 
and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the 
mandate of the Doha Development Round’.
For the petroleum, minerals and metals sector, the question of 
commodity booms and busts and the differentiation between short-
term and long-terms trends are critical (Erten and Ocampo 2012). 
Financial markets have also been seen to have had an important impact 
on the volatility of prices in these sectors. 
Booms and busts in commodity prices have strong macroeconomic 
and investment effects on commodity-dependent exporters. Busts in 
commodity prices (or increases in international food and energy prices) 
provoke periods of external borrowing on the part of commodity 
exporters (or net importers of food and energy). In 1963, the IMF 
established a compensatory fund which permitted non-conditional 
financing for periods of falling commodity prices, to be paid back when 
commodity prices recovered. It was the largest special IMF facility and 
accounted for a quarter of total IMF credit extended between 1976 
and 1985 (Kumar 1988).
In the 1990s, the compensatory non-conditional financing from the 
IMF for shocks that were purely external in nature was increasingly 
in conflict with structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and 
poverty-reduction and development policy reform programmes. By 
1998, the IMF’s financial facilities were effectively folded into the 
poverty-reduction strategy programmes, which transformed them 
into conditional financing carrying interest, a modality inappropriate 
to the purpose and expensive to potential users. Following the 2009 
G20 summit, rules were amended to relax conditionality procedures 
and implement an increase in borrowing levels. What is still lacking 
is a stable, non-conditional, international facility for compensatory 
financing for external shocks.
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Trade Given the high rates of growth in global trade since the end of 
the Second World War, Lewis (1979), in his Nobel lecture, suggested 
that moving towards export-led growth would be a reasonable gamble. 
This challenge had been taken up by most developing countries since 
the start of the 1980s. While the volume of trade is much higher than in 
1980, and the size of the developing economies as a proportion of the 
total world economy has increased, only a few countries have succeeded 
in changing the structure of their economic relationship with the global 
economy in the period of intensified trade engagement since the 1980s 
(as also reflected in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in the previous section). 
In some countries, such as China – which is counted among those 
whose gamble on export-dependent2 growth has ‘paid off’ – there 
are serious concerns that this pattern of growth is unsustainable 
(Akyüz 2012a) and that a reorientation towards domestic demand 
is already required. The unprecedented growth rates in output and 
income recognized by Lewis (1979) were those achieved in the era 
of import substitution and internationally sanctioned state controls 
over private capital flows, not during the era of export promotion 
and deregulation of private finance. Export-reliant growth for most 
countries did not lead to the required scale and timing of economic 
diversification. 
The most dynamic system and rule-making arena has been in 
free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), involving reductions in tariff rates, lower state regulation, 
and strengthened protection for intellectual property and investors’ 
rights. The process of negotiation and accession towards economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) with the European Union is one of 
these growing issues. EPAs, which have been agreed and begun to 
be put into force in many Caribbean countries, require participating 
countries to eliminate tariffs on 80 per cent of the value of trade within 
fifteen years. 
African countries have offered instead to liberalize 60 per cent over 
twenty years; the European Commission rejected the proposal. In 
many countries in Africa, between 50 and 70 per cent of exports to 
the EU ‘are made up of only one product’ – petroleum accounting 
for 90 per cent of Nigerian exports, gold and diamonds 96 per cent 
of Botswana’s exports, coffee 67 per cent of Burundi’s exports (South 
Centre 2010: 2). The challenge posed by the EPA tariff coverage is that 
African countries must rapidly establish competitive industries in other 
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products and sectors within fifteen years. The danger is that the EPA 
will ‘lock African countries into their current patterns of production, 
i.e. low levels of manufacturing capacity’ (ibid.: 2). 
The structure of economic openness should depend on the level 
of countries’ economic development, something the present free trade 
paradigm does not recognize (Akyüz 2009b). This would have to 
involve a degree of non-reciprocity, so that countries could shield some 
economic activities from external competition until they are competi-
tive. This could involve low or no tariffs on imports for machinery and 
other inputs to new production activities while having protective tariffs 
for activities that are being developed. 
WTO obligations limit policies that have been traditionally 
applied for structural transformation and catch-up, a situation Chang 
(2003) has characterized as ‘kicking away the ladder’, since the now 
developed countries had the scope to apply these policies in their own 
development. 
Disciplines on investment measures under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) inhibit WTO members from 
imposing domestic content requirements on investors. Intellectual 
property rights – which are enforceable under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) through trade 
sanctions – hinder reverse engineering and other activities to adapt 
foreign technologies to local conditions. Moreover, the threat of trade 
sanctions on key exports discourages efforts in developing countries to 
undertake reverse engineering activities even when such actions could 
potentially reduce the import bill or foreign exchange outflow and/or 
are supportive of the start-up of new economic activities. 
There are few signs that these developing country obligations 
undertaken in exchange for promised but unrealized actions on the part 
of developed countries, particularly in the elimination of agricultural 
subsidies, can be moderated or renegotiated soon, under the WTO’s 
Doha development agenda. The WTO Bali ministerial meeting in 
December 2013 did not advance these issues. 
Based on these considerations, the following elements are important 
in reshaping the international trade regime: 
1 There is an urgent need to dramatically shrink, if not eliminate, subsidies 
in developed countries that disadvantage developing countries 
through trade. The most flagrant of these are agricultural subsidies.
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2 The principle of non-reciprocity on the basis of development level must 
be revived and strengthened in trade. This is an application of the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the area 
of trade. 
The principal challenge is the revival and elaboration of non-
reciprocity based on the level of development, which can take many 
forms. One well-known approach is the provision of longer adjustment 
periods. Unfortunately, conditions for accession often ignore the 
applicant country’s level of development. Moreover, adjustment periods 
have been stipulated as a fixed number of years, rather than being based 
on the development level, as is the case at present for the intellectual 
property exemption for LDCs. Another problem is that exclusions from 
international disciplines, such as those for environment and research 
and development (R&D), actually tilt the playing field in favour of 
developed countries, since these have more resources and human 
capacities to undertake such interventions. R&D and environmentally 
motivated activities require public sector financing which is in short 
supply in developing countries since their tax and revenue systems are 
not as well developed as those of developed countries. The underlying 
issue is that the expansion of international commerce requires a steady 
increase in the number of countries that can participate in trade 
without increasing their debt to other countries. Restoring flexibility in 
the setting of tariff rates by developing countries is critical.
This can be done within a framework of progressive trade openness in 
the long term by returning to earlier approaches of measuring openness 
based on average rates across tariff lines. This will allow countries to 
raise or lower tariff rates according to which industries they seek to 
promote at a particular stage of development. The current approaches 
of setting percentages of tariff lines that either must be bound or set to 
zero within a particular time frame are either inimical to development 
or require high government capabilities to undertake rapid sectoral 
development interventions if the country is to escape being locked into 
its current pattern of production. 
Financial flows In the 2013/14 United Nations General Assembly 
discussions on Sustainable Development Goals, the ‘means of 
implementation’ became an arena of debate between developed and 
developing countries. Developed countries took the position that private 
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capital can be mobilized for developing financing with the removal of 
controls on capital flows, while developing countries were more sceptical 
that foreign private flows could by themselves provide the long-term 
finance needed for developmentally oriented investment. At the global 
level, capital and financial market liberalization was expected to enable 
developing countries to acquire increased access to investment financing. 
Based on investment rates on fixed capital, there is no evidence that 
the increased volume of capital flows can be associated with increased 
investment (see UN 2010: chs 2 and 5). Instead, since the 1980s, in 
response to the removal of capital account controls, private flows have 
been mostly short-term, leading to increased volatility and uncertainty, 
and these appear to have destabilized long-term investment actions 
critical for structural transformation and development. 
For many LDCs, notably in Africa, ODA represents a large 
proportion of public resources, as much as 40 per cent for some. 
Volatility in ODA flows induces volatility in public spending, which 
in turn induces volatility in demand in the whole economy. One can 
group the required reforms into two main categories (Akyüz 2009a): 
crisis prevention and crisis resolution. 
Crisis prevention
Crisis prevention mechanisms are crucial for reducing the vulnerability 
of developing countries to external financial instability, while preserving 
their national policy autonomy to set their pace of international trade 
integration. Three areas require attention for crisis prevention (ibid.; 
see also UN 2009, Ocampo 2011): 
1 Effective multilateral discipline over financial, macroeconomic and 
exchange rate policies in systemically important countries, particularly 
those economies whose currencies are components of the IMF’s special 
drawing rights – the United States, the eurozone countries, Japan and 
the UK. Such countries should be precluded from quantitive easing 
when its extent floods the international economy with liquidity which 
developing countries have to fend off to safeguard the levels of their 
exchange rates and international competitiveness. 
2 Establishment of an international reserves system not based on a 
national currency or currencies.
3 Effective regulation and supervision of financial markets and capital 
flows.
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To achieve the first goal, the international system must establish 
monetary and financial disciplines on reserve-issuing economies. Large 
swings in macroeconomic policies and financial conditions in developed 
economies have imposed boom–bust cycles on developing economies. 
‘International spillovers from macroeconomic, exchange rate and 
financial policies in advanced economies are much more damaging … 
than shocks from their trade policies. But, unlike trade, there is no 
effective multilateral discipline in money and finance’ (Akyüz 2009a: 
12). Because of the absence of obligations on the part of the USA as 
a reserve-issuing currency, there was no mechanism, including in the 
IMF, to prevent the explosion of risks in the US financial sector, whose 
failure has caused a global crisis. 
A fundamental change in the reserve system is the second key 
requirement of crisis prevention. Effectively, the current global reserve 
system depends on the national currency of the USA. Liquidity booms 
and busts experienced by developing countries have been induced 
by policy changes in the USA in pursuit of its own macroeconomic 
imperatives. The system is also inherently unstable owing to the ‘Triffin 
dilemma’, which requires the reserve-issuing country to run current 
account deficits to provide liquidity to underpin increasing global trade. 
This system had been anchored in a fixed rate of gold convertibility 
and unsurprisingly collapsed in 1971 when the USA abandoned 
convertibility because of the threat of its gold stock running out.
The Asian crisis in the second half of 1990s demonstrated the 
inherent instability of the system and the vulnerability of developing 
countries to financial flows. Instability in international financial flows 
has resulted in developing countries undertaking significant self-
insurance by accumulating reserves. This is itself a source of additional 
instability since it generated financing for deficits undertaken by the 
USA in the lead-up to the crisis. 
The current crisis has restarted discussion on increasing the use of 
the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the IMF to uncouple global 
liquidity from the US dollar. There are technical and governance issues 
that must be addressed in increasing the use of SDRs (UN 2010, 2012; 
Akyüz 2009a) but this approach provides the most accessible path to 
reducing dependence on a national currency and removing a source of 
imbalance leading to a crisis. 
The effective regulation of financial markets and capital flows is the 
third pillar of crisis prevention. The present crisis demonstrates that 
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financial claims are highly vulnerable to cumulative processes that do 
not correct themselves except through discontinuous crises with large 
policy and social dislocation. Moreover, financial instability emanating 
from large financial centres has adverse international spillovers, in both 
the boom and bust phases. 
In practice, applying common but differentiated responsibility in 
international financial regulation will require that developing countries 
do not undertake the same degree of liberalization of financial services 
under the WTO; at a minimum, this will require that the positive list 
approach in scheduling international services to be liberalized must be 
continued. In practice, developing countries must also protect their 
sovereign right to impose controls on capital flows as provided for in 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. The IMF (2012) recently published 
an ‘institutional view’ of capital account liberalization and management 
which recognized this right. Developing countries will need to exercise 
this right in the face of the generally ‘hostile’ (Gallagher 2011: 12) view 
that IMF staff have had of capital account management tools since the 
1990s. 
Financial crisis resolution
Financial crises have been occasions for dramatic development reversals 
in the developing world. Avoiding these reversals will require orderly 
and equitable approaches to crisis resolution which the international 
system does not provide at present. 
The standard approach has been fraught with controversy. IMF-
led programmes involve new financial injections and public sector 
austerity, which are mainly intended to keep debtor countries up to 
date on their debt service obligations with external private debtors. 
These programmes insist on keeping the capital account open, even 
with significant capital outflows and losses in reserves. Under these 
programmes, the burden of adjustment falls almost exclusively on 
debtor countries. These programmes often require the public sector 
to assume the external debt obligations of the private sector (often 
including those of operations of foreign companies resident in the 
debtor country). This approach exempts external creditors from 
market discipline and propagates moral hazard in private financial 
lending activities to developing countries. 
The underlying objective of crisis resolution must be to restore as 
quickly as possible the ability of the affected country to resume economic 
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activities, as is the case in crisis resolution in domestic contexts. This 
will require the sanctioning of standstills during the period of debt-
resolution negotiation and the provision of resources for critical current 
account needs (Akyüz 2009a). Beyond a standstill, a growth-oriented 
resolution could also require restrictions on capital account flows and 
import restrictions during the period of debt resolution in order to 
conserve foreign exchange.
The absence of an orderly, non-arbitrary process of sovereign 
debt resolution is an important development obstacle. Countries 
are subjected to litigation which ties up their external economic 
transactions; a proper crisis-resolution mechanism will include a 
standstill on such litigation. There is a need to involve neutral parties 
in the resolution process, such as arbitration panels made up of 
experts, as in the WTO’s dispute settlement process, since the lead 
role played by the IMF in these episodes creates conflict-of-interest 
concerns as the IMF and its sister organization the World Bank are 
themselves creditors. 
Rebuilding domestic ‘policy space’3
The radical application of SAPs and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) in the developing world hinged essentially on reliance 
on private incentives and markets to address social problems and 
underdevelopment based on profound suspicions concerning the 
capacity of other institutions, particularly the government, to deal with 
these issues (see Montes 2013: section 1). The MDG framework requires 
governments to invest in social sectors while keeping low tariffs and taxes 
which induce fiscal deficits. It is also assumed this should be done while 
keeping the emphasis on international competitiveness, and progressive 
opening of the capital account. Since the MDGs provided social targets 
as responsibilities of developing country governments, Nayyar (2011: 
19) characterized the resulting division of responsibilities thus: ‘In 
fact, the emphasis on social development meant that governments in 
LDCs relied on external resources to finance expenditure on social 
sectors but did not mobilize domestic resources to finance investment 
in infrastructure, agriculture or productive activities.’ 
The global deregulation of financial markets has made large private 
sector portfolio managers the principal arbiters of real sector outcomes, 
in sharp contrast to the situation in the 1950s and 1960s. The original 
Bretton Woods economic system of 1944 assigned a definite priority 
146 | s ix
to the real sector, as opposed to the financial sector, as the driver of 
growth. The Bretton Woods system mandated controls over capital 
movements, which were eventually eroded when countries eliminated 
policies on their capital account. The resulting system is that private 
portfolio managers can immediately react through capital movements 
to policy changes by developing country governments and their central 
banks. Developing country policy-makers find their policy options 
limited to those that will not provoke adverse reactions on the part of 
international portfolio managers. 
Since the 1980s, international priorities have shifted away from 
policies that promote expanded employment, trade and production. 
While in the past developing countries sought to protect domestic 
industries from competition from imports to build their competitiveness, 
the proliferation of international disciplines, including those in FTAs 
such as under the EU’s economic partnership agreements, reduces the 
number of industries they can seek to develop and protect (by binding 
the tariff at zero, for example, for 80 per cent of tariff lines). FTAs require 
accelerated trade liberalization and limit the period and the resources 
public authorities can utilize to build domestic industries to enable them 
to expand their participation in external trade in subsequent years. The 
accompanying shift in international economy policy towards decisive 
control by private financial markets over economic decisions as a result 
of national and international policies towards financial deregulation has 
reduced public resources and mechanisms for addressing international 
boom–bust cycles. Financial markets have attained enormous influence 
on commodity prices and access to credit.
There are two sources of restrictions of policy space in devel-
oping countries: (1) restraints originating in the overall status of 
‘openness’ in the international economy; and (2) constraints arising 
from international commitments. In an ethos that privileges openness, 
these two sources, of course, interact. For example, the openness of 
commodity-dependent economies makes them more susceptible to 
the procyclicality of international prices. During price booms, many 
commodity-exporting countries have greater access to external debt, 
and many take it on. During periods of commodity-price downturns, 
these economies are more subject to conditionalities in stand-by pro-
grammes with international financial institutions, which have most 
often resulted in restrictions on policy space in the name of enhancing 
openness to the international economy. 
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Nature and degree of economic ‘openness’ International trade and 
investment provide important advantages to developing countries. 
However, the nature and degree of economic openness themselves have 
a direct impact on the amount of policy space available to authorities in 
developing countries. The term ‘openness’ refers to the extent to which 
states have degraded their capacity to regulate private sector actions to 
achieve national or developmental goals. 
The most significant loss of policy tools for developing countries 
has come from liberalization of the capital account. The degree of 
capital-account openness severely restricts the scope for monetary 
policy and exchange-rate policy. While it would be preferable to use 
exchange-rate policy to achieve exchange-rate stability in order to meet 
trade and domestic industrial development objectives, surges in external 
capital flows can overwhelm the resources of monetary authorities to 
intervene in exchange-rate markets. With fully open capital accounts, 
authorities also lose the ability to use interest rates to determine credit 
availability and adopt a counter-cyclical policy. 
Under the IMF Articles of Agreement, capital controls legally remain 
a sovereign right of member states. However, member states have given 
up some of these rights via BITs. They have also given up many of the 
tools to regulate capital accounts as part of SAP commitments. 
In many emerging markets, authorities have shown reluctance to 
recover capital-account management tools. In the years after their 
economic crises in the late 1990s, capital accounts in Asian countries 
were more open than they were before (Akyüz 2012a). For many 
countries in Latin America, accepting exchange appreciation through 
open capital accounts has played a role in meeting inflation targets, but 
this is at the expense of medium- and long-term goals in productivity 
growth, employment and industrial development. 
There is a channel through which open capital accounts increase 
the risk of lending to developing countries, which is contrary to the 
widely held view that open capital accounts reduce the risks to lenders 
by offering greater assurance of being able to recover their claims. 
Because most developing countries cannot borrow abroad in their own 
currencies, ‘during recessions the real value of their currency tends 
to decline, raising the cost of servicing foreign debt exactly when the 
capacity to pay is diminished’ (UNCTAD 2011: 41). 
Developing countries must recover a capacity to regulate their capital 
accounts. Among regulations on capital accounts, ‘macro-prudential’ 
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tools and policies apply to protect the prudential integrity of domestic 
financial systems. However, a significant proportion of capital flows, 
such as portfolio positions in the local stock markets and the foreign 
purchase of local bonds, are not undertaken in the banking system 
(though banks might serve as conduits for these transactions) and are 
not normally part of financial supervisory activities. In fact, because 
previous BOP crises have been followed by widespread collapses in 
financial sectors in developing countries, it would be advisable for 
even ‘macro-prudential’ policies to be undertaken beyond prudential 
reasons with a view to eliminating the build-up of external imbalances 
and an increased risk of BOP crises. 
Capital controls are the most critical when countries are facing a 
payments crisis, since international reserves are necessarily finite. As 
discussed in the section on crisis resolution, developing countries 
must have the capacity to impose orderly standstills and have access to 
external finance in these situations. 
At the international level, improved regulation of source markets 
and greater stability in exchange rates and interest rates in reserve-
issuing countries have the potential significantly to reduce capital 
surge pressures in developing countries and facilitate capital account 
regulation. 
International commitments In the original Millennium Declaration (UN 
2000: para. 13), UN member countries declared: ‘We are committed 
to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory 
multilateral trading and financial system,’ thus incorporating equity 
as a standard for the international system. When the MDGs were 
formulated, in theory drawn from the Millennium Declaration, the 
standard of equity was not carried over and target 8A under MDG8 
requires only further development of an ‘open, rule-based, predictable, 
non-discriminatory trading and financial system’. A clear lacuna in the 
international system is the poorly developed conception of what equity 
in the design, application and practice of a rules-based international 
trade and financial system entails. 
How equity is built into the rules and practices of international 
governance is key to assigning differential responsibilities in sustaining 
a development-enabling global system. 
In the case of external imbalances, the international financial 
system provides for enforceable adjustments only on debtor countries, 
montes | 149
the country grouping most populated by developing countries. 
Adjustment programmes for debtor countries are the favoured domain 
of policy conditionality, which has subsequently provoked extensive 
international debate within the framework of aid effectiveness. Under 
SAPs, occasioned by the developing country debt crises of the 1980s, 
conditionality proliferated and reached extensively into development 
policies and strategies, going beyond what might be considered donors’ 
legitimate concern to prevent the wasteful use of resources provided 
to debtors in support of their adjustment programmes. The OECD-
led aid-effectiveness effort initially appeared to incorporate ambitious 
intentions to reform the system of policy conditionality towards 
genuine partnership between donors and recipients and the realization 
of ‘country ownership’ of development programmes. 
The framework for country ownership starts with debtor/recipient 
countries taking the lead in deciding on and designing their own 
development programmes. In practice, the design of many of the 
programmes involved aligning country policies to policies favoured 
by international financial institutions (UNCTAD 2011). An earlier, 
delicately worded, finding of a report of the World Bank’s (2004: viii) 
evaluation office on PRSP states: ‘The Bank management’s process for 
presenting a PRSP to the Board undermines ownership. Stakeholders 
perceive this practice as “Washington signing off” on a supposedly 
country-owned strategy.’
A very important form of policy space constriction comes from the 
growing area of BITs and private investor protections incorporated 
in the FTAs. Developed countries, notably the United States and 
European countries, have required investor protection in negotiating 
FTAs and EPAs. Under BITs, private investors obtain the standing 
to lodge disputes directly with states for violations of investors’ rights, 
which have been interpreted broadly to include policies that impact 
expected future earnings. This permits the private parties, mostly 
international companies, extraordinary influence over the policies of 
their host governments, well beyond domestic political processes and 
accountability. While both developing and developed countries are 
party to these treaties, the asymmetry derives from the more limited 
resources of developing countries, the greater incidence of international 
companies which are in fact based in developed countries, and the 
greater need for development interventions in poorer countries. 
Obligations under these treaties can subject developing countries to 
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penalties if, for example, a government imposed restrictions on capital 
outflows during a BOP crisis (Montes 2012). 
The international community must acknowledge the role of these 
asymmetries as obstacles to development, recognizing that national 
policy space is indispensable for all countries, developed or developing. 
Scoring trends using indicators of these asymmetries would be a 
valuable activity for civil society and international research institutes. 
Taking on international obligations is a sovereign national decision. 
In theory, these commitments sustain the value of the multilateral 
system for all participants in the system, although some benefit 
more than others. In exchange for a derogation of sovereign powers, 
global rules protect countries from arbitrary treatment in economic 
matters, such as their exports in foreign markets. The issue of 
international commitments arises when they are inequitable in nature, 
application or practice,4 meaning that they demand more in terms 
of performance and contribution on the part of poorer and weaker 
economies compared to developed economies. Beyond inequality 
among classes and people, inequitable rules among nations are an 
obstacle to development and poverty eradication. ‘It is also clear that 
unfair rules of the game in the contemporary world economy would 
encroach upon policy space so essential for development’ (Nayyar 
2011: 19). 
In trade, developed countries have retained their agricultural 
subsidies. Developing countries have fewer resources to sustain 
agricultural subsidies and have taken on commitments to limit 
restrictions on agricultural imports. Newly acceding countries to 
the WTO have been required to place a ceiling on or to eliminate 
agricultural subsidies. In the WTO, existing members have the right 
to impose obligations on countries seeking membership which they 
themselves do not fulfil. There is a wide range of sizes of economies, 
markets and levels of development in the WTO. Developing countries 
trying to draw from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) well-defined tradition of ‘special and differential treatment’ 
(SDT) have found it difficult to make measurable progress on the 
Doha Declaration’s agreement ‘that all special and differential 
treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening 
them and making them more precise, effective and operational’ 
(WTO 2001: para. 44). 
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Conclusions
While developing countries hold primary responsibility for their 
own development, the fortunes of their economies are now even 
more severely dependent on structures and events in the international 
economy. The international system can serve as an obstacle to devel-
opment in two ways: (1) missing, defective or perverse international 
institutional arrangements; and (2) restrictions on national policies 
from an undifferentiated proliferation of international obligations and 
policy rules. 
Focusing development cooperation on poverty eradication can be 
misleading, especially if such a focus absolves economically powerful 
countries of responsibility for eliminating systemic obstacles to 
development. Many of these obstacles have the potential of ‘biting back’ 
and causing damage to developed countries themselves. Many analysts 
look upon the current unresolved troubles of the eurozone as another 
instance of the error of resolving external debt crises through adjustment 
only on the part of indebted countries. As well as ‘biting back’, the 
international community needs to recognize the adverse medium- 
and long-term economic, social and environmental implications of 
anaemic development from a poorly structured international system. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, development progress was more robust, but 
this was also a period of more effective development cooperation and 
national policy space. Many of the elements needed to reform global 
mechanisms and restore the balance between international disciplines 
and national policy space are found in the outcomes of existing UN 
agreements but are poorly put into practice. 
Some of the elements of effective development cooperation emerged in 
the SDGs (OWG 2014). Among the list of malfunctioning international 
mechanisms mentioned in the SDGs are the following areas: 
1 Strengthening compensatory finance for commodities-dependent 
developing countries; Subgoal 2.c requires international food 
commodity markets to ‘adopt measures to ensure the proper 
functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives, and 
facilitate timely access to market information, including on food 
reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility’. 
2 Strengthening special and differential treatment in WTO rules and 
enlarging the non-reciprocal content of trade agreements, including 
FTAs, to permit developing countries greater ability to diversify their 
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domestic economies; Subgoal 10c: ‘implement the principle of special 
and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, in accordance with WTO agreements’.
3 Arriving at equitable and effective disciplines over agricultural 
subsidies in developed countries; Subgoal 2c as discussed above. 
4 Restoring flexibility in the setting of tariff rates, within reasonable 
ranges, to enable developing countries to raise or lower tariff rates 
in line with shifting priorities to develop specific sectors, as opposed 
to permanently bound tariff ceilings; no specific goal in the SDGs.
5 Creating effective arrangements to reduce the probability and size 
of international financial crises; no specific goal, but some hints in 
Subgoal 17.13: ‘enhance global macroeconomic stability including 
through policy coordination and policy coherence’.
6 Establishing orderly and equitable international financial and debt 
crisis resolution mechanisms; Subgoal 17.4: ‘assist developing 
countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coor-
dinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and 
debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) to reduce debt distress’. 
Subgoal 17.5 calls for ‘respect [for] each country’s policy space and 
leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication 
and sustainable development’. In protecting and enhancing space for 
national policies in developing countries, this paper presented a few 
proposals, including: 
1 Revising the structure of international commitments so that, based 
on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (see 
paragraph 5 of the OWG (2014) preamble), developed countries 
bear a greater burden than at present in international obligations 
and restrictions in the area of domestic subsidies, aid conditionalities 
and macroeconomic adjustments; the most problematic of these are 
developed countries’ agricultural subsidies.
2 Reforming current approaches to bilateral BITs and FTAs that limit 
the ability of developing countries to undertake changes in policies 
and regulations which might alter the profit expectations of foreign 
investors.
3 Restoring the capacity of developing countries to regulate their 
capital accounts. 
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Efforts to reform international economic architecture are impeded by 
the constraint that the highest decision-making bodies in key institutions, 
such as the IMF, do not provide sufficient voting weight and policy 
influence to countries most affected by their actions. One effort under 
way but under capricious political obstruction is that of updating voting 
weights in the IMF in line with the changed economic structure. Even 
the G20, where important developing countries sit, has been unable to 
advance progress. Even though they are non-specific, the proposed SDGs 
(OWG 2014) have three items that could possibly be a basis for future 
efforts in this regard: Subgoal 16.6: ‘develop effective, accountable and 
transparent institutions at all levels’; Subgoal 16.7: ‘ensure responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels’; 
and Subgoal 16.8: ‘broaden and strengthen the participation of 
developing countries in the institutions of global governance’. 
The coming struggle therefore is one of achieving greater specificity 
in designing and implementing needed reforms. A historical precedent 
was the redesign of the international economic system through the 
Bretton Woods agreements in 1944, drawing on the lessons of the 
humanitarian catastrophes in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The political discussions in the UN on post-2015 development and the 
approval of the SDGs should be the occasion to build a development-
enabling international economic environment, or at least to set in 
motion a process that can eventually eliminate the obstacles to 
development in the existing system.
Notes
1 The formulation of MDG8 Target 
8.A is ‘Develop further an open, rule-
based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system’ and Target 
8.B is ‘Deal comprehensively with the 
debt problems of developing countries’. 
There are also targets on the needs of 
LDCs and landlocked countries, and 
on the international governance of 
technology sharing. See UN (2013) and the 
series of previous reports from this annual 
series, which have attempted to interpret 
targets and monitor progress on MDG8. 
2 China’s exports destined for 
developed countries are heavily 
dependent on imported inputs from 
other developing countries (Akyüz 
2012a). China’s domestic demand is less 
dependent on imports and could have 
an impact on the export performance of 
other developing countries. 
3 The original use of the phrase 
‘policy space’ in an official document 
was in paragraph 16 of the Accra Accord 
of UNCTAD XII (UNCTAD 2008). In that 
formulation, policy space is defined in 
terms of the impact of international 
rules and arrangements. Policy space 
is essential to have the scope for 
introducing ‘a range of policies for 
building domestic productive capacities 
and local technologies, and to establish 
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the institutions and support measures 
to spread the resulting gains’ (UNCTAD 
2011: 41). 
4 Here ‘practice’ refers to the degree 
to which states adhere to international 
obligations, including to the extent that 
they can be effectively sanctioned when 
they do not fulfil their obligations. 
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Introduction
Millennium Development Goal 2 aims to achieve universal primary 
education, to ‘ensure that, by 2015, children2 everywhere, boys and girls 
alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling’. In 
Brazil, this has focused on the expansion of compulsory education for 
children aged seven to fourteen. In spite of the great progress the Brazilian 
government has achieved in relation to the primary education of young 
children, the same cannot be said in relation to those aged fifteen and 
over who did not receive a primary education at the appropriate age. 
In a country like Brazil, where there is a great age discrepancy 
among students in the same grade, there are still a significant number 
of students over fourteen who have not yet completed primary school. 
According to the UNDP’s 2013 Atlas of Human Development in Brazil, 
in the period 1991–2010 the percentage of Brazilians aged fifteen to 
seventeen who completed primary school increased from 20 to 57.2 
per cent. This means that, in Brazil, over 40 per cent of those aged 
fifteen to seventeen still do not have a full primary education. 
This chapter will argue that, in spite of the impressive progress 
achieved in relation to MDG2’s indicators in Brazil, educational policies 
aimed at children between the ages of seven and fourteen have had the 
unintended consequence of further marginalizing those primary students 
over fourteen. The chapter will argue that, indeed, those over fourteen 
now suffer a double exclusion. First, people over fourteen who have not 
completed primary education are more likely to be unemployed and 
thereby more likely to remain marginalized and in extreme poverty. They 
are therefore socially excluded. Secondly, they have been neglected by 
the current educational policies aimed exclusively at younger children. 
They are therefore institutionally excluded.
This chapter seeks to explain the double burden that the current 
educational policy imposes on uneducated Brazilian students over the age 
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of fourteen. It argues that, if the purpose of MDG2 is ‘universal primary 
education’, then the age criterion, which fails to take into consideration 
other social factors, needs to be complemented by other criteria. It is 
often claimed that the age criterion was adopted with the purpose of 
helping to achieve the numerical targets set by MDG2’s indicators more 
quickly. We argue that this purpose does not justify the perpetuation and 
exacerbation of the social exclusion and poverty of the population over 
fourteen who did not receive a full primary education. This is not to say 
that the current educational policies are without merit: the fact that in 
Brazil almost 100 per cent of children aged seven to fourteen now have a 
primary education is very good indeed; the pursuit of that good provided 
a sound reason in favour of said educational policies. Nevertheless, there 
is still great marginalization, some of which has been exacerbated by 
current policies, and this also provides sound reasons for policy reform. 
As is common after a policy achieves some success in bettering the 
conditions of a certain group, there is a change in the composition of 
the group of the more vulnerable people. This suggests that there should 
be a change in priority. As we will argue, the priority of educational 
policies should now be to rectify the fact that students over the age 
of fourteen are finding it significantly more difficult to get their basic 
primary school education. Additional measures are urgently needed, 
without prejudicing the progress already achieved for younger children. 
The chapter is structured thus: Section 1 will discuss the purpose 
of MDG2 and will address the ways in which policies in Brazil have 
been successful in advancing this goal. Section 2 will expose some of 
the adverse effects of these policies on the double-burdened students, 
already referred to. Building on the argument that one should give 
priority to those more vulnerable, Section 3 will then argue that the 
structural injustice aggravated by current educational policies calls 
for reforms in existing Brazilian legislation, so as to prioritize the now 
more vulnerable over-fourteen age group. 
MDG2 in Brazil: successful primary education policies
MDG2 encompasses three indicators: 
1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education.
2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach the last grade of 
primary school. 
3 Literacy rate of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, women and men.3
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In its implementations of MDG2, Brazil has achieved almost 
100 per cent of its targets as they relate to indicators (i) and (iii). 
As reported by the Brazilian government, 97.7 per cent of children 
aged seven to fourteen are enrolled in primary school and 98.7 per 
cent of people aged fifteen to twenty-four are considered literate. As 
the government declares, the success has resulted mainly from direct 
financial investment in the primary education of the seven-to-fourteen 
age group, which rose from 3.9 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 5.5 per cent 
in 2012 (see Neri and Osório 2014). The increase in public funding for 
primary education of children aged seven to fourteen has been a flagship 
success in terms of MDG2, reinforcing the understanding of education 
as a basic human right, fundamental to the dignity and development of 
the human person, as posited in the Brazilian Constitution: 
Art. 214. Legislation shall establish the national education 
system, which will last for the period of ten years, and will have 
the objectives of articulating the national education system in 
a collaborative way, setting and implementing the guidelines, 
goals and strategies to ensure the maintenance and development 
of education at its various levels, stages and modalities through 
coordinated actions among the public branches and their separated 
powers, within the various federal spheres, towards: 
  I – illiteracy eradication;
  II – universal school attendance;
  III – improved quality of education;
  IV – formation conducive to employment;
  V – humanistic, scientific and technological developments of 
the country;
  VI – settlement of the goal to use public resources for education 
in proportion to Brazil’s GDP.
Brazil has made progress on all three MDG2 indicators. When 
it comes to indicator 1 – net enrolment ratio in primary education 
– huge progress has been made: in 1990, 81.2 per cent of children 
aged seven to fourteen were attending primary school, and in 2012 
the percentage had risen to 97.7 per cent (Neri and Osório 2014). 
Therefore, nearly all children aged seven to fourteen are now 
enrolled in primary school. This includes children of colour from 
poor socio-economic backgrounds as well as white children from rich 
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socio-economic backgrounds. It is worth mentioning that in 1990 only 
67.6 per cent of coloured children in poor families had completed 
primary education, so, by 2012 the school enrolment disparity between 
the two groups had become virtually non-existent (IPEA 2014: 39). 
This drive towards the inclusion of the most marginalized (i.e. children 
of colour in poor families) can also be seen in relation to indicator 2. 
Indicator 2 – proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach the 
last grade of primary school – focuses on the appropriate correlation 
between age and school grade. This indicator measures not only 
how many of those commencing primary school get to the last grade 
level, but also how long they take to complete primary schooling. 
This is still the greatest challenge in Brazil. The age-grade gap is 
particularly problematic among coloured families and those living in 
rural and remote areas. Children from poorer households are more 
likely to delay the start, progress and completion of their education 
for a number of reasons, including poor health and nutrition, the risks 
associated with travelling long distances to school, and the need to take 
up work instead of attending school.4 This problem particularly affects 
the delayed primary school students above the age of fifteen, in the 
poorest families. Eventually, when these students return to school and 
resume studies at their original school grade, they lack the necessary 
incentives to persevere: they fail repeatedly, and then the age-grade gap 
is increased ever further. Students whose education is either interrupted 
or delayed are more likely to drop out, without mastering basic literacy 
and numeracy. Without these basic skills, they are unable to enter 
the job market, and are more likely to be permanently unemployed 
and socially marginalized. Some progress in the age-grade gap has, 
however, been made over the last few decades. While in 1990 50 per 
cent of primary school children aged nine to seventeen were enrolled at 
the appropriate school grade, by 2012 this percentage had risen to 60 
per cent (IPEA 2014: 40–41). 
Finally, when it comes to indicator 3 – literacy rate of fifteen- 
to twenty-four-year-olds, women and men, Brazil has achieved 
considerable success: in 1990, this literacy rate was 90.3 per cent, 
and in 2012 it was 98.7 per cent (Neri and Osório 2014). Therefore, 
nearly all fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds are considered literate. This 
includes people of colour from poor socio-economic backgrounds, 
whose parents are likely to be illiterate. Although in families with 
illiterate parents the literacy rate is actually lower (93.5 per cent), it is 
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worth mentioning here that the literacy rate in families with illiterate 
parents rose significantly, from 72.8 per cent in 1990 to 93.5 per cent 
in 2012 (IPEA 2014: 43). 
As was noted earlier, Brazil’s great achievements regarding MDG2 
are linked to the government’s decision to increase public investment 
in primary education, particularly through the Bolsa Escola programme, 
introduced in 1996, and then replaced in 2003 by the more wide-
ranging Bolsa Família programme.5 As discussed by Paes-Sousa and 
Jannuzzi in Chapter 5 of this book, these are conditional cash transfer 
programmes that provide financial incentives for school enrolment and 
attendance. Depending on the number of children in the family and on 
the family’s level of poverty, the government pays between R$22 and 
R$200 (US$9–78) directly to the mother (rather than to the father), 
so long as all their children aged six to seventeen are enrolled in school 
and have a monthly attendance rate of at least 85 per cent. This money 
transfer is meant to alleviate poverty. 
As of May 2014, 14 million families have received cash transfers 
under the Bolsa Família programme. The Brazilian Ministry of 
Education collects and analyses data on school attendance in order 
to monitor compliance with Bolsa Família’s requirements. Non-
compliance triggers first a warning to the family; if it persists, the cash 
transfer is blocked; after that, if the families do not send their children 
back to school, the government suspends and eventually cancels the 
money transfer. This procedure was put in place as a tool to help local 
authorities identify when a family becomes at greater risk of poverty and 
in need of additional help. This is because when parents stop sending 
their children to school, it is often because they have started sending 
them to work to increase family income. It is precisely at this point that 
the family needs greater governmental attention and help to counter 
extreme poverty. Typically, the government sends a public servant to 
visit the family and tries to ascertain the reasons why they have not 
been able to fulfil their commitments regarding school attendance 
(Veras 2013). 
This procedure has proved to be highly effective in helping 
government officials recognize families at risk of poverty so that they 
can intervene before too much damage has been done. According to 
the Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, ‘Undoubtedly, the foundation 
of the Brazilian MDG’s success is the Bolsa Família programme’ (IPEA 
2014: 7). The government also highlights:
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the main point to be noted relates to the reduction of inequalities. 
The improvements of MDG-2 indicators do not relate exclusively 
to a greater number of children and young people attending 
schools; they also indicate that primary school is increasingly 
starting at the appropriate age, and that children and young people 
have better chances of continuing their studies towards the secondary 
level and university, in an ever more inclusive way. … The percentage 
of young people between 15 and 24 who completed at least six 
years of primary education increased from 59.9% in 1990 to 84% 
in 2012. That is, the percentage of young people between 15 and 
24 who failed to complete primary education fell two-fifths [sic!], 
from 41.1% [sic!] in 1990 to 16% in 2012. (IPEA 2014: 44, 
emphasis added) 
Two crucial points are made in this quoted statement, and these 
points will be relevant for the critical analysis of MDG2 in Brazil in the 
next section of this chapter. The first is that the educational policy in 
Brazil clearly has as its ultimate goal inclusion, so that people will have 
‘better chances of continuing their studies towards the secondary level 
and university’. The second point is the Brazilian government’s firm 
commitment to all primary school students, comprising therefore not 
only those below the age of fifteen, but also those above, ‘in an ever 
more inclusive way’.
MDG2 in Brazil: the adverse effects of the 1996 and 2006 primary 
education policies 
Brazil’s successful achievements regarding MDG2’s target and 
indicators are a result of a myriad of political initiatives that have been 
carried out since 1996.6 In that year the government made a firm 
commitment to prioritize the so-called ‘regular’ primary education 
at the corresponding school grade. To this end, it amended Article 
294 of its Constitution, introducing a comprehensive reform of the 
Brazilian educational system, under the umbrella of the Bolsa Escola 
programme. First, Brazil enacted the 1996 ‘Law on Directives and 
Foundations of the Educational System’ (LDB – Lei de Diretrizes e 
Bases), as a result of an inclusive and participatory process whereby 
educators and other stakeholders in civil society were given a voice. 
LDB is the cornerstone of the current Brazilian educational system; 
it clarifies the different roles of municipalities, states and the federal 
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government regarding the Brazilian educational system. Secondly, 
also in 1996, the constitutional amendment n.14 created the ‘Fund 
for the Administration and Development of Education and Teaching’ 
(FUNDEF – Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação e de 
Valorização do Magisterio). 
FUNDEF regulated the allocation of funding for education in a 
more efficient and equitable way: not only did FUNDEF raise the 
public budget for education from R$35.2 billion to R$50.7 billion 
annually, it also required a minimal resource allocation per pupil for 
all primary schools. FUNDEF also increased primary school teachers’ 
salaries: in general salaries rose by 13 per cent. In extremely poor and 
rural areas (see UN 2013: 15), where parents were more prone to 
putting their children to work at the expense of their studies, there 
was an additional increase of 60 per cent in salaries, to give teachers 
an additional incentive to fulfil their teaching responsibilities more 
diligently, which includes monitoring and reporting on their students’ 
attendance. 
However, FUNDEF’s most controversial issue was that it diverted 
public resources originally destined for the ‘Primary Education of 
Youth and Adults’ – the so-called EJA (Educação de Jovens e Adultos) 
students above the age of fourteen who had not attended primary 
school at the proper age – towards the primary education of children 
aged seven to fourteen – the so-called ‘regular’ primary school students. 
The situation for primary school students above the age of fourteen 
worsened in 2006 when FUNDEF was replaced by FUNDEB (Fundo 
de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização 
dos Profissionais da Educação), which explicitly and exclusively focused 
on the ‘regular’ primary school students.
It is true that the new fund raised the public budget for primary 
education (R$55 billion, 5.2 per cent of GDP) (OECD 2011: 182). It 
is also true that the new fund has covered a greater number of students 
(FUNDEB covers 61 per cent more students than its predecessor 
FUNDEF). Yet the most controversial point regarding FUNDEB is 
that it has not only continued its predecessor’s strategy of focusing on 
‘regular’ primary school students, by diverting public resources from 
EJA to ‘regular’ students, it has also established an upper limit of 15 per 
cent of public expenditure on EJA students.7 To be precise, FUNDEB 
establishes different limits in public investments for primary school 
students based on the criterion of age alone, with the outcome that 
164 | seven
primary school students below the age of fifteen receive greater public 
investment than primary school students above the age of fourteen. 
In other words, FUNDEB’s institutional scheme explicitly prioritizes 
primary school students below the age of fifteen and neglects primary 
school students above the age of fourteen. As mentioned earlier, it is 
often claimed that the reason for this priority is to achieve the numerical 
targets of MDG2’s indicators – particularly indicator 2, which focuses 
on how many students commencing primary school complete it in an 
adequate time frame (i.e. by the age of fourteen). This is therefore a 
twofold social and institutional, mutually reinforcing marginalization.
Marginalization and poverty are multifaceted problems, which 
cannot be addressed simultaneously, making all poor people better off 
in exactly the same way, at the same time. This would not be feasible. 
It is thus sound policy that the government prioritizes certain groups 
in greater need. But the reasons for such a priority should be morally 
justifiable. As we will discuss in the next section, the moral problem 
with Brazil’s current educational policies (FUNDEB in particular) 
is that the sole criterion of age is not a reasonable one. We will also 
discuss why this situation justifies further reforms in the Brazilian 
primary education system.
MDG2 in Brazil: the double burden imposed by current primary 
education policies 
Generally speaking, there are good prima facie reasons to prioritize 
the primary education of young children over the primary education of 
older children and adults.
The most obvious reason is that young children are more vulnerable 
than older children and young adults. However, recent Brazilian 
education policies have neglected primary students over the age of 
fourteen, and as a consequence have increased their vulnerability as 
compared to before. Since this population of older primary school 
students now has special needs, it requires priority, especially in terms 
of allocating a greater portion of public investment to help address 
their needs. 
As argued above, in the multifaceted reality of poverty, other variables 
need to be taken into account. We will argue here that when other 
social factors concerning primary students above the age of fourteen 
are brought into view, age alone becomes a morally unacceptable 
criterion. 
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Why is this differentiation of primary school students based 
exclusively on the criterion of age morally unacceptable?
Generally speaking, the practical reasons for giving some good (e.g. 
resources) to one particular vulnerable group are either the same as the 
practical reasons for giving it to any other vulnerable group, or they are 
different. If the practical reasons for giving to each vulnerable group 
are the same, then these groups are owed the same treatment, and it 
would be arbitrary and unreasonable to treat the parties unequally. 
If the reasons for giving to each vulnerable group are different, then 
these groups are owed different kinds of treatment, and it would then 
be arbitrary and unreasonable to treat them equally (see Finnis 2011: 
ch. 1). In light of this general practical principle, what are the practical 
reasons for giving primary education to group 1 (i.e. children aged 
seven to fourteen) and to group 2 (i.e. primary school students above 
the age of fourteen)? Are these reasons the same or are they different? 
The purpose of primary education for both groups is precisely the 
same: students must first and foremost complete primary education to 
develop their moral and intellectual capacities so that they gradually 
mature their sense of responsibility in striving to pursue their own good 
and the good of the community of which they are members. For the 
development of the human person, primary education seeks to ensure 
that students master, for example, basic literacy and numeracy, and 
acquire skills in preparation for the job market. The purpose of the 
basic human right to education thus applies equally to both groups: 
the right to education is fundamental to the dignity and development 
of the human person, independently of the person’s age. 
The fact that younger students are ceteris paribus more vulnerable 
than older students justifies a differentiated and preferential treatment 
in response to such greater vulnerability. But likewise, the fact that 
older students have now become more vulnerable than before also 
justifies a differentiated and preferential treatment. Let us call this ‘the 
principle of primary school inclusion’. 
Would this principle contradict the understandings of MDG2 or 
the Brazilian Constitution? MDG2 focuses on ‘children’ in general, 
without specifying their age – only indicator 3 explicitly addresses youth 
aged fifteen to twenty-four, but this does not mean that this group is 
necessarily excluded from indicators 1 and 2; it just means that this 
particular problem (i.e. illiteracy) afflicting this particular population 
group (i.e. students aged fifteen to twenty-four) in a particular way 
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has to be eradicated by 2015. So, MDG2’s understanding does not 
contradict the principle of primary school inclusion. 
Likewise, the Brazilian Constitution seems to accommodate 
the principle of primary school inclusion. In fact, Article 294 of the 
Brazilian Constitution seems to go even further than accommodating 
it: it seems positively to promote the principle, when it requires that 
primary education should strive for ‘universal school attendance’ and 
‘formation conducive to employment’. By doing so, the Brazilian 
Constitution is endorsing not only the idea that primary education 
shall include all students, but also the idea that school attendance is 
necessary for obtaining skills conducive to employment. The latter also 
applies to all students in an inclusive way – and even more so to the 
primary students above the age of fourteen, who are more likely to 
be unemployed. President Rousseff has very recently reinforced these 
ideas, when she emphasized the importance of primary education for 
the development and formation of ‘children and young people … in a 
ever more inclusive way’ (IPEA 2014: 44).
So, if both MDG2 and the Brazilian Constitution promote the 
principle of primary school inclusion, why did the recent educational 
policies in Brazil (FUNDEB in particular) contradict this principle 
by not treating primary school students with like needs in the same 
way, and instead differentiating them according to the criterion of age 
alone, when other social factors are also applicable? Arguably, Brazil 
has opted to reach the numerical targets of MDG2’s indicators at all 
costs because this would demonstrate Brazil’s progress and success 
regarding MDG2. And this is particularly evident in the numerical 
targets of indicator 2, Brazil’s most challenging indicator. Since Brazil 
arguably wanted to maximize the fulfilment of indicator 2 at all costs, 
it adopted certain policies to tackle primarily the age-grade gap. 
It is true that Brazil has made progress on this particular matter, 
and the age-grade gap has been declining since 1996. However, 
such progress needs to be carefully assessed. The 1996 reform of the 
Brazilian educational system under the Bolsa Escola programme laid 
particular emphasis on the urgent need to correct late school entry and 
grade repetition as the way to more quickly reducing the age-grade 
gap. In this respect, the 1996 ‘Law on Directives and Foundations of 
Educational System’ (LDB) has established a number of measures to 
ensure the start and the completion of primary education between the 
ages of seven and fourteen, including, for example, speedy primary 
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schooling for delayed primary-school students, limitation on the 
school entry age, and the abolition of grade repetition. The latter aims 
at automatic progress from one school grade to the next in order to 
ensure that students leave school at the expected age of fourteen. But 
the great criticism is that it allows primary students to leave school 
without necessarily having mastered the basic skills required for 
employment. This suggests that there has been no real concern for 
students’ actual learning and development (see Haddad 1998: 158): 
the only real concern has been the lowering of figures for the age-grade 
gap, so that improvements on MDG2 indicators could be made more 
quickly.
So, the real reason for the focus on the age criterion alone and for the 
priority given to primary school students aged seven to fourteen, with 
the concomitant neglect of primary school students above the age of 
fourteen, seems not to be the correction of the particular vulnerability of 
this group that would ceteris paribus justify granting priority to younger 
children over older children and adults. The real reason seems to be to 
more quickly achieve MDG2’s numerical targets. 
Is this option morally justifiable? If the main purpose of Brazilian 
educational policies was to exhibit victorious figures to the international 
community, showing the success of a more universal primary education 
for Brazilian children on paper, then the criterion of age alone may be 
justified. But if the main purpose of the Brazilian educational policies is 
to provide a universal, quality primary education in reality, age cannot 
be the sole or the most adequate criterion for distinguishing and defining 
investment priorities. That is not to say that the criterion of age has no 
relevance at all in the allocation of public investments; but other factors 
in the Brazilian context need to be taken into consideration. 
Again, poverty is a complex problem, and a multiplicity of social 
factors need to be considered. The fact that primary school students 
over the age of fourteen have not completed primary education, and are 
overly burdened, both institutionally and socially, and are now more 
likely to be unemployed and to remain in a situation of marginalization 
and poverty, raises compelling reasons to question the reasonableness 
of using the age criterion alone. These are additional relevant social 
factors to which the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals’ (i.e. the 
Rio+20 outcome document; see Paes-Sousa and Jannuzzi this volume) 
agendas need to give priority, when determining and specifying the 
allocation of public investments for primary education in the future. 
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Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the double burden that Brazil’s current 
educational policy imposes on primary school students above the age 
of fourteen. We have argued that the fact that older primary school 
students have now become more vulnerable than before justifies a 
differentiated and preferential treatment. The chapter argues that, if the 
purpose of MDG2 is ‘universal primary education’, then age alone is not 
a reasonable or morally justifiable criterion for identifying the priority 
group in the Brazilian context. Other factors must also be taken into 
account. The age criterion alone has served the purpose of achieving 
more quickly the numerical targets set by MDG2’s indicators. But the 
complex social factors that led to the perpetuation and exacerbation 
of social exclusion and poverty for primary students over the age of 
fourteen with uncompleted primary education have been left out of 
account. The fact that almost 100 per cent of Brazilian children aged 
seven to fourteen now have full primary education is to be applauded. 
But, equally, the fact that uneducated students over the age of fourteen 
have now been made all the more vulnerable calls for them to be 
prioritized in the context of the post-2015 development agenda. 
Notes
1 The authors are grateful to Dr 
Francisco Urbina, Fr Alban McCoy, Dr 
Alisha Gabriel and Professor Thomas 
Pogge for their comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter. 
2 Note that MDG2 mentions 
‘children’ in a general sense, without 
making specifications regarding age.
3 Available at www.undp.org/
content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/
mdg_goals/mdg2/.
4 According to the UN: ‘Household 
poverty is the single most important 
factor keeping children out of school 
… Children and adolescents from the 
poorest households are at least three 
times as likely to be out of school as 
their richest counterparts. Location of 
residence also matters. Rural children are 
nearly twice as likely to be out of school 
as urban children’ (UN 2013: 15). 
5 Four existing cash transfer 
programmes, including Bolsa Escola, were 
integrated under the same umbrella 
– i.e the Bolsa Família programme. The 
idea was to increase the total amount 
of funding available and the number of 
poor/extremely poor families covered, as 
well as to increase the efficiency of the 
programme’s administration. Bolsa Escola 
covered 5.7 million families; and this 
number has reached 14 million families 
under the Bolsa Família programme. See 
OECD (2011: 182).
6 There are a vast number of 
political programmes and initiatives, 
in partnership with local governments 
as well as civil society, that can be 
mentioned: a) o Plano de Metas e 
Compromisso Todos pela Educação; b) o 
Plano de Desenvolvimento da Educação; c) 
o Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento 
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da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos 
Profissionais da Educação (FUNDEB); d) 
os Programas nacionais suplementares 
para educação, como o de transporte 
escolar; e) o Índice de Desenvolvimento da 
Educação Básica (IDEB); f) Prova Brasil; 
g) Programa Nacional de Reestruturação 
e Aquisição de Equipamentos para a Rede 
Escolar Pública de Educação Infantil 
(PROINFÂNCIA); h) Obrigatoriedade 
do ensino dos 4 aos 17 anos; i) Programa 
Mais Educação; j) Programa de Formação 
Continuada do Ensino Fundamental; k) 
Programa do Livro; l) Programa Nacional 
de Tecnologia Educacional; m) Programa 
Brasil Alfabetizado; n) Universidade 
Aberta do Brasil; to name only a few. For 
a description of each programme and 
initiative, see IPEA (2014), particularly p. 
45. See also OECD (2011: 180–92).
7 Public resources for EJA (i.e. 
primary school students above the age of 
fourteen) may not exceed 15 per cent of 
the FUNDEB total budget (Pinto 2007).
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Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the relevance of Millennium Development 
Goal 1 (MDG1), Target 1 on halving from 1999 to 2015 the proportion 
of the population below the World Bank’s extreme poverty lines, both 
in itself (methodologically) and against the background of two features 
of capitalism – periodic economic crises and the process of automation 
– which can be seen as the main forces determining global poverty 
trends. 
The first section compares the central features of the Keynesian 
and neoliberal variants of capitalism, showing how the first mitigates 
capitalism’s tendency to produce poverty and the second reinforces 
it. The tendency of global poverty to increase during the present 
neoliberal phase of capitalism is denied by the World Bank (WB), 
whose calculations imply the opposite trend. These calculations are 
shown to be biased. Moreover, the poverty threshold used by the WB 
is shown to be an Ultra Extreme Poverty Line (UEPL) arbitrarily 
detached from any conception of human need, implying that human 
beings can be treated as cattle. 
Once the ‘empirical evidence’ from the WB has been shown to be 
false, we continue with our argument, looking, first, at MDG1 as a very 
limited initiative, as it is completely disconnected from the main causes of 
poverty trends. The second section discusses the conceptual limitations 
of MDG1, while the third looks at the Mexican experience, showing 
that, at least in this experience, this goal is completely irrelevant, both 
because the method for the identification of the poor is flawed and does 
not correspond to the methods which the Mexican federal government 
and the Mexico city government use to identify the poor, and because 
the fact that Mexico subscribed to the MDGs has not modified, in any 
sense, Mexican anti-poverty policies. 
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The fourth and fifth sections broach the two main causes of global 
poverty trends. Some Marxist and mainstream theories of capitalist 
crises are analysed in the fourth section. The fifth section starts by 
pointing out the nature and consequences of the Scientific and 
Technical Revolution (STR), which has made possible automation, and 
which is bringing to an end a form of a societal organization centred on 
paid work, i.e. the wage-based society. We look also at the (potentially) 
positive consequences of automation as it opens up the possibility of 
human emancipation from ‘forced’, repetitive and alienating work. The 
policy response of a Basic or Universal Citizen’s Income – regarded as 
a promising alternative that saves capitalism and gradually, peacefully, 
transforms it into the basis for a more humane post-capitalist society – 
is addressed in the sixth and last section, together with other proposals. 
A very brief section of final reflections closes the chapter.
Capitalism and poverty in the Keynesian and neoliberal periods
Although capitalism per se has a tendency to produce poverty, 
this tendency was mitigated by Keynesian welfare states, while left 
unbridled by neoliberalism. Keynesian welfare states combined 
economic policies aimed at full employment and the institution of 
unemployment insurance so as to maintain positive rates of growth 
in effective demand, with very broad social policies. This variant of 
capitalism, prevalent for around forty years in many high-income 
countries, developed as a response to the 1929 Great Depression, 
which in turn was a crisis of overproduction and over-accumulation of 
capital, associated with low wages, as well as a response to the perceived 
successful establishment and economic performance in the USSR of 
what appeared as an alternative to capitalism. 
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, was developed as a response to 
the 1970s crisis, which was generated by a declining rate of profit. 
In Keynesianism, employment and wages are regarded as factors 
of effective demand. However, the Keynesian model ceased to be 
functional for capital when the rates of profit became too low. At that 
point in time, capital had the power to replace Keynesianism with a 
variety of capitalism that regards employment not as a demand factor 
but merely as a production cost, which, as all costs, must be reduced. 
Capital’s counter-revolution was launched and is still under way 
globally. Neoliberalism can be seen as a global drive to reorganize the 
entire social order so as to subordinate it to the logic of accumulation 
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and profit. The restructuring of capitalism focused on an offensive 
against labour, which was devalued and fully recommodified. The 
result has been a massive redistribution of income from labour in favour 
of capital on a global scale. But in its sin, neoliberalism carried its own 
penance: in generating global production without global consumption, 
it raised to a planetary scale the unsolvable contradiction between 
global growth of production and global decline in real wages, the same 
contradiction which had caused the Great Depression of 1929. 
The global devaluation of the workforce occurred in the context 
of two revolutions: one in information technologies that made 
deterritorialization of production possible, and the other in automation, 
which is making the direct use of labour less and less necessary in the 
production process. Under neoliberalism, the main instruments to 
expand demand are credit expansion, based on over-indebtedness of 
households, enterprises and governments, and financial bubbles or 
financialization. 
Capitalism has gone back to the laissez-faire variant of capitalism 
that prevailed before 1929, and has globalized it further. The style of 
globalization fostered has been asymmetrical: commodities and capital 
move freely, but labour does not. The mobile factor of production 
(capital) imposes its conditions on the non-mobile factor (labour). 
Capitalism is again in a crisis – the Great Financial Crisis – at least 
as severe as the 1929 Great Depression, and more global. Neoliberal 
capitalism increases poverty as it is based on the full commodification of 
labour, and on its devaluation. This is in stark contrast with Keynesian 
welfare state modalities of capitalism, which decreased poverty, at least 
in the developed countries, by revaluing the labour force.
Capitalism is coming to an end. It can be saved only in a radical 
way that would lead gradually to its transformation into the basis for a 
post-capitalist society. The main reason for this is the automation revo-
lution, which is under way not only in industry, but also in agriculture 
and, crucially, in services. It is incompatible with the wage system as 
the main distributor of income that enables the sale of commodities 
and the very reproduction of life – in other words keeping the worker 
alive and allowing for intergenerational reproduction. Both automation 
and deterritorialization of production imply the devaluation of labour, 
massive unemployment combined with the growing presence of pre-
carious employment and with them the globalization or generalization 
of poverty. Capitalism has to be radically transformed from within, 
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or it will destroy the planet as it tries, desperately, to save itself from 
death. 
The decline of global poverty in the neoliberal period according to 
the World Bank
This analysis of a generalization of poverty is negated by World 
Bank statistics. These present declining levels of poverty in the global 
South, where most of the world’s poor live. These statistics are false 
and misleading. Thomas Pogge and Sanjay Reddy (2010: 42–54) have 
illustrated a number of problems and flaws in the World Bank’s poverty 
measurement. They include inter alia: 
1 The alleged evolution of world poverty between 1981 and 2005 
depends highly on the poverty line (PL) used. If using the ‘official’ 
WB PL of $1.25 (at purchasing power parities: PPP) per person 
per day, poverty over those twenty-five years decreases by 27 per 
cent; but if using a $2.00 PL, poverty increases by 1 per cent. 
Using a $2.5 PL, it increases by 13 per cent. As can be seen, three 
totally different diagnoses: the lower the PL, the more optimistic 
and more favourable the outcome of neoliberal capitalism. The 
total population living in poverty in 2005 would be, respectively: 
1.38 billion at $1.25 PL; 2.56 billion at $2 PL; and 3.08 billion at 
$ 2.50 PL. 
2 The WB official PLs have been falling in real terms, while the 
institution attempted to give the impression of a rising PL. The 
reality is that in terms of 2009 purchasing power, the original PL 
of $1, which was used between 1990 and 1997, was $1.99 dollars; 
that of $1.08, used between 2000 and 2008, was $1.60; and that of 
$1.25, which is now being used, is equivalent to $1.37. 
By lowering the PL in real terms, the WB calculations imply that 
poverty is falling, thereby adding a fallacy to an open and shameless 
cynicism implied in offering, to nearly half of the world’s population, 
a perspective of bare animal-level survival – a standard of living 
attainable with $1.25. The PLs of $1.25 and $2.00 per person per 
day lack any conception of human needs. This can be illustrated with 
the example of Mexico, where the PL of $1.25 PPP results in very 
low poverty incidence levels (5.3 per cent in rural areas and 1.3 per 
cent in cities). Conversely, the two official poverty measures (one 
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multidimensional, the other income poverty) applied by the federal 
government (Coneval) show poverty incidences of around 50 per cent 
of the national population. Two other measurement options (one of 
which is the official one for Mexico City) show a poverty incidence 
around 80 per cent.2 
Moreover, in basing its PL on the extreme poverty line (EPL) of the 
poorest countries, the WB falls into circular reasoning, since it takes 
as a normative parameter the lowering of expectations by accepting 
a universal extreme poverty line (UEPL). The WB assumes food to 
be the sole human need, leaving all other needs fully unmet, and thus 
adopting a conception that reduces human beings to the status of 
animals.
The conceptual limitations of MDG1
The 2008 financial crisis has spread around the world, and its 
negative effects have combined with the food crisis, caused by increases 
in food prices. Consequently, the achievement of MDG1, Target 1 – 
halving extreme poverty in developing countries – is threatened (World 
Bank 2009: xi). The WB estimated in 2009 that between 55 and 90 
million people would fall into extreme poverty as a result of the crisis. 
Among the various factors behind the adoption of such a low UEPL 
is the dominance, since the early twentieth century, in social sciences, 
especially in economics, of logical positivism and the replacement of 
human needs by preferences. Putnam (2002: 33, emphasis in original) 
deconstructs the idea of the facts/value dichotomy as follows:
What of the idea that the correct description of the world is 
the same as objectivity? This idea rests, pretty clearly, on the 
supposition that ‘objectivity’ means correspondence to objects … 
But it is not only normative truths such as ‘murder is wrong’ that 
pose counterexamples to this idea; … mathematical and logic truths 
are likewise examples of objectivity without objects … it is time we 
stopped equating objectivity with description.
For Putnam, acceptance since the 1930s of the fact/value dichotomy 
destroyed the capacity of welfare economics to undertake an evaluation 
of economic well-being. The logical consequence of accepting the fact/
value dichotomy in economics should have been that economists reject 
altogether the existence of the discipline of welfare economics. Instead, 
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economists sought an optimal economic performance criterion that was 
neutral in terms of values, and found one in the notion of the ‘Pareto 
optimal’ – or at least so they thought. Putnam highlights the weakness 
of the Pareto optimality criterion using the defeat of Nazi Germany 
in 1945 as an event that, according to this criterion, did not improve 
the world’s well-being because at least one agent, Adolf Hitler, was 
worse off. Taking this example, Putnam argues that if there should be 
a discipline of welfare economics, and particularly if it is to deal with 
problems of poverty and other deprivations, then welfare economics 
cannot avoid substantive ethical issues. 
Economists who defend the fact/value dichotomy have, paradoxically, 
invaded the study area of poverty. Poverty is an entangled term, where 
statements of facts cannot be separated from value judgements. As 
economists assume that in terms of values there can be nothing rational, 
they have not taken seriously the definition of the poverty threshold, 
which is a heavily value-laden task, thus facilitating the task for the 
World Bank and others of its ilk, which seeks to reduce measured 
poverty to a minimum. Opponents of value judgements, orthodox 
economists have impoverished poverty studies in the same way they 
impoverished welfare economics. 
Let us look at how the WB defines its UEPL. In its first report on 
poverty (World Bank 1990: 26–7), the Bank defines it as ‘the inability 
to reach a minimum standard of living’, a standard which the WB 
defines as a level of consumption which must include ‘two elements: 
the expenditure necessary to achieve a minimum level of nutrition 
and other basic needs, and an additional amount that varies from one 
country to another and reflects the cost of participating in daily life of 
society’ (ibid.: 26). The first of the above elements is regarded by the 
WB as being ‘relatively simple’ to calculate, because it can be done ‘by 
finding out the prices of the foodstuffs that comprise the diet of the poor’. 
Ignoring the circular reasoning involved in this last phrase, the WB 
then argues that the second element is ‘by far more subjective as in some 
countries piped water inside the dwelling is a luxury, but in others it is a 
“necessity”’ (ibid.: 27, emphasis added). The Bank regards the decision 
to consider piped water necessary a subjective exercise and tries to induce 
the belief that it is impossible to reach agreement on what human needs 
are, by qualifying piped water as both a ‘luxury’ and a ‘need’. 
Several authors have criticized the denial, in different disciplines, 
of the existence of universal human needs (see Doyal and Gough 1991; 
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Wiggins 1987; Boltvinik 2005). Wiggins (1987) states that the 
irreplaceable character of the term ‘need’ in the political-administrative 
process forces one to capture the special content from which it derives 
its strength. If in the phrases formulating claims of need we try to replace 
‘needing’ by ‘wanting’, ‘desiring’ or ‘preferring’ the result lacks not 
only the rhetorical force of the original, but even its particular meaning, 
its consistency and its logical argument. Wiggins defines necessities 
(the objects needed) as follows: ‘a person needs X [absolutely] if and 
only if, whatever the moral and socially acceptable changes that can be 
envisaged (economic, technological, political, historical …) occurring 
in the relevant period, he/she will be damaged if she/he lacks X’ (ibid.: 10). 
Avoiding harm to human beings is what gives strength to the claims of 
needs. 
The WB decides, in its definition, to take food as the sole need, leaving 
all other needs fully unmet and thus showing its conception of human 
beings. It implicitly reduces us to the level of animals since the UEPL 
suffices only to – inadequately – provide for nutritional requirements. 
Arguing that there is no consensus on what other needs are, the second 
element in the poverty definition of the World Bank (1990) is sidestepped. 
This is a crucial controversy. If norms regarding needs are seen not to 
have an objective social existence, then the concept of poverty would not 
be appropriate for scientific research, and the measurement of poverty 
would be a subjective exercise. As Sen has put it, it would be ‘unleashing 
one’s personal morals on the statistics of deprivation’ (Sen 1981: 17). 
Sen has assumed the position that what researchers do is to describe 
existing social prescriptions, which constitutes ‘an act of description and 
not of prescription’. For Sen (ibid.:17–18) there is a considerable degree 
of social consensus on minimum well-being standards. He quotes Adam 
Smith, who, speaking about how much an individual needs, says that 
a worker would be ashamed if he/she had to appear in public without 
a linen shirt and leather shoes. In the same line of argument, Boltvinik 
(2005) quotes Marx to show that there is an agreement in every society 
on the requirements of workers’ consumption, which is expressed in real 
wage levels, the only price that includes, according to Marx, a historical 
and a moral element.
The irrelevance of MDG1 in the Mexican experience
According to the Mexican presidency, in 1989, adopted as base year, 
9.3 per cent of Mexico’s population was ultra-poor, using the $1.25 
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dollar PPP threshold. UEP incidence has evolved as shown in Figure 
8.1.3 This is a skewed selection of a base year, since the debt crisis started 
in 1982 and poverty was at a historical peak in 1989. Thus, MDG1 
would require Mexico to reduce its UEP population to 4.65 per cent by 
2015. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, if the year 1992 had been selected 
as a base year, the goal would have been set much more ambitiously, 
at 2.54 per cent, since UEP incidence in 1992 was lower than in 1989 
– at 5.08 per cent. In 2010, UEP was 5.3 per cent, which is close to the 
minimalist goal of 4.65 per cent. But if 1992 had been the base year, the 
figure for 2010 (5.3 per cent) would be farther away from the alternative 
goal (2.54 per cent) than the base-year figure, which was 5.08 per cent. 
It also shows that the selection of 1989 as base year was a manipulation 
to ensure that Mexico would ‘accomplish’ MDG1.
Figure 8.2 shows UEP incidence evolution for the years 1992 to 2006 
at the national, urban and rural levels using the $1.08 PPP threshold. 
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8.1 Evolution of Ultra Extreme Poverty incidence (per cent) in Mexico and 
MDG1 ($1.25 PPP)
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that there is almost no poverty in the urban areas of Mexico: the urban 
graph starts at 0.7 per cent and ends at 0.47 per cent, providing a 
paradisiacal view of Mexico as a country that has no poverty in the 
urban areas and where less than 10 per cent of the rural population is 
poor. But these series end in 2006; after that year poverty incidence 
started to increase again, as shown in Figures 8.3 and 8.4. In both, 
the respective goals using 1992 as base year4 have been added. The 
first compares the evolution of UEP incidence in rural settlements in a 
longer series: 1992 to 2010,5 showing that the evolution of rural poverty 
is quite similar using the two thresholds of $1.25 PPP and $1.08 PPP, 
and adds information about the evolution from 2006 to 2010 using 
the $1.25 UEPL. The $1.25 series shows that Mexico had, by 2010, 
merely reduced UEP incidence by less than three percentage points in 
rural settlements, while the goal would have required reducing it by 7.5 
points. In 2006, the outcome is better for the $1.08 UEPL: it lies only 
1.1 percentage points above the goal, whereas with the $1.25 UEPL, 
the outcome was 2.25 points worse than the goal. 
Figure 8.4 presents the evolution of UEP in urban settlements and 
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8.2 Evolution of UEP (per cent) in Mexico (national, urban and rural) 
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8.3 Evolution of UEP (per cent) in rural settlements with $1.08 and $1.25 PPP 
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been achieved in 1994, and again in 2002. In 2006, one of them had 
been reached and the other was quite close to attainment. The reader 
might conclude that whereas MDG1 is set too low for urban areas of 
Mexico, it might be adequate for rural areas. However, this is not so. 
Figure 8.5 shows the acute contrast between poverty incidence levels, 
using the $1.25 PPP threshold and Mexican government thresholds. 
In Mexico, there are currently two official poverty measurement 
methods: one adopted by the federal government and the other by the 
government of Mexico City. The current federal method (identified 
in Figure 8.5 as FED, MD and intersection) shows multidimensional 
poverty, and replaced the previous income poverty method, which the 
federal government had introduced in 2002 (identified in the figure 
as Previous FED Income). The method adopted by the Mexico city 
government (identified in Figure 8.5 as MexCityGov, IPMM) is the 
Integrated Poverty Measurement Method, developed by Boltvinik in 
1990–92. The figure also includes the reinterpretation of the current 
official federal-level method, using a union criterion of poverty 
instead of the official intersection criterion. The responsible agency, 
Coneval, has interpreted the larger population identified as poor in 
the union approach, arguing that it identifies the sum of the poor plus 
the vulnerable. The figure compares poverty incidence by these five 
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The contrasts are stark. At the national and urban levels, the $1.25 
PPP line renders one-digit poverty incidence levels (5.3 and 1.3 per 
cent respectively) whereas the other options show poverty incidences 
in the range 40–95 per cent. The four alternative indices result in very 
high multiples of the incidences obtained with the MDG1 lines. 
It is obvious that these huge discrepancies in MDG1 estimates of 
poverty incidence in Mexico vis–à-vis the official estimates make them 
and the MDG1 goal for 2015 absolutely irrelevant. The issues at hand 
are what is the purchasing power in Mexico of $1.25 PPP, what does 
the UEP mean, and to what did the Mexican government commit itself 
by committing itself to attain MDG1? 
As mentioned, to calculate poverty in 2005, the WB updated the 
values of the PPP dollars, relative to the currencies of most countries. 
In May of that year, a dollar PPP was equivalent to 7.13 pesos when the 
nominal exchange rate was 10.96 pesos per dollar (World Bank 2008: 
25). Therefore, the poverty line defined by the WB ($1.25) was 8.91 
pesos per person per day (81 per cent of a current dollar value at that 
time). The very frugal ‘food’ line of the federal government recognizes 
that to acquire the raw food basket to cover nutritional requirements, 
an income of 19.50 and 26.36 pesos was needed in rural and urban 
areas, respectively. This means that people who have income equal 
to the WB’s UEPL would be able to acquire only 46 and 34 per cent 
of the minimum requirements for not being extremely (or food) poor 
according to federal criteria, in rural and urban areas respectively. This 
shows that the UEPL of the WB is meaningless for Mexico, as it is well 
below what even the federal government considered its most extreme 
poverty threshold. 
Two further points need to be made. First, from a methodological 
point of view, the measurement is statistically meaningless. To measure 
the incidence of a phenomenon as rare as UEP incidence in urban 
Mexico (1.3 per cent), one would need sample surveys of orders of 
magnitude larger than those employed in most countries, including 
Mexico, to capture its incidence with reasonable confidence intervals. 
With present sample sizes, the confidence intervals are so large that 
the results become statistically meaningless. For example, some of the 
abrupt fluctuations in the incidence of UEP observed in Figure 8.4 
might be partially due to sampling errors and the observed changes 
between observations might be statistically non-significant (confidence 
intervals may overlap).
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Secondly, from a policy point of view too, MDG1 had no relevance. 
The fact that Mexico committed to the Millennium Development 
Goals had no influence on its policy to combat extreme poverty. In 
the year 2000, when the Millennium Declaration was issued, Mexico 
had already been running the Progresa programme for three years. 
The programme title was changed in 2001 to Oportunidades. It has 
continued to grow, and has had a large influence (via the World Bank) 
on many other countries. It is a CCT (Conditional Cash Transfer) 
programme consisting of monetary transfers to the extremely poor 
only, conditional on certain behaviour requirements the beneficiaries 
have to follow
An impressionistic panorama of theories of capitalist crises
Marxian theory of capitalist crises6 is based, essentially, on the law 
of the declining rate of profit. This law establishes that labour is the 
only creator of value (and thus of surplus value). To the extent that the 
process of production is mechanized and automated – which is something 
capitalism cannot stop doing – the work process will be provided with 
more and better means of production. As a consequence, the ‘organic 
composition of capital’ – the proportion of constant capital invested 
in means of production and inputs in total capital – will increase. The 
rate of profit diminishes accordingly. Hence, the above-mentioned 
law is a consequence of mechanization and automation. Additionally, 
Marxist theory of capitalist crises is based on the Law of the Two 
Faces, which establishes that as a reaction to the first law, capital will 
do everything necessary (despite the falling rate of profit) to increase 
the mass of surplus value (which requires the employed workforce to 
increase), which in turn forces capital to search for the maximum rate 
of accumulation and to expand geographically. So, both the decrease 
in the rate of profit and the increase in the absolute amount of surplus 
value are necessary conditions for the functioning of capitalism. From 
this, John Strachey (1935) derived the Basic Dilemma of Capitalism, 
which makes capitalist crises inevitable; it is the dilemma by which 
wages are both too low and cause an excess supply (as in 1929 and 
2007) and too high to diminish the rhythm of accumulation, as was 
the case in the 1970s. 
Keynes’ theory of capitalist crises refutes Say’s Law (‘supply 
creates its own demand’), contesting two myths of neoclassical theory: 
the myth of the rate of interest as the price that equates savings and 
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investment, and the myth of wages as the price that equates supply and 
demand of labour. Keynes replaced these two myths by the thesis that 
the level of employment depends on effective demand (investment plus 
consumption) and that investment is determined by profit expectations 
(the expected rate of profit, which he called the marginal efficiency of 
capital, should be above the rate of interest so that new investment may 
proceed). Full employment ceases to be automatic and any level of 
employment becomes possible. Capitalism is not self-regulated; state 
intervention is hence indispensable. 
Neo-Marxists Foster and Magdoff, in The Great Financial Crisis 
(2009), characterize the present phase of capitalism as financial 
monopoly capitalism. They postulate the need of current capitalism 
for financial bubbles (financialization). Their departure point is the 
tendency of monopolist capitalism to stagnate, as formulated by Baran 
and Sweezy (1966). Minsky (1986) had observed the tendency of 
capitalism to create financial bubbles, which pile debt on debt and 
will inevitably burst. Financialization has become the main mechanism 
(displacing military expenditures) to temporarily absorb the gigantic 
surplus generated and thus keep afloat financial monopoly capitalism. 
This is a phenomenon which they call the symbiotic embrace between 
stagnation and financialization, and which we characterize as spontaneous 
private Keynesianism. There is no possibility for the capitalist system 
to absorb the enormous surplus through productive investment. As, 
additionally, the financialization process itself is in crisis, Foster and 
Magdoff foresee a profound and prolonged stagnation. 
Krugman (2008), winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, thinks 
that the fact that ‘the shadow banking system’ is unregulated is the 
cause of the bubble, which will burst inevitably. He argues that when 
the housing bubble burst, the lack of a replacement bubble led to 
the widespread crisis, thus acknowledging the need capitalism has of 
financial bubbles. Krugman stated clearly, even before the current 
crisis, the impotence of conventional economic theory to face a 
crisis. The stagnation of Japan in the 1990s would confirm the neo-
Marxist thesis of the tendency to stagnation of financial monopoly 
capitalism. 
The biggest difference between Krugman and Foster/Magdoff lies 
in the policy recommendations. While Krugman sees regulation of 
the shadow banking system as the solution, Foster and Magdoff think 
regulation would lead capitalism to chronic stagnation because of their 
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analysis of the need for capitalism to create financial bubbles. In our 
view, this regulation would be equivalent to suppressing spontaneous 
private Keynesianism. Capitalist crises magnify the tendency of capi-
talism to create poverty.
The preceding argument requires an additional perspective to 
explain the current situation. This additional perspective is the 
Scientific and Technical Revolution (STR), a long-term process that 
began after the Second World War, goes beyond cyclical crises, and 
transforms the character of production as it creates the conditions 
for full automation. Full automation ushers in the inevitable end of 
capitalism and anticipates an era of upheaval. This is discussed in 
the next section. Meanwhile, let’s recall Marx’s (2000 [1859]: 425) 
famous Preface: ‘At a certain stage of their development, the material 
productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations 
of production … From forms of development of the productive forces 
these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social 
revolution.’
Automation and the end of the wage-work society
Capitalism, in its relentless search for higher profits, constantly 
revolutionizes the techniques of production. It has generated at least 
two industrial revolutions: the eighteenth-century First Industrial 
Revolution centred on coal and the steam engine and its multiple 
applications in factories, and in railway and maritime transport; and 
the twentieth-century Second Industrial Revolution centred on oil, 
the internal combustion engine, electricity and the telephone. In 
both revolutions, production in industry, agriculture and mining was 
greatly transformed. Machines replaced an important proportion 
of direct human labour. In many branches of industry, workers 
increasingly became supervisors of automatic machinery. But this 
machinery was based exclusively on mechanical principles, which 
have limits. 
In contrast, the Scientific and Technical Revolution (STR), starting 
towards the end of the Second World War, introduced cybernetics, 
information technology, artificial intelligence and robotics. It 
unleashed a spiral of technological development that can be termed the 
Third ‘Industrial’ Revolution (TIR), covering all human productive 
activities. These revolutions have led to a gigantic replacement of 
human labour, first by mechanical machinery, and now by what 
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Richta et al. (1968) called autonomous production complexes. The 
stability of capitalism is very easily shaken by decreases in wages 
and/or employment, which diminish effective demand and lead the 
system to crises, as output cannot be sold. For the USA, Heilbroner 
(1995: xii–xiii) reminds us that technological change reduced the 
proportion of the agricultural labour force from 75 per cent in 1850 
to just 3 per cent in 1990, and then reduced employment in industry: 
between 1960 and 1990, manufacturing output continued to grow 
while the number of jobs was reduced by half. These reductions were 
offset by an increase in employment in services, which rose from 3 
to 90 million persons between 1870 and 1990. But as in industry, in 
services too technology creates jobs with one hand and destroys them 
with the other. ‘We are pushing the relationship between machines 
and work beyond the difficult adjustments of the last two hundred 
years,’ concludes Heilbroner, ‘towards a new relationship about 
whose configuration we can only say it will be very different from 
the past’ (ibid.: xiii). He refers to an anecdote from the history of 
economic thought: 
In 1817 the famous economist David Ricardo wrote that the 
amount of employment in an economy was of no consequence as 
long as rent and profits, out of which flowed its new investment, 
were undiminished. ‘Indeed?’ replied Simonde de Sismondi … 
‘In truth then, there is nothing more to wish for than the king, 
remaining alone on the island, by constantly turning a crank, might 
produce, through automata, all the output of England’. Jeremy 
Rifkin’s mind-opening book is about a world in which corporations 
have taken the place of kings, turning cranks that set into motion the 
mechanical, electrical, and electronic automata that provide the goods 
and services of the nation. (Ibid.: xi)
There are not enough new commodified, profit-driven, labour-
intensive activities to create enough new waged jobs to compensate 
for those that are being lost owing to automation. Although this 
transformation might take decades to bring about its full consequences, 
it has been silently contributing to crisis, stagnation, unemployment, 
underemployment, generalization of precarious employment (the 
‘precariat’, as aptly dubbed by Guy Standing in 2011), poverty and 
hunger. But the full consequences might come earlier than the moment 
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when a high percentage of the working-age population has been 
displaced by automation. As Martin Ford (2009: 108–9) has stated, 
replicating the type of analysis of expectations Keynes did so well: 
As automation begins to eliminate jobs in an increasingly wide range 
of industries and occupations, its impacts are clearly not going to 
be kept a secret … As a growing percentage of the population is 
exposed to direct evidence of ongoing job losses, many people will 
begin to experience a greatly heightened level of stress and worry. 
Facing this, individuals will take the obvious action: they will cut 
back on consumption, perhaps quite dramatically, and try to save 
more in anticipation of a very uncertain future … But what if, at 
some point in the coming decades, there is a general coalescence of 
belief that suggests the basic character of the economy has changed 
to such an extent that jobs may not be available – or at least will be 
very hard to obtain – in the future? If this were to occur in a critical 
mass of the consumers … we could clearly be thrust into a very dark 
scenario … a dramatic economic downward spiral would almost 
certainly be precipitated.
As a result of unstoppable automation progress, capitalism will fall into 
increasingly severe crises until it becomes completely non-viable. This is 
what a very distinguished group of scientist led by Robert Oppenheimer, 
constituted as the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, were 
pointing at, more than fifty years ago, when they published an open 
letter to the president of the United States in the New York Times which 
argued that cyber-technologies were forcing a change in the relationship 
between income and work and urged president and Congress ‘to consider 
guaranteeing to every citizen, as a matter of law, adequate income’. 
Their text says (at www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isr/vol25/
no03/adhoc.html): ‘The continuity of the link between income and 
employment as the only major distribution system of effective demand 
– to grant the right to consume – now acts as the main brake of the almost 
limitless capacity of the cybernetic system of production’. 
Compare the phrase in italics with Marx’s words (cited above) in 
the 1859 Preface: ‘At a certain stage of development, the material 
productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations 
of production … From forms of development of the productive forces 
these relations turn into their fetters.’
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In response to the Oppenheimer Committee request, President 
Kennedy decided to establish a National Commission on Automation, 
which was created by President Johnson. It published its report in 
1965. The Commission argued that technology reduces the number 
of jobs, not work. Rifkin (1995: 83) comments that this is also the 
view of the Oppenheimer Committee: if the economy produces work 
without workers, as both sides suggest, then some form of government 
intervention would be necessary to provide a source of income, of 
purchasing power, to the growing number of workers displaced by 
technology. But ultimately, the presidential commission concluded 
that the technological displacement of workers was a necessary and 
temporary condition engendered by progress.
Rifkin (2003: 27) predicted that the twenty-first century would be 
faced with the end of mass work. ‘This is the anthropological point 
where we are. We have a technological revolution that can create a 
renaissance or a great social upheaval. We can take a leap forward 
for the generation of your children or we can have years, decades and 
generations of instability and unrest.’ 
The renaissance option relates to texts by Marx and by Richta et al. 
Marx (1976 [1876]: 532) quotes Aristotle and then Antipater:
‘If every tool, when summoned, or even by intelligent anticipation, 
could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus 
moved of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestus went of their 
own accord to their sacred work, if the shuttles were to weave of 
themselves, then there would be no need either of apprentices 
for the master craftsmen, or of slaves for the Lords’. Antipater, 
a Greek poet of the time of Cicero, hailed the water-wheel for 
grinding corn, that most basic form of all productive machinery, as 
the liberator of female slaves and the restorer of the golden age!
In Civilisation at Its Crossroads (1968: 35–6, 133–7), Richta et al. 
argue: 
Over the past decades, the impetuous development of science 
and technology has begun to escape the limits of the industrial 
revolution … The work instruments exceed the limits of 
mechanical machines and assume functions which, in principle, 
transform them into autonomous production complexes … the 
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subjective aspect of production, unchanged for centuries, is amended: the 
direct production functions performed by simple labour force disappear 
gradually … New social productive forces enter the process of production, 
the main being science and its technical applications … The originality 
of the yet incipient development, which … defines it as scientific 
and technological revolution, lies in its shaking of the entire 
elemental structure of production to radically alter the place occupied 
by man. It ensures the triumph of the automatic principle in the 
widest sense of the term … (Ibid.: 35–6)
[While the] predominant type of worker in mechanised industrial 
production is the worker-operator handling machinery or caught 
in the mechanism of the assembly line … [p. 133], complex 
automation goes increasingly further, freeing man from his direct 
involvement in the process of production, the role of simple ‘gear’ in the 
system of machines and offers him, in return, the role of promoter, creator 
and director of the technical system of production … (Ibid.: 135) 
We can expect the process of the STR to absorb traditional simple 
industrial work, which is not an internal need for man, but is imposed 
by an external necessity. On the other hand, once man ceases to 
produce the things that things themselves can produce in his place, the 
possibility to devote himself to a creative activity that mobilizes all 
his forces, that tend to research new pathways, that expands his 
capacities, opens up before him … (Ibid.: 136)
The general diffusion of this type of human activity will in fact 
mark the overcoming of work. Indeed, once the material forms of 
human activity give to it the character of active manifestations of 
self, the external necessity, determined by the need of subsistence, 
gives way to the inner necessity of man; at that moment, human activity 
becomes a human need that exists for itself and enriches him; then the 
abstract contradictions between work and pleasure, between work 
and leisure wither away: human activity becomes entangled with 
life. (Ibid.: 136–7)
Rifkin (1995: 84–9), quoting David Noble (1984), posits that with 
respect to automation, most trade unions capitulated to companies, 
and this contributed to extinguishing a debate on the effects of 
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automation. Fearful of being labelled modern Luddites and considered 
obstacles to progress, labour leaders were on the defensive and many 
embraced labour-saving technology, causing the labour movement 
to lose the strength it had acquired in the early post-war years. In 
collective bargaining, the workers relinquished control over technology 
in exchange for job retraining. Workers could have negotiated 
collective agreements to ensure a share in productivity gains derived 
from automation. However, unions grossly overestimated the number 
of skilled jobs that would be created by the new technologies. As a 
consequence, they lost members and influence. Eventually, automation 
destroyed their most powerful weapon: the strike. The new technology 
allowed management to operate plants with very few staff.
Rifkin (2003) recognized the clothing and electronics industries as 
the last cheap labour markets responsible for growth in the developing 
world, but added ‘German engineers have automated the seam’ and 
‘we are quickly going to the automated production of electronic 
components’. He wondered what would happen in the global South 
when these branches too become automated.
One year before Rifkin published The End of Work, Aronowitz and 
DiFazio published The Jobless Future in which they make the following 
point (1994: xi–xii): 
As experts, politicians, and the public become acutely aware of 
new problems associated with the critical changes in the economy 
– crime, poverty, homelessness, hunger, education downsizing, loss 
of tax revenues to pay for public services, and many other social 
issues – the solution is always the same: jobs, jobs, jobs. The central 
contention of this book is that if jobs are the solution, we are in big 
trouble. We argue that the tendency of contemporary global economic 
life is toward the underpaid and unpaid worker … Scientifically based 
technological change in the midst of sharpened internationalization 
of production means that there are too many workers for too few jobs, 
and even fewer of them are well paid … The aim of this work is to 
suggest political and social solutions that take us in a direction in 
which it is clear that jobs are no longer the solution, that we must find 
another way to ensure a just standard of living for all.
They observed (ibid.: 3–4) that, contrary to expectations that 
the service sector would absorb the unemployment generated in 
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manufacturing, the new information technologies were also displacing 
workers. Rifkin (1995: 141–57), recognizing that computers can 
understand speech, read text and perform tasks previously performed 
by human beings, forecast a new era in which the services would be 
increasingly automated. Not only routine personal services, but also 
more complex services are being taken on by intelligent machines. 
Retail trade is also being automated. The use of bar codes, by increasing 
the efficiency of cashiers – the third-largest job in services in the 
USA (1.5 million) – will eliminate many jobs. Self-service checkouts 
are appearing in supermarkets, menacing the jobs of cashiers, as 
has already happened in car parks. Retail trade was the sponge that 
absorbed unemployment (Rifkin 1995) – this no longer holds true. 
The exceptions are the education and health sectors, where available 
data show for the USA that these continue to create jobs. 
Rifkin (ibid.: 121) returns to the end of work theme:
Big data, advanced analytics, algorithms, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), and robotics are replacing human labor across the 
manufacturing industries, service industries, and knowledge 
and entertainment sectors, leading to the very real prospect of 
liberating hundreds of millions of people from work in the market 
economy in the first half of the twenty-first century.
He quotes the 4 November 2011 issue of The Economist, which cites 
Rifkin (1995), who had ‘argued prophetically that society was entering 
a new phase – one in which fewer and fewer workers would be needed 
to produce all the goods and services consumed … the process has clearly 
begun’. Rifkin reacts to this text: 
It wasn’t that I was clairvoyant. The signs were everywhere, 
but in the growth years, most economists were so attached to 
conventional economic theory – that supply creates demand and 
that new technologies, while disruptive, reduce costs, stimulate 
consumption, spur more production, increase innovation, and 
open up opportunities for new kinds of jobs – that my message fell 
largely on deaf ears. Now economists are taking notice. (Rifkin 
2014: 122)
He adds: 
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Today, near workless factories run by computer programs are 
increasingly the norm, both in highly industrialized countries 
and developing nations … [Many] blame blue-collar job losses 
on the relocation of manufacturing to cheap labor markets like 
China. The fact is that something more consequential has taken 
place. Between 1995 and 2002, 22 million manufacturing jobs 
were eliminated in the global economy while global production 
increased by more than 30 percent worldwide … Manufacturers 
that have long relied on cheap labor in their Chinese production 
facilities are bringing production back home with advanced 
robotics that are cheaper and more efficient than their Chinese 
workforces … (Ibid.:123)
As Rifkin acknowledges (ibid.: 128), after the Great Financial Crisis 
there has been a boom in publications ‘warning about automation’s 
impact on jobs … and their message of a coming workerless world 
began to gain attention in social media outlets, even attracting some 
comments from policy makers, think tank researchers, economists, and 
President Barack Obama’.
Martin Ford links the advancing technology with the current 
crisis (2009: 6), and is concerned that economists reject the idea that 
technology displaces human labour and dismiss those raising concerns 
regarding technological unemployment as ‘neo-Luddites’, coining the 
term Luddite-fallacy (ibid.: 47–8). He is very clear on the role of the 
labour market in capitalism: 
The reality is that the free market economy, as we understand it 
today, simply cannot work without available labor market. Jobs 
are the primary mechanism through which income – and therefore 
purchasing power – is distributed to the people who consume 
everything the economy produces. If at some point machines 
are likely to permanently take over a great deal of the work now 
performed by human beings, then that will be a threat to the very 
foundation of our economic system. This is not something that will 
just work itself out. (Ibid.: 5)
He perceives, correctly in our opinion, that ‘off-shoring is a prelude 
to automation’ (ibid.: 56–7): ‘… many jobs that are currently being off-
shored will, in the future, end up being fully automated’; ‘Off-shoring 
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is the small wave that distracts you. Automation is the big one further 
out that you don’t see coming.’ 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2012, 2014) provide further evidence on 
the impact of automation on job displacement. For instance, they show 
clearly that job growth has been de-accelerating constantly since the 
1940s. 
The population of the United States grew by 30 million in the 
past decade, so we would need to create 18 million jobs just to keep 
the same share of the population working as in the year 2000. Instead, 
we’ve created virtually none, reducing the employment to population 
ratio from over 64% to barely 58%. The lack of jobs is not simply 
a matter of massive layoffs due to the Great Recession. Instead, 
it reflects deep structural issues that have been worsening for a 
decade or more. (Ibid.: 35)
In a more radical vein, André Gorz, the great Marxist thinker, 
begins Reclaiming Work. Beyond the Wage-Based Society (1999: 1) by 
saying: ‘We must dare to break with this society that is dying and will 
not reborn. We must dare to Exodus. There is nothing to be gained 
from symptomatic treatment of the “crisis” because there no longer is 
any crisis. A new system has been installed which is abolishing “work” 
on a massive scale.’
There is a partial diagnostic agreement between Gorz, Rifkin, 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, and Aronowitz and DiFazio. Gorz main-
tains that ‘It is not this abolition we should object to, but its claiming 
to perpetuate that same work, the norms, dignity and availability of 
which it is abolishing, as an obligation, as a norm, and as the irre-
placeable foundation of the rights and dignity of all’ (1999: 1). He 
concludes: 
We must dare to prepare ourselves for the Exodus from ‘work-
based society’: it no longer exists and will not return. We 
must want this society, which is in its dead-throes, to die, so 
that another may arise from its ruins. We must learn to make 
out the contours of that other society beneath the resistances, 
dysfunctions and impasses which make up the present. ‘Work’ 
must lose its centrality in the minds, thoughts and imagination 
of everyone. We must learn to see it differently: no longer as 
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something we have – or do not have – but as what we do. We must 
be bold enough to regain control of the work we do. 
(Ibid.: 1, emphasis in original)
Gorz also discusses the nature of the work that is being eliminated: 
‘it is what everyone calls work, but not work in the philosophical or the 
anthropological sense, nor the work of giving birth to a child, nor the 
work of the sculptor or poet’. 
It is not work as the ‘autonomous activity of transforming 
matter’, nor as the ‘practico-sensory activity’ by which the subject 
exteriorizes him/herself by producing an object which bears his/
her imprint. It is unambiguously, the specific ‘work’ peculiar to 
industrial capitalism, the work we are referring when we say ‘she 
doesn’t work’ of a woman who devotes her time to bringing up 
her own children, but ‘she works’ of one who gives even some 
small part of her time to bringing up other people’s children … 
(Ibid.: 2)
From the above analyses, we conclude that the development of 
productive forces compatible with capitalism appears to be coming 
to an end. Globalization and industrial expansion to capture the very 
cheap and docile labour of the global South appear as temporary steps 
before the full automation of production.
What can be done within capitalism? Universal, Sufficient 
and Unconditional Citizen’s Income
Earn your bread by the sweat of your brow, says the Bible, and we 
may add: ‘and by the humiliation of your spirit’. Maslow (1987 [1954]: 
27) wrote that the experience can reassess more pre-potent needs (the 
physiological): ‘a man who has quit his job to keep self-respect, and 
lives hungry for six months, may be willing to return to work even at 
the price of losing his self-respect’. Heilbroner (1963) has shown that 
in the history of mankind there are three ways to solve the fundamental 
economic problem, defined as the mobilization of human energy to 
work: tradition, coercion or literal whip, and the metaphorical whip of 
hunger. Despite the monotonous nature of work and the humiliations 
imposed, the proletarian cannot quit her job because she is dominated 
by the whip of hunger.
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The growing contradiction between automation and the wage-
based society, which heralds the end of capitalism, has stimulated 
different proposals to solve a challenge, which could result in a global 
apocalypse. Rifkin (1995) offered a proposal: a reduction of the 
work week and the promotion of non-profit-oriented activities, in 
a third sector or social economy, beyond the market and the public 
sector, providing community and social services. This sector would 
be promoted through tax incentives and by the government paying a 
social wage to those ‘holding a job’ in it. This can be interpreted as 
an attempt to save capitalism, although Rifkin posits that capitalism 
will constitute a declining proportion of the future economy, while the 
third sector would increase. Rifkin’s proposal is not in the line of a 
Basic Income approach, which he discusses but does not incorporate 
into his proposal. 
Martin Ford has also offered solutions to this blind alley seeking to 
save capitalism. He acknowledges, ‘in order to preserve the mass market 
in a largely automated economy, we need to provide an alternative 
to jobs. We need a mechanism that can get a reliable income stream 
into the hands of consumers. This, of course, is a proposition that 
will be very difficult for most of us to accept; the idea that we must 
work for a living is one of our most basic core values’ (2009: 159). He 
adds (ibid.: 160), ‘there is simply no way to envision how the private 
sector can solve this problem. There is simply no real alternative 
except for the government to provide some type of income mechanism 
for consumers.’ To fund this income-providing mechanism, Ford 
(ibid.:162–79) proposes to recoup wages lost as a consequence of 
automation via taxation. Incomes would be unequal and would depend 
on three factors: level of education, participation in community and 
civic activities, and positive behaviour towards the environment. He 
sums up his proposal (ibid.: 195) as follows: ‘By offering unequal 
incentive-based income to consumers, we not only sustain consumer 
demand, but also drive people to act in ways that benefit us all …’ It 
could be called a conditional basic income, which apparently would not 
be universal but targeted at those directly affected by automation. 
The great aspiration to overcome scarcity and alienation, achievable 
from the point of view of the productive forces for the past fifty years 
(Richta et al. 1968), is, in our assessment, unattainable within capital-
ism. The intensified contradiction between the forces of production 
and the rules of income distribution in capitalism was observed, from 
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the 1960s, by persons who were more interested in saving capitalism 
than in overcoming it.
Oppenheimer and the group of scientists he led, which included 
Robert Theobald, proposed a Universal Citizen’s Unconditional 
Income (UCUI). Theobald coordinated one of the first publications 
on a ‘Guaranteed Income’ (Theobald 1965). In his contribution to 
that volume, Fromm argued that the UCUI could, for the first time, 
free the individual from the threat of starvation, from economic threats. 
Nobody would have to accept conditions of work merely because he 
otherwise would be afraid of starving … the woman could leave her 
husband, the teenager his family (Fromm 1965: 176). 
In another approach, with a view to transcending rather than saving 
capitalism, André Gorz made the case that, with automation, the labour 
society, the wage society, was coming to an end. It was therefore time 
to distinguish between ‘the imperative need for a sufficient, regular 
income’ and ‘the need to act, to strive, to test oneself against others, 
and be appreciated by them’ (Gorz 1999: 72). The right to a sufficient, 
regular income will no longer have to depend on the permanent 
occupation of a steady job. The need to act, strive and be appreciated 
by others will no longer have to take the form of paid work done to 
order … ‘Working time would no longer be the dominant social time.’ These 
are the outlines of a new civilization ‘which is struggling to be born 
beyond the wage-based society … They correspond to the aspiration 
for a multi-active life …’ and personal autonomy (ibid.: 73, italics in 
original). 
Discussing his proposal of a guaranteed income for life, Gorz 
argued that it must meet two conditions: it needs to be sufficient to 
avoid poverty, and it needs to be unconditional. One could therefore 
call it a Universal, Sufficient and Unconditional Citizen’s Income 
(USUCI). A USUCI would allow people to refuse non-dignified 
working conditions (ibid.: 82–3). USUCI is intended to ‘enable 
people to reject inhuman working conditions. It must be part of a 
social environment which enables all citizens to decide on an ongoing basis 
between the use value of their time and its exchange value, that is to say 
between the ‘utilities’ they can acquire by selling their working time 
and those they can ‘self-provide’ by using that time themselves’ (ibid.: 
83). The aim of USUCI is ‘not to enable people not to work at all, 
but rather to give genuine effect to the right to work: not the right to 
that work you are “employed” to do, but to the concrete work you 
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do without having to be paid for it’. In this sense, work represents 
a mastery of self and of the surrounding world which is necessary 
for the development of human capacities. ‘As the need for “work” 
diminishes, fairness requires that it should diminish in everyone’s 
life and that the burden of work should be equitably distributed’ 
(ibid.: 84).
USUCI differs fundamentally from the guarantee of an income 
below the poverty line proposed by neoliberals, which seeks to force the 
unemployed to accept reduced pay and thus make profitable otherwise 
unprofitable jobs, creating a lumpen labour market (ibid.: 81).
According to Gorz, free time allows individuals to develop their 
capacities for invention, creation, conception. The consequence – but 
not the purpose – of this is unlimited productivity. It allows converting 
production into an ancillary activity and enables the maximization 
of available time to become the inherent meaning and purpose of 
economic reason. It replaces work – as the dominant form of activity 
– with personal activity. 
To replace the society of work with the society of multi-activity, 
the USUCI must be accompanied by the redistribution of work, and 
new modes of cooperation and exchange (ibid.: 93–100). There is only 
one way to distribute a decreasing volume of work among a growing 
number of people: to work increasingly in a discontinuous way and 
allow people the choice between various forms of discontinuity, thereby 
transforming it into a new freedom: the right to work intermittently 
and lead a multi-active life. 
Gorz finds one concrete example for this approach in Denmark. 
There, non-work is subsidized. Its principles give equal importance to 
the right to work and to the right not to work and the links between 
them: the right to work discontinuously with a continuous income. 
Payment when not working is 63 per cent of normal salary; thus 
someone who works half-time receives a salary equal to 81.5 per cent 
of a full-time salary. The limit of the Danish formula lies in the fact 
that it guarantees a conditional social income that not everyone can 
achieve. But as a transitional formula it is particularly interesting, Gorz 
concludes (ibid.: 96–8).
The issue of funding as an objection to USUCI ‘comes to encapsulate 
the problem of the system as a whole’: although working time is no 
longer the measure of created wealth, it still remains the basis for the 
distribution of incomes. Wassily Leontief (quoted by Gorz) puts it as 
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follows: ‘When wealth creation depends no longer on work, men will 
die of hunger at the gates of paradise, unless a new income policy is 
established as a response’ (Gorz 1998: 100). As an important financial 
source for USUCI and decommodification, two lines of action should 
be gradually implemented. First, land rent should be appropriated 
by the state, by way of very high and progressive property taxes on 
commercial land use. A second source would come from a tax on 
financial transactions and on foreign currency transactions, and a 
capital gains tax.
A USUCI would eliminate poverty radically and at the same time 
solve the contradiction between gigantic levels of actual and potential 
production and shrinking consumer demand as a result of wage loss 
due to automation. It would save capitalism, but plant in it the seed of 
its transformation by eliminating the whip of hunger and thus liberating 
people.
Final reflections
If capitalist crises and automation are the two basic forces determining 
the trends of global poverty, then it is logical to conclude that the 
adoption of poverty reduction goals is a somewhat futile exercise, unless 
this exercise examines the causes of global poverty trends and establishes 
the changes required to modify those trends. The chapter has argued 
that capitalism is coming to an end because automation continuously 
decreases the jobs required to produce a potentially increasing amount 
of goods and services. When jobs decrease, the income in the hands of 
the vast majority of consumers also decreases, making the sale of goods 
produced impossible. This growing contradiction can bring to an end 
a society that distributes income mainly by wages. 
The conclusion is straightforward: the global community must discuss 
how to design and implement a mechanism that could decouple income 
from paid jobs, if it wants to avoid the social chaos that could be coming 
soon, both in developed and in developing countries, if it continuous 
pretending that fixing poverty reduction goals is all it has to do. 
USUCI, or something equivalent to it, prevents the coming social 
chaos as it decouples income from declining jobs and allows for the 
capitalist system to continue functioning. Not only extreme poverty 
– all poverty is eliminated completely and permanently. The barriers 
that social relations of production pose to the further development of 
productive forces are eliminated. 
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On the other hand, the adoption of ultra-extreme poverty reduc-
tion goals does not respond to the social chaos threat. These goals 
have led many countries to the adoption of CCTs (Conditional Cash 
Transfer) targeted at ultra-extreme poor households, following recom-
mendations by the World Bank to achieve the goals. But CCTs result 
in a lumpen proletariat labour market, promoting the growth of the 
‘precariat’ (Standing 2011), and do not reduce poverty significantly, 
as transfers are very low and the causes of poverty trends are not taken 
care of. 
Notes
1 Unless otherwise stated, emphasis 
in quoted material is the authors’.
2 The official poverty measurement 
method used by the Government of 
Mexico City is the Integrated Poverty 
Measurement Method (IPMM), a 
multidimensional method developed 
by Boltvinik in the early 1990s. The 
other is a reinterpretation of Coneval’s 
official poverty measurement method, 
conceiving as poor all households/
persons belonging to each of two sets: 
those below the poverty line and showing 
one or more ‘social lacks’ (i.e. deprivation 
in direct indicators), instead of using an 
intersection, as does Coneval. 
3 In the figure the years that show 
an e have been estimated from a graph 
in on the Mexico presidency’s web page 
and also using previous and more detailed 
information from INEGI which includes 
all the years since 1989 where information 
is available and which separates rural and 
urban figures on UEP incidence.
4 The year 1989 cannot be used 
as baseline as there is no comparable 
information for that year to identify urban 
and rural settlements.
5 National poverty data for 1989 
cannot be disaggregated by rural and 
urban areas because the corresponding 
1989 survey used a very odd rural–urban 
definition.
6 Marx did not formulate 
systematically a theory of capitalist crises, 
but wrote a lot about them in dispersed 
passages of his main economic writings: 
Capital, Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus 
Value. John Strachey (1935) was one of the 
first to systematize his thought on this 
topic, together with Paul Sweezy (1970 
[1942]).
References
Aronowitz, S. and W. DiFazio (1994) 
The Jobless Future: Sci-Tech and the 
Dogma of Work, Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Baran, P. A. and P. Sweezy (1966) 
Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review 
Press.
Boltvinik, J. (2005) ‘Ampliar la Mirada. 
Un Nuevo enfoque de la pobreza 
y el florecimiento humano’, 
PhD dissertation, Centro de 
Investigación y Estudios Superiores 
en Antropología Social, Occidente, 
Guadalajara, Mexico.
Brynjolfsson, E. and A. McAfee (2012) 
Race against the Machine, New York: 
Norton.
— (2014) The Second Machine Age: Work, 
Progress, and Prosperity in a Time 
of Brilliant Technologies, New York; 
Norton.
202 | e ight
Doyal, L. and I. Gough (1991) A Theory of 
Human Need, London: Macmillan.
Ford, M. (2009) The Lights in the Tunnel. 
Automation, Accelerating Technology 
and the Economy of the Future, San 
Bernardino, CA: Acculant Publishing.
Foster, J. B. and F. Magdoff (2009) The 
Great Financial Crisis: Causes and 
Consequences, New York: Monthly 
Review Press.
Fromm, E. (1965) ‘The psychological 
aspects of the Guaranteed Income’, in 
R. Theobald, The Guaranteed Income. 
Next Step in Economic Evolution, New 
York: Doubleday, pp. 175–84. 
Gorz, A. (1998) Miserias del presente: 
Riqueza de lo posible, Buenos Aires: 
Paidós.
— (1999) Reclaiming Work: Beyond the 
Wage-Based Society, Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
Heilbroner, R. (1963) The Making of 
Economic Society, Prentice Hall.
— (1995) ‘Foreword’, in J. Rifkin, The End of 
Work, New York: Putnam, pp. xi–xiii. 
Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of 
Depression Economics and the Crisis of 
2008, New York: Norton. 
Marx, K. (1976 [1867]) Capital: A Critique 
of Political Economy, vol. 1, London: 
Penguin.
— (2000 [1859]) Preface to A Critique of 
Political Economy, in D. McLellan 
(ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Maslow, A. (1987 [1954]) Motivation and 
Personality, 3rd edn, New York: 
Addison-Wesley Longman. 
Minsky, H. (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable 
Economy, Yale University Press.
Noble, D. (1984) Forces of Production: 
A Social History of Industrial 
Automation, New York: Knopf.
Pogge, T. and S. Reddy (2010) ‘How not 
to count the poor’, in S. Anand, P. 
Segal and J. Stiglitz, Debates on the 
Measurement of Global Poverty, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
42–85.
Putnam, H. (2002) The Collapse of the 
Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other 
Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Richta, R. et al. (1968) La civilización en la 
encrucijada, Madrid: Artiach. 
Rifkin, J. (1995) The End of Work, New 
York: Putnam.
— (2003), ‘Tiempo libre para disfrutarlo 
o hacer filas de desempleados’, in 
L. J. Alvarez, Un mundo sin trabajo, 
Mexico City: Editorial Dríada, 
pp. 15–49.
— (2014) The Zero Marginal Cost Society, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sen, A. K. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An 
Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Standing, G. (2009) Work after 
Globalization: Building Occupational 
Citizenship, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
— (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous 
Class, London: Bloomsbury. 
Strachey, J. (1935) The Nature of Capitalist 
Crisis, New York: Covici Friede 
Publishers.
Sweezy, P. (1970 [1942]) The Theory of 
Capitalist Development, New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
Theobald, R. (1965) The Guaranteed 
Income: Next Step in Economic 
Evolution, New York: Doubleday.
Wiggins, D. (1987) Needs, Values, Truth: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
World Bank (1990) World Development 
Report 1990: Poverty, Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
— (2008) Global Purchasing Power, 
Parities and Real Expenditures, 2005, 
Washington, DC: International 
Comparison Program, World Bank. 
— (2009) Global Monitoring Report 
2009, A Development Emergency, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
9  |  S O C I A L  S O L I D A R I T Y  M U S T  R E P L A C E 
P O V E R T Y  E R A D I C A T I O N  I N  T H E  U N ’ S 
P O S T - 2 0 1 5  D E V E L O P M E N T  A G E N D A
Bob Deacon1
Introduction and overview
This chapter does the following. It 
• reviews the beginnings of the discussion within and around the UN 
regarding what should be the UN development agenda after 2015. 
It suggests that while the initial outcomes of the review held out the 
possibility that the post-2015 agenda might shift from a targeted and 
technical residual approach to alleviating poverty to an approach 
which is more concerned with policy and process focused in part upon 
overcoming social structural inequity both within and between countries, 
this agenda a) became complicated by the injection of sustainability 
concerns into it and moreover b) by the time of the publication in late 
2014 of the Open Working Group’s outcome document the focus on 
social policies that might address structural inequality was lost. 
• argues, and presents support for the case, that the continuing global 
politics of poverty alleviation and eradication should indeed shift 
towards a new global politics of building social solidarity and include a 
focus as much on the welfare needs of middle-class state builders as 
on the poor in order to create those solidarities. 
• reviews several global policy responses that have been concerned 
with poverty issues consequent upon the global economic crisis of 
2008. These include a) affording more resources to the IMF, b) 
the development of the UN-wide Social Protection Floor initiative, 
c) the increased attention given to the concept of freedom from 
poverty as a human right and d) a renewed focus on state-lead 
development. 
• asks which if any of these approaches might both address the issue 
of building solidarities and of being likely to be embedded in the 
post-2015 agenda. 
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The UN discusses the post-MDG agenda
To initiate the process of thinking through the post-2015 
development agenda within the UN system the first step was given to the 
internal UN Task Force made up of spokespersons from over fifty UN 
agencies. It began its work in January 2012 with a Zero Draft2 prepared 
by UNDESA and UNDP staff drawing on a number of critical papers 
such as those of Gore (2010) and Fukuda-Parr (2010). In its balanced 
review of the perceived positive and negative aspects of the MDG goals 
it noted among the shortcomings of the MDG agenda that it was ‘not 
explicit as to what are to be seen as the structural causes of poverty and 
social exclusion [my emphasis], nor regarding the strategies and policy 
actions to be taken to address the structural causes to facilitate the 
achievement of the MDGs’ (UN 2012a: 4). It went on to suggest that 
‘critics have suggested that the MDGs have introduced an undue and 
mechanistic association of poverty reduction with economic growth 
with no reference to the structural causes of poverty and deprivation’ 
(ibid.: 7). The think piece asked ‘How to bring into the development 
framework questions of inequality, peace and security, global and 
national governance, human rights, sustainable development without 
overloading the agenda to the point of losing its operational value?’ 
(ibid.: 8).
After several video conferences and other forms of communica-
tion the Task Force reported in May 2012 (UN 2012b). Its Executive 
Summary was predictably bland but did suggest a future development 
agenda centred on ‘four key dimensions of a more holistic approach: 
(1) inclusive social development [my emphasis]; (2) inclusive economic 
development; (3) environmental sustainability; and (4) peace and 
security’ (ibid.: 2). It suggested a high degree of policy coherence was 
needed to achieve this. The baton then passed to the High Level Panel 
(HLP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda whose membership and 
terms of reference were announced on 15 July 2012. In setting out the 
terms of reference the UN Secretary-General reordered the items in the 
Task Force report which had suggested inclusive social development as 
number one by now putting economic growth as the number-one pri-
ority. It commanded the Panel to make ‘Recommendations on how to 
build and sustain broad political consensus on an ambitious yet achiev-
able Post-2015 development agenda around the three dimensions of 
economic growth, social equality and environmental sustainability; 
taking into account the particular challenges of countries in conflict 
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and post-conflict situations’ (UN 2012c: 5). UK prime minister David 
Cameron, Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, of Indonesia, are co-chairs. Cameron has been 
rewarded for keeping the UK commitment to reach the 0.7 per cent of 
gross national income spent on development aid. Unfortunately his pre-
occupation is what he calls the ‘golden thread’ of development. Owen 
Barder, Europe director of the Centre for Global Development think 
tank, says the golden thread stresses free markets, jobs and growth, but 
not other ways to encourage positive social and economic change, such 
as reducing inequality, tackling the power of elites, providing social pro-
tection, and ensuring a strong voice for civil society.3
Initial reaction from the Beyond 2000 Civil Society Campaign 
Group (Beyond 2000 2012) was critical of the terms of reference. It 
was ‘surprised and disappointed that the ToRs do not include a single 
reference to human rights’. It did, however, ‘welcome the HLP 
plans to set out key principles to reshape global partnership. One 
lesson learnt from the MDGs is the need to better deliver equity and 
equality, within but also between countries’.
In the event the final report of the High Level Panel included the 
concept of human rights but avoided a focus on equity by continuing 
to address in the spirit of the MDGs the issue of extreme poverty. 
Thus it concluded: ‘After 2015 we should move from reducing to 
ending extreme poverty, in all its forms. We should ensure that no 
person – regardless of ethnicity, gender, geography, disability, race or 
other status – is denied universal human rights and basic economic 
opportunities’ (UN 2013: 8).
In parallel to setting up the HLP the UN Secretary-General took the 
step of establishing the Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
(SDSN) on 9 August 2012, which
will provide global, open and inclusive support to sustainable-
development problem solving at local, national, and global scales. 
The SDSN will work together with United Nations agencies, 
other international organizations, and the multilateral funding 
institutions including the World Bank and regional development 
banks, to mobilize scientific and technical expertise to scale up 
the magnitude and quality of local, national and global problem 
solving, helping to identify solutions and highlighting best practices 
in the design of long-term development pathways.
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Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-
General on the MDGs, will direct the project with the core aim of 
creating an open, inclusive and world-class global network of expertise 
and problem-solving. The network will comprise mainly universities 
and scientific research institutes, but will also tap technical expertise 
within technology companies, science foundations and academies of 
sciences and engineering. Columbia University’s Earth Institute will 
serve as the secretariat for the network. However, an examination of 
its website suggests a lower profile in the process than might have been 
expected.
The other context for this crafting of the UN development agenda 
beyond 2015 is, of course, the widely criticized outcome of the Rio+20 
conference, which produced a broad thesis on sustainable development 
with little specific policy guidance. George Monbiot (blog, 21 June 
2012) was particularly scathing about the outcome:
In 1992, world leaders signed up to something called 
‘sustainability’. Few of them were clear about what it meant; I 
suspect that many of them had no idea. Perhaps as a result, it did 
not take long for this concept to mutate into something subtly 
different: ‘sustainable development’. Then it made a short jump to 
another term: ‘sustainable growth’. And now, in the 2012 Rio+20 
text that world leaders are about to adopt, it has subtly mutated 
once more: into ‘sustained growth’. This term crops up 16 times in 
the document, where it is used interchangeably with sustainability 
and sustainable development. But if sustainability means anything, 
it is surely the opposite of sustained growth. Sustained growth on a 
finite planet is the essence of un-sustainability.
In relation to our concern with poverty, equity and inclusive social 
development the recent significant International Labour Conference 
recommendation that countries should develop a Social Protection 
Floor (see later) ended up relegated to one sub-paragraph (n) of 
paragraph 58 of the Rio+20 document concerned with the green 
economy, which should, among sixteen concerns, ‘address the concern 
about inequalities and promote social inclusion, including social 
protection floors’.
The Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals was 
set up following Rio+20 to work on sustainable development goals.4 
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The OWG (UN 2014) reported in late 2014, listing seventeen goals, 
each with a number of targets. In terms of the concerns of this chapter 
it is notable that goal one remains couched in the language of the global 
politics of poverty alleviation and eradication, calling for the end of 
poverty in all its forms everywhere. The nearest the specific targets get 
to addressing social policies that might ensure that this happens is the 
vacuous target that urges the creation of ‘sound policy frameworks, 
at national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor 
and gender-sensitive development strategies to support accelerated 
investments in poverty eradication actions’. 
Inequality is addressed in goal 10, which calls for the reduction 
of inequality within and between countries and suggests in one asso-
ciated target that countries should ‘adopt policies especially fiscal, 
wage, and social protection policies and progressively achieve greater 
equality’.
In relation to the vexed question of sustainability, the Open Working 
Group’s report, like the Rio+20 outcome document, is littered with the 
undefined ‘sustainable’ adjective. It is applied to water, energy, eco-
nomic growth, industrialization, cities, consumption, oceans, forests 
and development in goals 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
Lurking in goal 8, however, is the problematic sustained per capita 
economic growth of at least 7 per cent in developing countries. To 
repeat Monbiot, ‘sustained growth on a finite planet is the essence of 
un-sustainability’. 
So there have been parallel tracks in the work on the post-2015 
development agenda; the trick for the UN will be to combine them 
into one. The UN appointed a new special adviser on post-2015 
development planning, Amina Mohammed, who has said that both 
the High Level Panel and the Working Group on Sustainability share 
one secretariat, meaning that the end result will be ‘one development 
agenda’. We await this in 2015. The synthesis report of the Secretary-
General, the first draft of which was published in December 2014, 
entitled The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All 
Lives and Protecting the Planet, might give some clues as to where the 
UN process will have reached by September 2015. The document 
(UN Secretary-General 2014) argues for ‘six essential elements 
that would help frame and reinforce the universal, integrated and 
transformative nature of a sustainable development agenda and ensure 
that the ambition expressed by Member States in the outcome of the 
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Open Working Group translates, communicates and is delivered at the 
country level’. These are
• Dignity: to end poverty and fight inequalities.
• People: to ensure healthy lives, knowledge, and the inclusion of 
women and children. 
• Prosperity: to grow a strong, inclusive, and transformative economy. 
• Planet: to protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children. 
• Justice: to promote safe and peaceful societies, and strong institutions.
• Partnership: to catalyse global solidarity for sustainable development.
The beginnings of the post-2015 discussions reviewed above 
therefore:
• Do open up for debate the issue of inequality and equity rather than 
just poverty.
• Do open up a space for engaging in social policy recommendations and 
not just targets.
• Do permit a reordering of priorities other than a simple focus on 
economic growth.
But also:
• Muddy the waters with more intangible, ill-defined, albeit important, 
concerns with sustainability.
This chapter now turns to argue how this opportunity for 
rethinking could be used during the final discussions in 2015 if policy 
recommendations for equity and social solidarity are to be advanced. 
Welfare states, solidarity and social inclusion
The UN post-2015 development agenda must leave behind the 
global politics of poverty alleviation, now poverty eradication, and focus 
instead on shaping a new global politics of social solidarity. For the past 
thirty years the dominant discourse in international development has 
been the ‘global politics of poverty alleviation’, which focuses on the 
poor and seeks policies that lift populations out of poverty or protect 
others from falling into it. Subsequently, global policies have pursued 
the elimination of indirect causes of poverty, such as disease and poor 
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education and compensation for lack of income, whether through cash 
transfers, microcredit or low-wage employment.
It is suggested here that the difficulties with this approach not 
only point to the general need for a new direction but also call for the 
more specific engagement of other social groups normally excluded 
from global policy interest. This would mean replacing the strategy 
of targeting the most vulnerable populations with support for a 
‘global politics of solidarity’ based on inclusion of the ‘middle class’ 
in development policy. The new strategy would promote alliances 
between the poor and non-poor, especially the middle class, while 
making services and opportunities more available and more effective 
for all. Middle class here signifies educated men and women working 
in professions, small and medium-sized enterprises, management, 
public sector administration and skilled vocations. Based on the 
development of welfare states in the twentieth century, social policy and 
social development science tell us that the better way to reduce poverty 
is fairly consistent and involves middle-class buy-in to inclusive state 
welfare provision. In developed countries, Goodin et al.’s (1999) 
comparative research on liberal, conservative and social democratic 
welfare states concludes that whether the objective of policy is poverty 
alleviation, social inclusion or the facilitation of personal autonomy, 
social democratic welfare states are best at doing the job. This remains 
largely unchallenged by social policy analysts. For developing countries, 
Mehrotra and Jolly’s (1997) comparative review of those countries 
with higher than expected human development indicators concluded 
too that a common feature of such human development leaders was the 
universal provisioning of social services. At the same time there is clear 
evidence that in both rich and poor countries more equity is good for 
growth, for poverty alleviation and well-being (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2009).
Given this, who played the major role in helping to forge the best 
and most socially cohesive welfare states in Europe? A casual reading 
of the social policy literature and certainly of the development studies 
literature would suggest that either the poor struggled for their own 
interests or that a fraction of national and international reforming elites 
did so on their behalf. Sometimes a role is ascribed to organized trade 
union and working-class struggle, which has taken a variety of forms 
in a development context. Some have, however, drawn attention to 
the trade-off between targeting the poor (which might save money) 
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and including the middle class (which ensures greater tax revenue). 
Korpi and Palme (1998) concluded that excluding the middle class 
from pension programmes may remove broad-based support for such 
programmes and make them unsustainable. There is a higher budget 
available for redistribution where targeting is reduced.
Twenty years ago, Peter Baldwin’s (1990) Politics of Social Solidarity: 
Class Bases of the European Welfare State argued the case that middle-
class expectations/demands fuelled service provision for all. As he put 
it, ‘The simplest, and most frequently answered, questions posed to 
the welfare state concern the nature and extent of the benefits now won 
by the disadvantaged. A much more intriguing problem deals with the 
stake developed by the comfortably upholstered middle class in such 
reform’ (ibid.: 9). For Baldwin, ‘Although far from all social policies 
were implemented [in Sweden] with the bourgeoisie in mind, it did 
not take long for fortunate groups to recognise their interests in the 
right sort of measures. In Scandinavia, the middle classes have rarely 
shunned state intervention on their own behalf. From the start, they 
lobbied successfully for advantageous welfare policies’ (ibid.: 28).
Baldwin’s analysis was based on case studies of several European 
welfare state developments where universal social security acted as the 
mechanism for implementing the ideals of universalism and fulfilling 
the self-interest of all social groups to eliminate risk and uncertainty. 
Consistent with Goodin’s conclusions, the social democratic welfare 
states of Scandinavia were successful in part because they provided 
high-quality public health and education services of all kinds, which 
ensured middle-class usage and a willingness to pay taxes. In terms of 
the conservative corporatist (or Bismarckian) welfare states of Germany 
and France and the Benelux countries, which did not fare too badly, 
the middle class had their welfare needs met through a wage- or salary-
related social security system. The liberal ‘welfare state’ of the USA 
failed in part because the middle class were in general cast out on to the 
marketplace to have their needs met, except for social security, which 
was uncharacteristically a public commitment to insured workers. 
Where there are now moves to reduce the core universalism combined 
with status-differentiating aspects of European welfare states, there are 
signs of disquiet among middle classes, who begin to argue that the 
remaining basic level of social security should be linked to inducements 
to encourage responsible behavioural changes among the poor (Mau 
and Sachweh 2010).
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It was not only in Europe that meeting the welfare needs of the 
middle class was seen as an important element of economic develop-
ment. Those in charge of the state-led development project in East 
Asia and Latin America understood this logic. A recent paper describes 
the central role of welfare provisioning for the middle class in Korea’s 
development in the 1960s: ‘The social welfare benefits that white-
collar workers received included housing loans, retirement benefits, 
subsidies for tuition fees as well as health insurance’ and ‘new apart-
ments (built with city-state money and accessed with benefits to the 
better off) became the symbol of modernity and a new culture of the 
middle class’ (Yang 2010: 10–12). In this way such states created a 
satisfied middle class committed to modernization.
The assault on universal welfare states in a development context
Whereas social policy and social development science explained the 
central role of the middle class in welfare state development in Europe, 
unfortunately the economic scientific community framed the analysis of 
emerging welfare states in a development context and therefore the 
policy response to their development in different terms. The story of 
structural adjustment is well known. A recent summary of the period 
captures the essence (Voipio 2011: 104): the structural adjustment drive 
was motivated not only by World Bank and IMF economists’ objective 
analysis about what would be best for the poor countries and their poor 
people, but also by a deliberate ideologically motivated effort to reframe 
the idea of ‘aid-for-poverty-reduction’ as an instrument for promoting 
the paradigm of pro-market and anti-government neoliberalism. For 
us what is central is the direct assault on the embryonic welfare states 
carried out during this period by economists who knew nothing of the 
political economy of inclusive welfare state building within which the 
middle class were central.
The World Bank’s econometric and technocratic approach was 
based on the use of a beneficiary index to assess which social groups 
benefited from public expenditure in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
Armed with this tool the Bank’s missions to country after country in 
the 1970s and 1980s concluded that the middle class benefited most 
from public expenditures and that this was a bad thing. They got better 
state pensions in Brazil, which was true. They got better state housing 
in Senegal, which was true.
Cost-cutting economists argued that this was unjust from the point 
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of view of the poor. It was this line of thinking which led to the Bank’s 
and the IMF’s assault on the embryonic universal welfare states in 
those countries. It is worth recalling a key text of the time that argued 
for safety nets for the poor rather than services that met the needs of 
other social groups. Carol Graham (1994: 9–10), then a visiting fellow 
at the World Bank, argued:
Safety net programs that give them [the poor] a political voice 
provide new channels of access to the state. By inviting new actors 
to help implement the programs, such as NGOs, the government 
can create a new political space for the poor, garner their political 
support, and therefore increase their chances of sustaining the 
redirection [my emphasis] of public resources [away from exiting 
better-off beneficiaries]. 
An alliance between the Bank, the poor and development NGOs 
(which have an interest in meeting the needs of the poor) was constructed 
that challenged fundamentally the universalism of the European social 
policy experience (Deacon 2007; Deacon et al. 1997). This gave rise 
to the UK-influenced5 OECD–DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee) 
poverty targets focused upon the poor, which in turn resulted in the 
MDGs, themselves a retreat from the more universalist formulations of 
the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development. Those 
who constructed the global politics of poverty alleviation between the 
1980s and 2000 were ignorant of the political economy of welfare state 
building, which teaches us that the latter depends on the construction 
of cross-class alliances and middle-class buy-in to reform.
One final twist in the global politics of poverty alleviation centred 
on an aid business powered by a global NGO community was the 
absorption of the neglected and impoverished poor middle class into 
its project. Finnish scholar Jeremy Gould demonstrated that the aid 
business has played a major part in seducing the professional and middle 
class of developing countries away from the developmental role they 
used to occupy. Writing about Tanzania and other African countries, 
Gould blames the decline of the nationally engaged middle class on 
the actions of international aid agencies: ‘Seduced by access to the 
dollar economy, they prioritize acquiring skills for … the requirements 
of the aid cartel … at the expense of contributing to the development of 
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domestic manufacturing and processing industries that would generate 
actual wealth within the national economy’ (Gould 2005: 148–9).
This rupture between the middle class and the state in Tanzania was 
also evident in Morocco; here due to increasing economic insecurity 
among younger, educated men and women. Moroccans look to the 
globe to fulfil the ideal of individual potential they cling to as the 
consequence of education, family pressure and political discourse. In 
shifting their gaze beyond national borders, they detach themselves 
from national politics and social development, preferring either to work 
on local causes close to home or to engage in global cultural production 
and consumption. Cohen writes:
… the political goal of the global middle class would be to 
obtain access to services formerly subsumed within the province 
of the state, that now increasingly comes from the non-
located, heterogeneous social relations that signify and support 
globalisation … [as a result] the social and political bond between 
elite and non-elite falls apart globally and locally leaving only 
economic benefit and exploitation. (Cohen 2004: 114)
Interestingly, Graham conceded (1994: 10): ‘this does not imply 
that hard hit middle sectors of society do not merit some form of 
compensation or that they will not be the focus of government 
attention in the future’. That future is here. The hope has to be that 
their seduction into the global dollar economy has not lost them for 
good from the state-led development projects of the future.
Is the social policy in development discourse bringing the middle 
class back in?
Despite the deliberate neglect of, or even attack on, the idea of 
public policy meeting middle-class welfare needs in international policy 
discourses in the last century, a small shift seems to have occurred in 
development discourse since then. The World Bank’s (2003) World 
Development Report 2004, which focused on making services work 
for poor people, hinted at some movement towards considering the 
middle class. Within the text (and probably among the authors) there 
was a tension between those who stayed with the line that much public 
spending by developing countries benefits the rich and is therefore to be 
refocused on the poor (e.g. ibid.: 4, Figure 2) and those who appeared 
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now to argue that ‘cross class alliances’ between the poor and non-
poor are needed to pressure governments to ‘strengthen public sector 
foundations for service delivery’ (ibid.: 180, Figure 10.1) (Deacon 
2005). Most striking was the assertion that ‘In most instances making 
services work for poor people means making services work for everybody 
– while ensuring poor people have access to those services. Required is a 
coalition that includes poor people and significant elements of the non-
poor. There is unlikely to be progress without substantial “middle class 
buy-in” to proposed reforms’ (World Bank 2003: 60). This section of 
the report goes on to quote Wilbur Cohen, US Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare under President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s: 
‘Programmes for Poor People are Poor Programmes’. 
More recently, policy analysts like Nancy Birdsall, using income-
based definitions of class, have associated political stability with a large 
middle class (2007). Like modernization theorists before her, Birdsall 
makes the assumption that the middle class, educated and dependent 
on modern institutions and technologies, will engage in civic activism 
and support political liberalization. Analysing the failure of relatively 
successful African economies to undergo political transformation, she 
remarks,
The implicit assumption of the donor community is that Africa is 
trapped by its poverty, and that aid is necessary if Africa is to escape 
the trap. In this note I suggest an alternative assumption: that 
Africa is caught in an institutional trap, signalled and reinforced 
by the small share of income of its independent middle-income 
population. Theory and historical experience elsewhere suggest 
that a robust middle-income group contributes critically to the 
creation and sustenance of healthy institutions, particularly healthy 
institutions of the state. I propose that if external aid is to be helpful 
for institution-building in Africa’s weak and fragile states, donors 
need to emphasize not providing more aid but minimizing the risks 
more aid poses for this group in Africa. (Birsdall 2007: 4)
Developing her arguments, which have a lot of synergy with mine, 
in a later paper she argues: 
A focus on the middle class does not imply a lack of concern for 
the poor. To the contrary; in the advanced economies the poor 
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have probably benefited from the rule of law, legal protections, 
and in general the greater accountability of government that a 
large and politically independent middle class demands, and from 
the universal and adequately funded education, health and social 
insurance programs a middle class wants and finances through the 
tax system. (Birdsall 2010: 159)
These arguments have been reproduced recently in a research report 
of the African Development Bank:
The middle class is also helping to improve accountability in 
public services through more vocal demands for better services. 
The middle class is better educated, better informed and has 
greater awareness of human rights. It is the main source of the 
leadership and activism that create and operate many of the 
nongovernmental organizations that push for greater accountability 
and better governance in public affairs … policies that include 
the promotion of middle class growth are more cost-effective and 
generate more long-term poverty reducing benefits than policies 
that focus solely on addressing problems of the poor. (AfDB 
2011: 15)
Despite the marginalization of the middle class in global policy, 
there are immediate practical, political, social and economic reasons 
for policy-makers at a global level to address directly the welfare 
of the ‘middle class’. On the most material level, public and NGO 
services depend on the presence, motivation and skills of local staff. 
The World Bank, the UN, national aid agencies and NGOs have long 
noted the shortage of teachers and health workers (DfID 2009) as a 
consequence of emigration and low education rates as well as conflict 
and poor facilities. The World Bank has also investigated the reasons 
for health worker and teacher absenteeism in the public sector and its 
consequences for care and learning (Chaudhury et al. 2006). Lastly, 
the focus on corruption among aid agencies reflects salary conditions 
and morale within the public sector in developing countries (Hellsten 
and Larbi 2006).
More particular to development, agencies like DfID and academics 
have criticized the migration of competent public sector staff to 
international organizations attractive for their salaries and career options 
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(DfID 2006). As we noted earlier, Jeremy Gould analysed how aid 
agencies in Tanzania and other parts of Africa had lured professionals 
away from the developmental role they used to occupy. He further 
argues: ‘the intellectual and entrepreneurial class must choose between 
a self-referential and parasitic post-developmentalism, and national(ist) 
development projects – enhancing domestic savings and productive 
investment, improving the productivity of land and labour, building 
the revenue base of the public economy’ (Gould 2005: 149).
His comments point to possibly more urgent and profound reasons 
for considering the role of the middle class in global social policy. 
Promoting demand and productivity, which Gould cites as a function of 
the middle class, necessarily means addressing the economic insecurity 
among middle-income groups provoked by the global recession 
or more long-standing trends in unemployment among educated 
younger generations. The relative decline in revenue of middle-
income groups, forced into focus by the global recession, has arguably 
blurred the segregation of need characteristic of ‘target-based’ policies. 
Furthermore, trends in unemployment and declining income coupled 
with the failure of national policy-makers to incorporate the middle 
class into a vision of social and political progress have engendered 
profound alienation and, in areas like the Arab world, resistance 
aimed at regime change. As mentioned earlier, researching the global 
aspirations of the middle class in Morocco, Cohen (2004) argued that 
increasing economic insecurity among younger, educated men and 
women has ruptured the relationship between the middle class and the 
state in the region. This rupture has pushed younger generations away 
from conventional political participation associated with the modern 
nation-state.
Global social policy responses to the economic crisis
But what of the most recent developments in the global social policy 
discourse in the wake of the global economic crisis? Reviewing the 
impact of the global economic crisis on the shifting global discourse, 
Deacon (2010) suggested that the crisis has highlighted three strands 
of thinking about social policy in a development context. The first, 
derived from the large sums agreed by the G20 with the IMF in 2009, 
still leaves the IMF’s parsimonious approach targeted towards the most 
vulnerable poor in a dominant position. No focus on the middle class 
here. At the other extreme, the second raises anew the case for a kind 
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of state-led development within which state capacity is central. Thus 
the UNCTAD Least Developed Countries Report 2009 argued that ‘the 
developmentally orientated elite … should establish a social compact 
through which broad sections of society support the developmental 
project’ (UNCTAD 2009: 51). Here support for middle-class state-
builders is central. The third is the idea of a global social floor, or more 
precisely the ILO Recommendation on Social Protection Floors (ILO 
2012), which the global economic crisis has propelled to centre stage. 
Though evoking universal access to a minimum standard of welfare or 
social security guarantees, it can be argued that the concept does not 
go far enough in recognizing the role of a middle class in engineering 
improved collective well-being. If attention is focused, however, on the 
twin-track approach for extending social security not only horizontally 
but also vertically the policy might be more amenable to our concern 
(Deacon 2013: 159. Finally there is the increased attention being 
given to the argument that poverty is an abuse of human rights. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty has put this case strongly6 
and has argued (Sepulvda and Nyst 2012) for the importance of the 
human rights approach to poverty alleviation and social protection, 
as indeed has Thomas Pogge (2010). The question arises, as with 
the Social Protection Floor, as to whether such an approach leads 
only to a policy approach targeted on the poor. Each of these global 
responses is now considered in more detail: a) IMF support, b) Social 
Protection Floor, c) the human rights approach, and d) State-led 
developmentalism.
IMF support The task of providing the first coordinated world 
response to the global economic crisis fell to the first ever meeting of 
the G20 at heads-of-state level at the 2 April 2009 G20 summit. It 
fashioned a global policy on the hoof. It committed US$1.1 trillion 
to support countries in crisis, as follows: US$750 billion to be used 
under the guidance of an unreformed IMF, US$250 billion for trade 
facilitation, and only US$100 billion for development purposes 
(including social development), through unreformed multilateral 
development banks. The UN was given only a marginal role, to 
monitor the crisis, with no additional resources. So in April 2009 we 
were faced with an interesting paradox. The world’s rich countries 
were embarking, albeit briefly with the exception of the USA, on 
huge fiscal stimulus packages involving often large social spending 
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guided by long-forgotten Keynesian principles, while for the poorer 
countries, the equivalent task was being given to the IMF without a 
word of comment about the fact that the IMF historically was focused 
upon forcing countries into neoliberal short-term procyclical budget-
balancing macroeconomic policies, which were the total opposite of 
what was being (briefly) prescribed for rich countries. The key question 
was whether the IMF was about to change its spots and policies and 
embark on a policy of encouraging poorer countries to invest in social 
expenditures to spend their way out of their crisis and moreover to 
spend on the middle class as well. 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was then the new IMF boss, insisted 
it was a new IMF and its website insisted 
The IMF tries to ensure that economic adjustments taken to 
combat the impact of the crisis also take account of the needs of 
the most vulnerable by developing or enhancing social safety nets. 
Social spending is being preserved or increased wherever possible. 
For instance, in Pakistan expenditure will be increased to protect 
the poor through both cash transfers and targeted electricity 
subsidies. About a third of programs in low-income countries 
include floors on social and other priority spending. Structural 
reforms are designed in a way to protect the most vulnerable. For 
instance in Hungary, low-income pensioners were excluded from 
benefit reduction.
Even if we take this at face value, the drift of the argument is not for 
social expenditures as social investments to support a renewed state-
led development project. It is not even for a global Social Protection 
Floor. At best it is for a targeted approach to poverty alleviation and 
a residual means-tested approach to social policy. The Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) finds that nine agreements that 
the Fund has negotiated since September 2008, including with eastern 
European countries, El Salvador and Pakistan – contained some 
elements of contractionary policies. These include fiscal (budget) 
tightening, interest rate increases, wage freezes for public employees, 
and other measures that will reduce aggregate demand or prevent 
economic stimulus programmes in the current downturn. Similarly, 
Eurodad’s analysis (Molina-Gallart 2009) of ten IMF agreements 
signed in 2009 shows that the IMF is still advising stringent fiscal and 
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monetary policies to low-income countries, as well as controversial 
structural reforms. The paper comments that ‘If the Fund is to provide 
funding to poor countries to meet the financial gaps created by the 
crisis it has to change and it has to do it soon. Reacting poorly and 
reacting late may mean death and starvation for millions of people in 
poor countries.’ Other research on loans to El Salvador, Latvia and 
Ethiopia come to the same conclusions (ibid.). Work by Lendvai and 
Stubbs in central and eastern Europe confirms that in that region 
the message of the IMF, now in alliance with the EU, which is faced 
with its own crisis in Greece, is uncompromisingly for public sector 
restraint and a targeted welfare approach (Lendvai and Stubbs 2015). 
Isabel Ortiz and her colleagues at UNICEF urgently addressed this 
failure of the IMF to change its approach, insisting there was an 
alternative. The UNICEF paper on Prioritizing Expenditures for a 
Recovery for All: A Rapid Review of Public Expenditures in 126 Developing 
Countries’(UNICEF 2010) showed that in 2011 fiscal consolidation/
austerity swept across developing countries and the risks of worsened 
social outcomes increased. The paper has become an important source 
of information with which to challenge the IMF procyclical economic 
policy advice, but the IMF does not seem to be listening. Isabel Ortiz, 
now Social Protection Director at the ILO, continues to report this 
gloomy story, noting in a recent (26 November 2014) contribution to 
the recovery-human-face e-discussion board:
Since 2010 many governments embarked on fiscal consolidation 
(or austerity policies) and premature contraction of expenditures, 
despite an urgent need of public support among vulnerable 
populations. In 2015, the scope of public expenditure adjustment 
is expected to intensify significantly. According to the latest IMF 
fiscal projections contained in the World Economic Outlook 
(October 2014 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/), 
120 countries, of which 86 are developing, will be contracting 
expenditures in terms of GDP. The scope of adjustments is 
expected to affect 131 countries in 2016. 
In other words, put simply, we cannot look to the IMF’s contribution 
to the post-2015 debate for any support for the need to spend not only 
on the most vulnerable but also the middle class. There are no social 
contracts being built within this framework.
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Social Protection Floor This forefronting of the G20 and the IMF as the 
global agencies to address the crisis annoyed many in the UN system 
and concretely led to a meeting of the UN Chief Executive Board 
in Paris later in April 2009, which generated the UN CEB Issue Paper 
‘The global financial crisis and its impact on the work of the UN 
system’. The meeting was able to draw upon an earlier draft report 
considered on 26/27 February 2009 by the CEB’s High-Level Committee 
on Programmes. The report called for coordinated action across the UN 
system in eight key policy fields: i) finance, ii) trade, iii) employment 
and production, iv) environment, v) food security, vi) social services, 
empowerment and protection of people, vii) humanitarian, security 
and social stability and viii) international cooperation for development. 
In terms of specific policies the ILO would lead on a Global Jobs Pact 
and ‘to help developing countries cope with the crisis, a counter-
cyclical global jobs fund could be established’. 
Most important from this chapter’s point of view was initiative six, 
which was to work towards a global ‘Social Protection Floor which 
ensures access to basic social services, shelter, and empowerment 
and protection of the poor and vulnerable’. This was subsequently 
elaborated in the June 2009 UNCEB document (UNCEB 2009) as 
a ‘floor [that] could consist of two main elements: (a) public services: 
geographical and financial access to essential public services (water, 
sanitation, health, education); and (b) transfers: a basic set of essential 
social transfers … to provide a minimum income security’. The ILO 
and the WHO would lead on this policy, supported by a host of other 
agencies such as UNICEF and UNDESA. The Global Social Floor 
had become UN policy at least in terms of the UNCEB. 
The Social Protection Floor became a formal new ILO standard 
in June 2012, when the International Labour Conference agreed the 
wording of its Recommendation on Social Protection Floors (SPFs) 
for countries. The SPFs should comprise at least the following basic 
social security guarantees: ‘(a) access to a nationally defined set of 
goods and services, constituting essential health care, including maternity 
care that meets the criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability 
and quality; (b) basic income security for children, at least at a nationally 
defined minimum level, providing access to nutrition, education, care 
and any other necessary goods and services; (c) basic income security, 
at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in active 
age who are unable to earn sufficient income, including in particular 
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in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and (d) 
basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for 
older persons’.
There are two very different assessments that can be made of this 
new ILO Recommendation. For its supporters the Recommendation 
is historic because, in the words of its main protagonist inside the ILO, 
it asserts that the ILO has a role in formulating social protection policy 
for residents, not just workers, it challenges the growth-first economists 
with the priority of social protection whatever the level of the economy, and 
it argues for redistribution nationally and internationally.
For those who would want to detract from its significance it is easy 
to point to the compromises and changes of definition that have been 
necessary to ensure that by the time of the 2012 ILC most controversial 
issues had already been dealt with. My study (Deacon 2013) of the 
history of the SPF demonstrates the changing formulations from when 
the concept was first mooted inside the ILO to the final 2012 text. 
These changes involved (a) a shift from a set of specific benefits such 
as universal pensions or child benefits to a set of outcomes, met by 
governments in whatever way they saw fit, (b) a shift from a global social 
floor under the global economy to nationally defined floors with each 
country defining its own minimum guarantee level, and (c) a retreat 
from an emphasis on international financial support for such a floor to 
mainly national responsibility for revenue-raising to fund the floors. 
Furthermore the issue of social protection of migrants was ducked by 
leaving the definition of ‘resident’ to countries. 
An earlier assessment of mine (Deacon and Cohen 2011) regarding 
the development of this SPF policy was sharply critical in terms of 
whether such a new policy would encourage a renewed focus on the 
social security needs of the middle class. A focus on the poor, I argued, 
distracts from cross-class solidarity-building and a focus on the poor 
undermines the middle-class commitment to pay taxes. This assessment 
is echoed by Francine Mestrum (2012: 14–15). She argues:
A[n] SPF is meant for the poor or ‘all in need’, it does not go 
beyond poverty reduction, even if the ILO stresses its link with the 
social security extension campaign. But the divergent references 
to ‘universalism’ leave some doubts. It is not always clear whether 
‘universalism’ refers to the whole population, to all the poor or to 
all the deserving poor. 
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… In short, however positively the plans for a Social Protection 
Floor can be assessed … if the SPF is limited to its minimal 
requirements, it will be compatible with Washington Consensus 
policies. And that means the impoverishment processes will not be 
stopped.
The counter-argument made by the ILO’s authors of the 
SPF Recommendation stresses, to the contrary the fact that the 
Recommendation, largely to ensure it got support from the Workers’ 
Group of the ILO, is focused as much on the vertical extension of social 
security, which involves encouraging more countries to establish formal 
wage-related social security systems. Thus they acknowledged the 
possible criticism of an SPF focused only on the poor by saying that ‘a 
social protection system that does not support higher benefit levels to a 
significant proportion of its population can lose the support of its own 
beneficiaries and contributors’ (Cichon and Wodsak 2011: 8). 
Debate about this will continue. However, it has to be pointed out 
that while the ILO seemed initially to miss the chance to inject the 
SPF as a post-2015 policy priority in the first discussions between UN 
agencies between January and May 2012 and in the Rio+20 outcome 
document, it has been more influential in shaping the more recent 
developments of the Open Working Group. In March 2014 the New 
York office of the ILO organized a technical workshop at the UN in 
New York to discuss possible indicators and means of implementation 
associated with the proposal to include Social Protection Floor targets 
as part of the SDGs. It is pleasing that Target 3 of the first goal reads. 
‘[countries should] implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve 
substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable’. 
The human rights approach Much of what has been said above about 
the SPF might apply to the issue of whether a focus on the human 
rights approach to poverty reduction can also accommodate the 
welfare needs of middle classes and help build solidarities within and 
between countries. The case for the SPF is predicated on a human 
rights agenda. Sepulveda and Nyst assert (2012: 18): 
The added value of the human rights approach to poverty 
reduction can be conceptualised in at least three different 
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ways. Of critical importance is that the human rights approach 
provides a normative framework for practical action to reduce poverty. 
Human rights can provide practical guidance to the design, 
implementation, evaluation and monitoring of poverty reduction 
efforts … From a human rights perspective, individuals are rights-
holders that can make legitimate claims, and States and other actors 
are duty-bearers that are responsible and can be held accountable 
for their acts or omissions. … Human rights also provide the legal 
imperative for poverty reduction policies.
Even if these arguments are accepted, the assertion by the poor 
as rights-holders that the state has a legal obligation to support them 
and adhere to a global set of policy principles does not ensure that the 
non-poor on whose taxes the state depends will finance their being 
met. A legal contract between the poor and the state is not a social 
contract between the better-off and the poor. Indeed, controversially it 
can be argued that the reference by the poor to a set of internationally 
formulated rights might undermine such a contract within a polity 
where the dominant discourse might be about the perceived ‘abuse’ by 
claim-holders (particularly outsiders and migrants) of the international 
human rights agenda. The concept of poverty as an abuse of human 
rights may give anti-poverty protesters one more bit of discursive 
armoury. It does not, however, address the social policies that are 
needed to build cross-class solidarities within one country or how the 
post-2015 UN Development agenda can contribute to that. 
State-led developmentalism The approach to the post-2015 agenda
which focuses on state-led economic and social investment within 
countries might be more fruitful in creating the required cross-class 
solidarities. Such an approach would address the needs of the middle 
class who otherwise may turn (if relatively well off) to have their needs 
met from a global private marketplace (hence undermining their 
commitment to a national social contract), or (if impoverished) turn 
to non-modernist political agendas. The involvement of the otherwise 
marginalized agency UNCTAD as a potential supporter of this approach, 
together with the ILO, would be important. Although it has to be added 
that UNCTAD is not monolithic – it is mainly the LDC report that has 
argued in this direction, and one or two statements by the Secretary-
General prior to UNCTAD XIII on the developmental state. 
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International policy could address economic insecurity among low- 
and middle-income populations and promote social solidarity through 
a number of strategies. The first concentrates on framing the discourse 
and substance of policy around the aim of elevating collective welfare. 
Conceptually, this path would imply relating the expansion and 
security of the middle class to meeting the needs of more vulnerable 
groups. Substantively, the strategy would first revitalize the notion of 
universal access and common quality of services for all, particularly 
through supporting public institutions as service providers or partners 
in services provided by other sectors offering equal quality and access. 
The strategy would also explicitly link job creation and sustainable 
income to improvements in services and the manufacture of products 
used in confronting the conditions of poverty, from housing to safe 
appliances. Emphasizing social solidarity would enhance the job 
creation strategy of the ILO. 
International organizations and national government supporting this 
strategy would likewise need to reverse the brain drain of professionals 
and convince diaspora communities, international NGOs and other 
sources of funding to look for reinvigorated public institutions and 
other signs of social solidarity when making decisions about investment. 
Practically speaking, revitalizing or building public services in education and 
health would be important for both the middle class and low-income groups 
for a number of reasons.Regarding health, reinforcing public services 
could mean the adequate treatment of pervasive conditions and health 
issues that private doctors and insurance companies can reject because 
of their expense, such as diabetes, and supporting the education of 
younger medical staff through supporting public teaching hospitals. 
In education, reinforcing public education could offer similar shared 
benefits for the middle class and the poor, namely by giving the state 
more power to coordinate education with labour market possibilities, 
and improving working conditions and the status of public school 
teachers removes incentives to work privately. Investing in public 
institutions would, as was the logic with welfare states, theoretically 
succeed because they should benefit both administrators and 
recipients. This statement has several implications. The first is that the 
institutions responsible for social mobility, such as education, would 
now be charged openly with ensuring the quality of future practitioners 
and increasing the opportunities and well-being of current users. The 
second is that effective management of public institutions would refer 
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at least partially to the quality of relations between practitioners and 
service users, with service evaluation assessing the impact of social 
relations and any activities aimed at integrating the institution into the 
larger community. 
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that the opportunity should be taken by 
the discussions surrounding the post-2015 MDG agenda to ensure 
that the current global politics of poverty eradication should shift towards 
a new global politics of building social solidarity and include a focus as 
much on the welfare needs of middle-class state builders as on the 
poor in order to create those solidarities. It has reviewed the several 
global policy responses that have been concerned with poverty issues 
consequent upon the global economic crisis of 2008. These were 
the affording of more resources to the IMF, the development of the 
ILO Social Protection Floor policy, the increased attention given by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
to the concept of poverty as a human right, and a renewed focus on 
state-led development by parts of UNCTAD. The only one of these 
approaches which might address the issue of building the cross-class 
solidarities I have argued for is that of UNCTAD. Also, so long as the 
twin-track approach of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the 
ILO SPF policy is taken seriously, this might help too. The IMF is 
irrelevant unless it can be persuaded to create more fiscal capacity in 
a country to permit social investments. Human rights is a rallying cry 
but does not get to the heart of the social structural issues. Whether the 
UNCTAD–ILO approach becomes embedded within the post-2015 
agenda remains the issue.
In terms of the vexed question of how the world might follow this 
social solidarity path as well as addressing at the same time the import-
ant issue of sustainability, it is clear that the continued uncritical 
endorsement of economic growth in both the Open Working Group’s 
report and the Secretary-General’s attempted Synthesis Report has 
to be confronted. These issues are discussed in the useful volume by 
Kaasch and Stubbs (2014) on Transformations in Global and Regional 
Social Policies, in which, referring to a contribution by Ian Gough, they 
suggest ‘that nothing short of a transformative paradigm is needed, 
moving … towards an “eco-social policy” capable of achieving ecologi-
cally beneficial and socially just impacts “by promoting new patterns 
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of production, consumption and investment, changing producer and 
consumer behaviour while improving wellbeing, and ensuring a fairer 
distribution of power and resources”’(ibid.: 12).
Notes
1 The third, fourth and fifth sections 
of this chapter draw upon Deacon and 
Cohen (2011). 
2 The technical term for the very 
first draft of any UN document written 
by civil servants before it has even been 
discussed by a first meeting of those who 






5 The role of Clare Short, then 
minister for development in UK DfID, was 
significant here, although Sakiko Fukuda-
Parr suggests that Fukuda herself was 
influential in shaping similar Japanese 
policy on this point.
6 The Special Rapporteur has 
produced reports to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly on human rights and cash 
transfer programmes (A/HRC/11/9), the 
role of social protection in the face of 
the global financial crisis (A/64/279), 
a human rights framework for non-
contributory pensions (A/HRC/13/31), 
the importance of social protection 
measures in achieving the MDGs, with 
a particular focus on gender-related 
concerns (A/65/259), and the human 
rights approach to recovery from the 
global economic and financial crises (A/
HRC/17/34), which included an analysis 
of the important role played by social 
protection programmes during times of 
crisis and recovery. She also undertook 
an analysis of social protection 
programmes in her visits to Ecuador (A/
HRC/11/9/Add.1), Zambia (A/HRC/14/31/
Add.1), Bangladesh (A/HRC/15/55), 
Vietnam (A/HRC/17/34/Add.1), Ireland 
(A/HRC/17/34/Add.2), Timor-Leste 
(A/HRC/20/25/Add.1) and Paraguay 
(A/HRC/20/25/Add.2).
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F O R W A R D :  T H E  C A S E  F O R  A 
D E V E L O P M E N T A L  W E L F A R E  S T A T E
Gabriele Koehler
The challenge1
Seventy years ago, with the historic creation of the United Nations, 
human rights and dignity, freedom from fear and freedom from 
want became universal normative principles. Fifteen years ago, the 
stirring Millennium Declaration promised human development and 
a considerable reduction in poverty and hunger. However, despite 
decades of development effort, these goals remain elusive. 
This chapter looks back at the history of development agendas, and 
forward towards the emerging next development agenda. It places the 
MDGs in the context of development decades, pursued by the UN 
and the international community since the 1960s, which, over time, 
moved from a primary orientation towards development in the sense 
of economic growth, to a broader attention to poverty and a focus on 
social or human development. It posits that the MDGs were a success 
in terms of raising the visibility of poverty and social development as 
global political concerns. They were nonetheless a failure in that the 
majority of the targets were not met; this was a result of conceptual 
shortcomings, and most importantly due to the lack of an explicit 
policy design and vision. 
Building on this assessment, the objective of the chapter is to revisit, 
and revive attention to, policy-making and hence the role of the state. 
The state is the only political institution at least notionally accountable 
to citizens, and therefore carries the primary responsibility for enabling 
and ensuring sustainable human development, and guaranteeing 
human rights. Ideally, a democratic state is oriented to both economic 
development – and hence developmentalist – and to social development 
and human rights – and hence a welfare state. This case is presented 
with an eye on the emerging, next development agenda – the globally 
applicable Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
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Looking back
The MDG agenda The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs were 
introduced at the turn to the twenty-first century. It was a time when 
North–South power dynamics were in flux. In 1989, with the end of the 
Cold War, there was a renaissance of – at least rhetorical – concern for 
social justice, human rights and development in global policy thinking, 
and in public awareness. The 1990s had seen a series of UN-initiated 
social-policy-oriented summits – most significantly the UN Social 
Summit (Copenhagen, 1995), which formulated an ambitious agenda 
for employment, social inclusion and participation. Social democratic 
governments were in place in several European countries, with a 
fortuitous constellation of social democratic gender-aware development 
ministers in power in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Fiscal 
resources were available. As a result, a certain degree of policy space 
was emerging. The UN seized the momentum and launched the 
Millennium Declaration and its ensuing developing goals. 
There were good and bad reasons for the international community 
to develop a new goal set. There was disillusionment with the four 
UN development decades which had up until then been a guide 
for development – the UN General Assembly had declared each of 
them in turn unsuccessful, not reaching their goals. Conceptually, 
the development decades’ remit was too narrow because they 
presented quantified goals primarily directed at economic growth and 
restructuring, so that the social goals they also contained appeared less 
crucial. So there was a case for correcting the economistic bias (Koehler 
1996). However, an equal driver for the move to a new agenda in the 
year 2000 was the fact that the international development decades 
had a strongly Keynesian flavour, and ascribed poor development 
outcomes to disadvantageous international conditions. This was out 
of tune with the neoliberal policy framework, which had become the 
predominant economic policy orientation since the rise of the structural 
adjustment regime of the international financial institutions, reinforced 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its planned and centralized 
economies.
Thus, at the cusp of the new millennium, political pressure for 
a change to the international development regime was issuing from 
many sources. It converged towards formulating a new and somewhat 
different development agenda. 
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In 2015, this Millennium Development Agenda and its set of 
goals, the MDGs, have arrived at a built-in juncture. However, the 
current international political situation is very different from the one 
that prevailed in the late 1990s when the MDGs were formulated and 
launched (Hulme and Wilkinson 2014: 186). On the positive side, 
government constellations are shifting. Many of the Group of 77 (G77) 
developing countries are economically strong, having experienced 
sound GDP growth rates and an increase in sovereign wealth funds, 
partly as a result of high commodity prices during the past decade. 
A number of non-OECD countries have emerged as development 
cooperation players. Leftist governments hold office in several Latin 
American countries, and one observes the advance of an at least 
notionally rights-based social policy agenda in South Asia (Koehler 
and Chopra 2014). In the multilateral arena, owing to public pressure 
and enhanced lobbying, civil society representation in multilateral 
discussions has grown exponentially, from roughly one hundred NGOs 
in the 1970s to 4,000 in 2013 (Bissio 2014: 195f.). The nine ‘major 
groups’ representing NGOs, local authorities, indigenous peoples, 
women, youth and children, trade unions, agriculture and business 
have become acknowledged partners in the negotiating process on the 
post-2015 agenda (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform 
2015). This would suggest a multipolar dynamic with room for shifting 
the goalposts.
On the negative side, however, are the economic, social and political 
effects of unbridled financial capitalism and a persistent global recession. 
Income and wealth inequality are at unprecedented extremes (Milanovic 
2011; ADB 2012; UNRISD 2012a; Cimadamore et al. 2013; Piketty 
2014; Oxfam 2014). The share of capital and labour in global GNI has 
shifted over the past decades to the benefit of capital (Lübker 2007; 
Milanovic 2011; Ortiz and Cummins 2012). Malnutrition continues to 
affect almost one billion people, and despite advances in the mitigation 
of extreme income poverty, 1.2 billion people have to survive with less 
than $1.25 a day (UNDP 2014: 19; UN 2014). In a more meaningful 
statistic which shows poverty across an individual’s life domains, more 
than 2.2 billion people are vulnerable to multidimensional poverty, 
including almost 1.5 billion who are multidimensionally poor (UNDP 
2014: 19).2 Registered unemployment is expected to rise to above 211 
million over the next five years (ILO 2013), and more immediately 
palpable, massive youth unemployment affects most countries, whether 
232 | ten
high- or low-income. Austerity programmes are cutting down social 
expenditures in many countries (Ortiz and Cummins 2014). These 
trends have weakened labour movements, and they pit the working 
poor and those in the informal economy within each country and 
across countries against each other. Environmental catastrophes and 
global warming affect high- and low-income countries alike, and the 
poor in these countries the most. The poor situation of global public 
goods – security threats, the missing resources for health, most recently 
in the Ebola pandemic – have painfully raised awareness of the lack 
of government capacity (Mackie and Williams 2015). Not one of the 
LDCs – despite their relatively good growth performance in the early 
2000s – has been able to achieve all the MDGs (UNCTAD 2014). 
The Southern countries among the BRICs, while functioning as 
new development policy leaders because of their progressive social 
protection policies, are falling short in the policy domain of governance, 
employment and environment management. The ‘North’ is, at the 
moment, predominantly in a politically conservative mode, as a result 
of constellations in the US Congress, and the homogenizing effect of a 
coordinated EU development policy which favours the lowest common 
denominator. The private sector has become an accepted partner in 
the UN system, pushing for its own commercial interests. The UN 
system – which could be a leader in the development agenda process 
– is fragmented and compartmentalized (see Hulme and Wilkinson 
2014; Browne and Weiss 2014). 
These factors have an influence on global economic and political 
dynamics. Democracy, good governance and tackling corruption and 
a rights-based approach, concern over inequities and anxieties over the 
environment and climate change have become accepted mainstream 
topics. The concerns have paved the way, in academic and development 
circles, for a new interest in a regulatory role for the state (see, for 
example, UNDP 2013). But the concentration of economic wealth and 
political power is unprecedentedly strong and may override the more 
progressive trends.
What, then, are the possibilities for formulating a new, progressive, 
egalitarian and rights-based development agenda, post-2015, which 
would engender a genuine approach to eradicating poverty and achieving 
inclusive and equitable human development in the foreseeable future? 
Will developmental welfare states be in place to carry these shifts? Will 
‘five big, transformative shifts’ (High-Level Panel Report 2013: 7ff.) 
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materialize? That will depend, inter alia, on a critical re-evaluation 
of the MDGs, and of the history of earlier development efforts. The 
following sections look into this.
History of development agendas The MDG agenda derived directly from 
the seven development goals proposed by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1996 (OECD DAC 1996; Fukuda-
Parr 2012; Martens 2013; Hulme and Wilkinson 2014: 184; Ivanova 
and Escobar-Pemberthy this volume). These had quantified and time-
oriented objectives, and all but one were carried over into the goals and 
targets introduced by the UN in 2002.3
However, there is another MDG precursor that is rarely mentioned: 
the UN development decades.4 They, too, had quantified objectives. 
The first UN Development Decade (A/Res/1710 (XVI)) was adopted 
by the General Assembly in 1961, formally triggered by an address by 
the American president to the UN. This UN Development Decade 
laid out policy recommendations for low-income countries to achieve 
‘development’. It adopted a Keynesian approach, with an emphasis 
on economic growth, to catch up with the economically advanced 
countries in terms of incomes and productivity. The decade posited 
a minimum annual growth rate of 7 per cent in aggregate national 
income. It proposed interventions to transfer capital from developed to 
developing (‘underdeveloped’) countries, to maximize the mobilization 
of domestic resources, and to increase exports of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods. There was an emphasis on the function of 
development plans to address social as well as economic development; on 
administrative machinery and incentives for effective implementation; 
and on the redirection of science and technology to focus on national 
problems (UN GA 1960; UN Intellectual History Project 2010). But 
the Decade was also about achieving ‘well-being and happiness not 
only of the present generation but also of the generations to come’ (UN 
GA 1970: Article 4).
The goals of the first decade were not achieved, prompting the 
UN General Assembly to introduce the International Development 
Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade (1971–
80). It reiterated the macroeconomic growth goals and objectives of 
the first, and again placed great emphasis on development planning 
(UN GA 1970). It also paid attention to social goals – employment, 
education, health, nutrition, participation – and noted that ‘[t]he 
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ultimate objective of development must be to bring about sustained 
improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits 
on all’ (ibid.: Article 7). 
The subsequent Third United Nations Development Decade (1981–
90) (UN GA 1980) proposed a new international economic order and 
called for institutional and structural changes in international eco-
nomic relations (ibid.: Article 17).5 It aimed for a reduction and elimi-
nation of poverty (sic) and a fair distribution of benefits (Article 43), 
the eradication of hunger (Article 93), and food security (Article 86). It 
featured a very extensive section on policy measures (Articles 52–168), 
covering international trade, industrialization, food and agriculture, 
energy, transport, financial resources for development, and the regula-
tion of transnational corporations (TNCs). It referred to environmental 
and ecological soundness and the funding of environmental manage-
ment (Article 156f.), picking up thinking from the first UN conference 
on the human environment, held in 1972.
The International Development Strategy (IDS) for the Fourth 
United Nations Development Decade (1991–2000) maintained a 
Keynesian policy orientation. Poverty eradication and environmental 
sustainability remained at the centre.6 The Resolution incorporated 
commitments ‘to speed up the pace of economic growth in the 
developing countries; devise a development process that meets social 
needs, reduces extreme poverty significantly, develops and uses 
people’s capacity and skills, and is environmentally sound and 
sustainable; improve the international systems of money, finance, and 
trade; strengthen and stabilize the world economy and establish sound 
macroeconomic management practices, nationally and internationally’ 
(UN GA 1990). 
The four Development Decades have much in common: the 
role ascribed to economic development, the attention paid to the 
international economic environment, and the commitment to poverty 
eradication. Their Keynesian approach is twinned with an explicit 
role ascribed to the role of the state and public policy. They also, 
unfortunately, have in common a lack of success: the high growth rates 
– conceived as a measure to close the GDP gap between high- and 
low-income countries – were not achieved, so that each decade in turn 
required an extension.
In fact, the four international development decades were followed 
by two new UN decades, explicitly devoted to poverty eradication. The 
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first of these began in 1997, thus preceding the Millennium Declaration 
(UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/50/107). The currently 
ongoing Second Poverty Eradication Decade (UN General Assembly 
Resolution A/Res/62/205) has as its main objective ‘full employment 
and decent work for all’ (UN GA 2009; UN DESA n.d. a and b) and 
commits to poverty eradication by 2017.7
Like their predecessors, the international development decades, 
they rely on public policy. They place employment at the centre of 
the argument and include active labour market policies and a call for 
social protection. A 2008 review of the first poverty eradication decade 
calls for ‘… effective institutions for the provision of public goods to 
the general population and the productive sector; pro-employment 
growth for decent work in a fair global economic environment; social 
protection and integration; and an effective international partnership’ 
(UN General Assembly A/63/190, Section VI). 
Curiously, the two Poverty Eradication Decades have gained only 
marginal attention in international development policy discussion, have 
so far not been mentioned in the academic literature, and do not reap 
any media attention, despite review sessions at the General Assembly. 
They have not been referenced in the MDG or SDG processes, nor in 
the UN Secretary-General’s 2014 synthesis report, a fact that remains 
puzzling, all the more so as they are housed in the same UN department, 
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), that also has 
been managing the MDGs and preparing the SDGs.
The MDGs’ ‘movement’ versus their outcomes In one interpretation, the 
Millennium Agenda and the MDGs constituted the fifth development 
decade, if one builds on the tradition of development decades, and if 
one ignores the Poverty Eradication Decades. The MDGs too have 
goals, set timelines, and delineate areas of development that need to 
be addressed. They address both national goals and the international 
arena. Technically, they even go beyond the development decade 
approach, since they dissect goals into targets, and offer indicators to 
track and measure progress. However, the similarities end here.
As is well known, the seven country-level goals of the MDGs address 
poverty, employment, nutrition, education, gender equality, maternal 
health, child health, HIV/Aids and the environment. Thus, compared 
to the UN’s development decades, and also compared to the Poverty 
Eradication Decades, the MDGs placed long-overdue emphasis on the 
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social domains of development, but in the process downplayed the role 
of economic development aspirations. 
The MDGs gained unprecedented visibility and traction. The UN 
Secretary-General’s roadmap (UN SG 2001), listing the goals, arguably 
became one of the most widely referenced development agenda texts: 
they became a movement. In developing countries, the MDGs have 
had impact on goal formulation, and have informed five-year plans, 
visioning documents and poverty reduction strategies (Fukuda-Parr 
2010; Ivanova and Pemberthy this volume). At the multilateral level, 
they have been influential in terms of awareness-raising, including for 
poverty and, more recently, for inequity. 
They have also triggered a massive interest and activities in the 
field of impact evaluation (World Bank Group 2011, 2014; EADI 
2014; Picciotto 2014), with national governments measuring progress 
on meeting the targets, and donors using them for evaluating official 
development aid (ODA) outcomes. The MDGs’ twenty-one targets 
and sixty indicators, of which most relate to economic and social 
development at the national level, have influenced how governments and 
societies recognize and address development issues. In many countries, 
the indicators are disaggregated by sex, location, ethnicity, language or 
religion, and thus serve to illustrate the discrepancies in achievements 
caused by systematic economic and social exclusion (Kabeer 2010; 
UNDP National Human Development Reports various years; UNDP 
MDG Progress Reports various years).8 The MDGs have functioned 
as a commonly agreed and measurable yardstick for developmental 
progress: in terms of ‘branding’ – awareness-raising and mobilization 
– they have been a success (Fukuda-Parr 2010; Ivanova and Escobar-
Pemberthy 2015 this volume). However, it needs to be observed that 
much of this was due to effective marketing (Hulme and Wilkinson 
2014: 188f.). As mentioned above, the international development 
decades also had time-bound goals – of specific GDP, per capita and 
sectoral growth rates, and an assessment process – albeit less stringent, 
during and at the end of each decade, but this is not acknowledged in 
the literature. The MDGs are often – erroneously – vaunted as the first 
development agenda with time-bound, measurable outcomes.
Conversely, the MDGs were not a success in terms of results. In 
people’s everyday lives, the central criterion of success is how countries 
and societies have fared in terms of improving human well-being or 
human development. As several of the chapters in this volume illustrate 
koehler | 237
(e.g. Boltvinik and Damian), both statistically, and on the ground, the 
targets have not been met satisfactorily. Recent reviews by the UN and 
by the World Bank Group reveal that key MDG objectives on hunger, 
poverty and mortality rates remain at intolerable levels. Many countries 
and regions are ‘off track’, and of those on track, many remain with 
high poverty levels, or large deficits in decent work (UN DESA 2012; 
World Bank Group 2011, 2014; UN 2014). Hunger – perhaps the 
most relevant development criterion – remains a scourge for one in 
eight people (UN 2014: 12). 
There are misleading perceptions on MDG success. For example, 
while poverty reduction globally is presented as one of the positive 
outcomes, it is in essence attributable to three illusions: the ‘per cent 
effect’, an ‘acute poverty effect’ and the ‘China effect’. 
Looking at the ‘per cent effect’ requires disaggregating the statistics.9 
The proportion of the world population living below the $1.25 poverty 
line has been cut by half – from 36 per cent in 1990 to 18 per cent in 
2010; in developing regions, $1.25 income poverty decreased from 47 
to 22 per cent in the same period (ibid.: 8). Thus, as widely celebrated, 
the MDG income poverty goal was achieved ahead of schedule – in 
percentage and aggregated terms. However, sub-Saharan Africa was 
able to decrease $1.25 poverty only marginally, and is not expected to 
meet the target; in southern Asia, poverty was not halved – it fell from 
51 to 30 per cent (ibid.: 8f.). In fact, in absolute numbers, for many 
countries and regions, poverty increased between 1999 and 2005, in 
India from 447 million to 456 million, in sub-Saharan Africa from 
383 million to 388 million (World Bank Group 2011: 6; see also UN 
DESA 2008). As mentioned above, globally, 1.2 billion people – every 
fifth person – still live with an income of less than $1.25 per person per 
day. The number of people living below the $2-a-day poverty line is 
estimated at 2.5 billion; it has not changed since the early 1980s and 
has increased in all regions except East Asia and the Pacific (World 
Bank Group 2011: 5–6; see also UN 2014). 
The hunger goal has been reached only in eastern and south-eastern 
Asia (UN 2014: 12). Overall, the proportion of undernourished 
people in developing regions decreased by less than projected – it fell 
from 24 per cent in 1990–92 to 14 per cent in 2011–13 (ibid.: 4). 
On a daily basis, approximately 870 million people were chronically 
undernourished in 2010–12, using a very restrictive hunger definition 
(FAO 2010, 2012; Pogge 2013);10 162 million children under five 
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suffer chronic under-nutrition (UN 2014: 5). This means that the 
MDG goal on tackling hunger has also not been achieved. Moreover, 
progress has slowed down in the past decade (ibid.: 4). 
Secondly, the MDGs are not substantively met. This is because of 
the ‘acute poverty effect’: the poverty line chosen, $1.25 per person per 
day, is unlivable, and unacceptably low in absolute and even more so in 
relative terms (see Boltvinik and Damian this volume). From a human 
development point of view, one should be using at the very least the 
$2 per person per day poverty line, or the $10 global median poverty 
line. It would moreover need to be supplemented by multidimensional 
poverty measurements as well as other social indicators to capture 
the extent of deprivation people are facing (Cimadomore et al. 2013; 
Koehler et al. 2014-).
Thirdly, regarding the ‘China effect’, the major share in poverty 
alleviation is attributable to a single country. In China, the extreme 
poverty rate declined from 36 per cent in 1999 to 16 per cent in 2005, 
which constitutes a decrease of 240 million people (World Bank Group 
2011: 5). By 2010, $1.25 poverty in China decreased further to 13 
per cent (UN 2014: 9). While it is remarkable for so many people to 
have moved out of extreme poverty, it needs to be flagged that 176 
million people remain under this extreme poverty line, despite China’s 
phenomenal rates of economic growth. Income inequality has gone as 
high as .4 to .6 on the Gini coefficient scale (Guo 2014). China, after 
all, had in 1948 set out to eliminate all poverty and inequality.
These MDG-related statistics are eye-openers. And one does not know 
the counterfactual (Hulme and Wilkinson 2014): whether the marginal 
improvements would also have materialized without the MDG efforts. 
In fact, some observers have argued that the MDG numerical targets 
merely followed the trend lines on improvement in social indicators 
observed in preceding decades (Vandemoortele 2012: 3), and thus, 
methodologically speaking, were not conceived to accelerate progress. 
Accordingly, any critical assessment concerned with equitable 
and inclusive human development would conclude that, in terms of 
outcomes, the MDGs have not being achieved (Hulme and Wilkinson 
2014; Pogge 2014). In the real world, for the majority of the world’s 
population, the agenda has failed.
MDGs reconsidered: the shortcomings of a successful brand To under-
stand the failure of the MDGs in terms of tangible, equitable human 
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development outcomes, it is necessary to look for the inherent systemic 
shortcomings. One can discern at least three types of shortcomings.
The first shortcoming is in terms of the issues covered. Reproduc-
tive health, central to gender equality and women’s health and well-
being, and part and parcel of earlier development agendas – even in the 
OECD DAC’s global development goals – was absent from the MDGs. 
The MDGs are weak also in their attention to environmental issues, 
climate change and sustainability: MDG 7 on ensuring environmental 
sustainability had only two explicit environment goals, namely on forest 
cover and biodiversity. Politically, the goals were silent. Participation, 
highlighted in the Social Summit outcome and the Poverty Eradica-
tion Decades, disappeared when the MDGs were formulated. To make 
them short and punchy, and palatable to all member states of the United 
Nations, cornerstone notions of development and dignity were dropped, 
although they had featured prominently in the Millennium Declaration 
(UN GA 2000; see Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy this volume). 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the MDGs narrowed down the 
set of core development areas by concentrating on education, health, 
water and sanitation, or HIV/Aids. These are centred on the social as 
opposed to the economic domain. In that, the MDGs succeeded in 
drawing attention to social development – or human development – and 
thereby present an improvement compared to the overly economistic 
tendencies of the early UN development decades. But at the same time, 
the recognition of the centrality of economic development, of equitable 
international trade regulation, of value chains, of productivity, is 
completely absent. A core response to poverty – employment in decent 
work conditions – was missing altogether in the initial MDGs, and 
introduced only post factum in 2005. 
By focusing on the ‘social’, the MDG agenda de facto handed the 
primary international responsibility for the economic agenda over to the 
World Bank and the IMF. It thereby permitted the discourse to remain 
in its neoliberal mode (Fukuda-Parr 2005, 2010; Hulme and Wilkinson 
2014). This has, in many low-income and transition countries, come 
at the expense of strategic thinking regarding the larger development 
agenda, and led to policy omissions regarding employment, and economic 
investments in productive capacity, or economic infrastructure.11 
Equity concerns were invisible in the MDGs as they looked at 
aggregates and global and country averages. Here, however, a consensus 
is emerging, even during the lifetime of the MDGs, that equity needs 
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to be integrated into MDG assessment. This has led to introduction of 
an equity-adjusted human development index (Alkire and Foster 2010; 
UNDP 2010). Equity is prominent in the recent work of UNICEF, 
and is being integrated into MDG evaluations (World Bank Group 
2014; UN 2014) and is integral to the SDG draft (UNDP 2012; UN 
Task Team on the Post 2015 UN Development Agenda 2012a and b; 
UNICEF 2010; Fukuda-Parr 2012; OWG 2014).
As a second major shortcoming, the MDGs eschewed any causal 
analysis. For example, the poverty and hunger goals did not reflect 
on the reasons for income and asset disparities and inequalities, or 
on power relations and institutional and systemic arrangements that 
create and recreate poverty and hunger (see Rogers and Balasz this 
volume). They did not look at functional income distribution. The 
MDGs, as cast in 2001, thus fell behind the analytical stances of 
earlier decades, such as the international development decades, where 
an analysis of root causes was integral to conceptualizing development 
strategies. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the MDGs were limited to spelling 
out objectives and targets, instead of taking a policy position, or 
at least linking the objectives to a set of policy options. This was a 
major departure from the international development decade culture, 
which had very specific policy recommendations. As a result, much 
MDG-initiated development discourse has been preoccupied with 
measurement issues, and there has been far less intense a discussion on 
which policies would be conducive to achieve each of the MDG goals 
and targets (Koehler and Stirbu 2007). Policy discussions have been 
eclipsed by this focus on measuring gaps and calculating investment to 
achieve the goals, without delving sufficiently into the policy choices 
and paths. 
Those policy discussions that do take place tend to remain sectoralized 
within each domain, and siloed in the relevant line ministries. They 
rarely converge around MDG synergies, human development outcomes 
or ‘well-being’. The outcome and policy discussions related to the 
education or health goals, for example, give insufficient consideration 
to cross-cutting synergies, such as the interplay among nutrition, health 
and education, or between maternal and child mortality, or each of these 
with employment and incomes and hence poverty reduction. Reasons 
include the fact that separate government ministries are responsible for 
discrete outcomes, and moreover compete for finite resources for their 
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particular area of human development investment;12 and that there is 
a lack of programme and policy coherence across the UN and donor 
agencies (Koehler 2011). 
Many low-income countries adopted the MDGs in the sense of 
integrating the objectives into development plans, and using the 
indicators to track progress. However, at the policy level, countries 
were not harmonizing policies that would need to be more concerted 
if goals and targets regarding poverty and decent work were to be 
achieved. For example, most countries, even those organized in regional 
groupings, continued to compete with each other on labour laws, tax 
legislation, trade policy and environmental requirements. There were 
no initiatives to harmonize approaches to decent work provisions or 
minimum wages. Instead, there is often a race to the bottom in the 
form of neighbouring countries outcompeting each other on low wages 
or foreign direct investment (FDI) tax exemptions or environmental 
requirements, despite commitments at the national level. This too 
made it difficult to achieve the MDGs.
Looking forward
An agenda for development post-2015 The inherent shortcomings of 
the MDGs demonstrate the need for a complete and radical overhaul 
of the development agenda (see also Fukuda-Parr 2012; Nayyar 2011; 
Kozul-Wright and Ghosh 2013) as one rethinks developmental visions 
and goals for beyond 2015. Three processes are called for. First, it is 
important to build on the MDG momentum, but at the same time 
benefit from the critique of the agenda’s shortcoming and failures. 
Secondly, one needs to search for and accept radical and comprehensive 
thinking on development policy and the role of the state. Thirdly, one 
would need to assess the political dynamics and power relations in 
which the SDG negotiations unfold (Dodds et al. 2014) – but that is 
an analysis beyond the reach of this chapter. 
As an unofficial beginning of the post-2015 agenda,13 the 2012 Rio 
Summit on Sustainable Development produced an outcome document 
called The Future We Want (UN Rio+20 Conference 2012). The catchy 
slogan triggers several issues: agreeing on what type of vision one 
would like to pursue and asking who is the we.14 It is about imagining 
feasible alternatives and offering corresponding policies. From such 
questions derives a case for both returning to a normative mode and for 
offering explicit policy stances. It presented the notion of sustainable 
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development, which was then successfully mainstreamed into the post-
2015 discussions (Dodds et al. 2014). 
In connection with the development of a next generation of 
development goals, discussion processes and proposals have spiralled 
since 2012 (see UN Rio+20 Conference 2012; Fukuda-Parr 2012; 
Martens 2013; Bissio 2014: 205ff.). The UN Task Team (UN Task 
Team on the Post 2015 UN Development Agenda 2012a: 24; see also 
UN Task Team on the Post 2015 UN Development Agenda 2012b; 
Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy 2015 this volume), for example, 
proposed four domains for the next development agenda: 
• inclusive economic development;
• inclusive social development;
• environmental sustainability; and 
• peace and security. 
Each of these domains clustered areas of concern – eradicating 
income poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities and ensuring decent 
work and productive employment; adequate nutrition for all; quality 
education for all; reduced mortality and morbidity, gender equality 
and universal access to clean water and sanitation. This framework is 
useful in that it offers a systematic ordering of topical areas. It is also 
progressive in comparison to the MDGs in that it has returned to the 
universalist ethos of the 1990s UN summits. But this proposal retains 
many of the flaws of the original MDG roadmap and its 2005 revisions. 
The freedom from fear aspect, for example, is centred narrowly on 
peace and security, with human rights and democratic governance 
relegated to the level of ‘enablers’ – as opposed to functioning as 
objectives in their own right. 
In his 2014 synthesis report (UN SG 2014), the UN Secretary-
General identified six elements for the next agenda similar to the earlier 
UN Task Team classification. This is a well-taken attempt to structure 
the seventeen goal areas. They echo the Millennium Declaration, and 
have a normative edge to them.
1 Dignity: to end poverty and fight inequalities. 
2 People: to ensure healthy lives, knowledge, and the inclusion of 
women and children. 
3 Prosperity: to grow a strong, inclusive and transformative economy. 
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4 Planet: to protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children. 
5 Justice: to promote safe and peaceful societies, and strong institutions.
6 Partnership: to catalyse global solidarity for sustainable development.
The proposal for the new development agenda issued by the 
Open Working Group on the SDGs is more specific, with seventeen 
goals and 169 targets (OWG 2014) (see Box 10.1). Several of 
these replicate the MDGs (see Ivanova and Escobar-Pemberthy 
this volume: comparator table) – those on poverty, hunger, health, 
education, gender, employment; several refer to, consolidate and 
highlight the sustainable development goals of the Rio+20 document 
– those on climate change, oceans and terrestrial systems and the 
call for sustainable production and consumption; and several indeed 
represent a departure from the MDGs’ narrow focus on the social 
domain, by highlighting the need for industrialization, infrastructure, 
innovation and access to energy. In this, they refer back to the 
broader understanding of development as encapsulated in the UN 
development decades and the Poverty Eradication Decades. A 
reference, however, is not made.
In the OWG proposal, the last goal, headed ‘means of 
implementation’, is a weak reference to all the promises packed into 
international deliberations over the past decade – to international 
trade, investment and finance, and the call for more ODA.
At the target level, the proposal adopts the fifteen-year timeline 
of the MDGs; at the indicator level, it accepts the lowest possible 
denominator, for instance the $1.25 poverty line. But only two of the 
seventeen goals proposed represent a complete shift from the MDGs: 
the explicit call for tackling inequality in and among countries, and 
the goal around peaceful and inclusive societies with a commitment 
to human rights. In terms of vision, the SDG proposal is thus at best 
an incremental improvement compared to the MDGs – despite much 
rhetoric around transformational shifts (HLPR 2013).
The need for progressive policies The most jeopardizing flaw of the 
MDGs, in our analysis, was, however, that they lacked a policy 
dimension. Policies are necessary to effectively deal with the structural 
causes of poverty and ‘underdevelopment’. The task at hand from a 
human development imperative is therefore not just to present a vision 
of social justice, or at least to imagine feasible alternatives, but also to 
Box 10.1 SDGs as at January 2015 (OWG 2014)
 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
 2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition 
and promote sustainable agriculture.
 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all 
ages.
 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and pro-
mote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
 6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water 
and sanitation for all.
 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and mod-
ern energy for all.
 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, full and productive employment and decent work 
for all.
 9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustain-
able industrialization and foster innovation.
10 Reduce inequality within and among countries.
11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable.
12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its im-
pacts.
14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine 
resources for sustainable development.
15 Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial 
ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertifica-
tion, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodi-
versity loss.
16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build ef-
fective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the 
global partnership for sustainable development.
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explore and promote radical policies – radical in the sense of addressing 
and tackling root causes. 
There is an aversion in the multilateral arena to identifying with 
and recommending comprehensive, heterodox macroeconomic and 
structural policies. There are at least two reasons for this; both are 
political, and they are interrelated. One is a reluctance to propose 
policies that could be perceived as interventionist. The other is a 
disinclination to accord a positive role to the state.15 Both of these stem 
from neoliberal ideology, which continues to cast its shadow on the 
development discourse. The role of policy space is acknowledged – a 
point which developing countries stress as a way to protect heterodox 
policy-making – but it avoids spelling out policy options. The role of 
governance is highlighted – but it takes on a micro-level meaning in 
the sense of having efficient government administration, it is not about 
the government having a responsibility to shape and deliver or regulate 
public goods, or about a social contract between citizens and the state.
But if, as the SDG proposal posits, poverty and hunger are to be 
eradicated, if economic growth is to become employment-rich and 
resource-neutral, if there is to be a redistribution between and within 
countries, one can only turn to ‘progressive’ policies, since none of these 
effects will evolve out of solely market-based economic processes. Even 
the building of infrastructure or ‘industrialization’, which can be co-
financed by the private sector, requires government-level prioritization, 
coordination and design, and public subsidies so as to reach regions 
that are commercially not lucrative. 
These requirements can underpin the case for an alternatively 
oriented development policy agenda, notably heterodox economic 
policies (Nayyar 2011). For the social sectors, this would mean 
reasserting health, education, water, sanitation and energy as public 
goods that are to be conceptualized as a right and require holistic policy-
making. In the MDG era, there have been myriads of programmes 
on social policy, but they are locked in at the programme level, often 
siloed in disconnected ministries and international agencies, and have 
eschewed fundamental debate on their interdependence. They have had 
a defeatist policy orientation at best, advocating for primary health and 
primary education, but oblivious to the necessity of higher education 
levels, of sophisticated health services delivery in the interests of human 
development, and as a right of all.
For the economic sectors, the policy shifts would need to include 
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some form of ‘industrial’ strategy – examining the government’s role in 
regulating or possibly incentivizing productivity-enhancing, sustainable 
and equitable outcomes in agriculture, commodity production and 
trade, the manufacturing sector, all the way to services and creative 
industries (see, for example, UNCTAD 2009: 149ff., notably 155ff.).16 
It requires proactive labour market policy to move towards decent work 
and job and income security policies. It requires innovation strategies 
and public funding for foundation research and higher learning. 
If one wanted to move beyond a reactive, palliative poverty alleviation 
approach, such a policy shift would also need to be radical and promote 
genuine structural reform, including some form of land reform and 
wealth and asset redistribution. It would require universalizing and 
upgrading social protection (UN GA 2010; Hanlon et al. 2010; 
Bachelet 2011; ILO 2012; World Bank 2012; UNICEF 2012; UN GA 
2014).17 There would need to be structured deficit spending to revitalize 
employment and investment or redress increasing hunger and poverty 
(Jolly et al. 2012; EuroMemo Group 2013; Ortiz and Cummins 2012). 
There would also need to be fundamental revisions to the governance 
of international finance, commodity trade and climate change. 
Such policies would require a reversal of current trends. In many 
instances, they would go against the interests of powerful countries and 
of powerful elites in countries.18
Reinstating the role of the state Policies are the remit of governments. 
Making a case for a more systematic and open policy stance logically 
means addressing and reasserting the role of the state. There are two 
traditions on which this can draw. One derives from the theory of public 
finance and its concept of public goods (Musgrave and Musgrave 
1989), later expanded into a theory of global public goods (Kaul 
et al. 2003; Kaul 2013). Its analysis is that services such as health, 
education, infrastructure, security or a clean environment are merit 
goods where it is in society’s interest that they be consumed by all, and/
or are technically indivisible, and have unequal costs across different 
regions or for different communities. Such goods therefore cannot be 
provided equitably by the private sector. The second tradition is that 
of the social contract, which postulates that citizens and governments 
enter a relationship in which the state has obligations to deliver public 
goods and citizens have rights (Rousseau 2010 [1762]; Kabeer 2005). 
Regardless of which framework is used, the complexity of policy 
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domains and issues that need to be tackled to achieve human 
development makes it obvious that there is the need for a central 
institution tasked with overseeing, guiding, enabling and guaranteeing 
the delivery of the pertaining public goods and services. It is the role 
of the state to enable negotiations of a social contract or social pacts, 
and to ensure their realization; this is coupled with a role in ensuring 
the revenues necessary to reliably fund high-quality public goods and 
services, and with a view to economic equity, to ensure income and 
wealth redistribution (UNRISD 2010: 280f.; Deacon 2010). Hence 
there is a need to revisit the role of the state, and to integrate it into the 
post-2015 conceptualization. This discussion will be necessary in order 
for the new agenda to genuinely work towards eradicating poverty and 
hunger.
Apart from the UN development decades, there is another 
strand of development thinking that has accumulated considerable 
knowledge on systematic, strategic state interventions (UNCTAD 
2009, 2011a and b, 2012; UNDP 2013; UNRISD 2010: 257ff.). A 
more encompassing notion of a ‘developmental welfare state’ comes 
from the academic literature (Kwon 1999, 2005a and b; Chang 2002; 
Gough 2004; Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2006; Ringen et al. 2011). 
Here, the state is seen to have responsibilities in terms of both economic 
development, and the delivery of public goods in the social domain 
– notably education, health and a habitable physical environment. 
This literature stresses that in low-income countries the state has a 
particular ‘developmental’ role: to promote economic growth as well 
as the structural transformation into higher-productivity sectors, and 
also to provide public goods and services that contribute to human 
development (Mkandawire 2004: 1). 
Nevertheless, there are major reservations regarding the role 
of the state. Historically, states were part of both the problem 
and the solution to the question of (democratic) development. In 
both developed and developing countries, there are violations of 
basic human rights. Insecurities are rampant in all domains of life, 
at the individual, community, in-country and cross-border level, 
often perpetrated by authoritarian states. In many countries, the 
state tolerates systemic social exclusion of minorities, and political 
oppression issues directly from the state. It therefore seems naive to 
seek solutions from the state. 
Secondly, there are numerous other entities with responsibility for 
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their own and the community’s human development, from individuals, 
households and families, through communities, trade unions, 
cooperative bodies representing the interests of the informal economy 
or the business sector, to organized civil society organizations, including 
regional and international political actors. Ideally, these actors can be 
democratically legitimized, and, if so, can be more representative of 
individual and community interests. 
However, these entities cannot achieve sustained results for 
human development without coordinated public action through a 
reliable, functioning, accountable body – the state (UNRISD 2010: 
257, 280). In making a case for the role of the state, it is therefore 
necessary in the same breath to insist that one is referring to a 
public sector that is controlled by and accountable to its citizens, 
democratic and rights-based. Thus, the argument remains that the 
new development agenda would need to integrate into its design the 
role of a rights-based, democratic developmental welfare state (ibid.: 
257ff.; UNCTAD 2009: vii;19 see also Koehler 2014),20 even if this 
is an abstract or idealized notion. Its purpose would be to finance, 
deliver and/or regulate public goods and services that make human 
development progress.
To correspond to such expectations, ‘the state’ needs to be outfitted 
with a number of capacities (UNCTAD 2009: 42ff.; UNRISD 
2010: 259ff.). These include the political capacity to formulate the 
development project, and to set and implement policies, and the 
capacity to protect civil rights, ensure legitimate mandates to govern 
and support social contracts, and channels for pressure on the public 
sector. They include technical capacity, meaning a politically, gender-
wise and ethnically representative performant public administration21 
(adapted from UNCTAD 2009: 42ff., esp. 45, and UNRISD 2010: 
263). Moreover, the state requires capacity to mobilize resources, 
notably savings and taxes, and to put them to effective use (UNRISD 
2010: 264ff.; in a similar vein see UNCTAD 2012: 113ff.). 
A transformative post-2015 development agenda? 
Closing reflections
The new post-2015 agenda must be a radical departure from the 
MDGs, if it wants to eradicate hunger and poverty, if it wants to redress 
local and global inequalities, if it wants to ensure sustainability – in other 
words, if it wants to be transformative in reality not just in rhetoric. 
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To do this, at the conceptual level, it could build on the conclusions 
and commitments generated by the UN development decades and the 
Poverty Eradication Decades, by the major UN conferences convened 
during the 1990s, as well as by the MDG experience itself.
There would also need to be a deeper process – a rededication at the 
normative level, to overarching principles such as the UN Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenants, and the UN 
Conventions. The global community needs to get back into a visioning 
mode and be ‘ahead of the curve’ (Emmerij et al. 2001), instead of merely 
reacting to changed conditions, if one is genuinely committed to creating 
a future everyone could want. From a development policy perspective, this 
means staking a claim for a rights-based developmental welfare state.
Is this a realistic proposition? Will the SDGs offer a ‘transformative’ 
development agenda, in the sense of attacking the root causes of poverty, 
inequality and climate change? At the level of the SDG negotiations, this 
will depend on the willingness and ability of progressive governments 
and civil society to coalesce, and their skills in driving bargains with 
governments and players who will defend the status quo and shy away 
from radical commitments. A post-2015 development agenda that 
formulates and notionally commits to transformation could then be 
a tool to, at long last, start genuine socio-economic restructuring. It 
could refer back to the impact of the UN Charter, in place for seventy 
years now, which helped to give normative power and analytical 
underpinning to decolonization and human rights movements across 
the globe, and which launched successive development decades. And 
it could move forward, building on but reaching beyond the positive 
momentum for poverty eradication and human development generated 
by the Millennium Declaration fifteen years ago. 
Notes
1 An early version of this chapter was 
presented at the CROP workshop on the 
MDGs, Bergen, August 2012. The author 
sincerely thanks Alberto Cimadamore, 
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Mariana Stirbu 
for insightful comments on earlier 
versions. Sonja Keller provided technical 
support.
2 Based on available data from 
ninety-one countries. Also UNDP (2014: 
72 and Table 6, 180f.).
3 They read as follows: to reduce 
by half the proportion of people living 
in extreme poverty between 1990 and 
2015; enrol all children in primary school 
by 2015; make progress towards gender 
equality and empowering women 
by eliminating gender disparities in 
primary and secondary education by 
2015; reduce infant and child mortality 
rates by two-thirds between 1990 and 
2015; reduce maternal mortality ratios 
250 | ten
by three-quarters; provide access for all 
who need reproductive health services 
by 2015; implement national strategies 
for sustainable development by 2005 so 
as to reverse the loss of environmental 
resources by 2015 (OECD DAC 1996).
4 For a complete overview of all the 
development decades, see UN (n.d.).
5 A declaration on the New 
International Economic Order had been 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1974 (UN GA 1974).
6 It ‘singled out a number of areas 
of special priority: the eradication of 
poverty and hunger, human resources and 
institutional development, population, 
the environment and food and agriculture’ 
(UN GA 1990: Article 15).
7 The poverty eradication decades 
derive from and draw on the UN Social 
Summit of 1995. 
8 The Multi-Indicator Cluster Index 
assessments (MICs), led by UNICEF, have 
a similar effect. The MICs disaggregate 
key child-relevant outcomes such as 
infant, child and maternal mortality, 
school enrolment, birth registration, by 
sex, by income quintiles, and by regions 
within a country, giving a very clear 
picture of social injustices in a given 
country. See Minujin et al. (2005).
9 For a discussion on this see, for 
example, Reddy and Pogge (2003) and 
Pogge (2012).
10 The FAO has changed its 
methodology for measuring hunger and 
undernourishment at the request of the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). 
See www.fao.org/hunger/en. The most 
recent data estimates that 870 million 
people were chronically undernourished 
in 2010–12, but preceding estimates 
had calculated that figure at 925 million 
for earlier years (FAO 2012, 2010). That 
hunger would have decreased despite 
land-grabbing, intensifying eco-crises, 
the global recession and food price 
speculation is counter-intuitive.
11 This critique has been elaborated 
by UNCTAD in its Least Developed 
Countries Report (UNCTAD 2009). It 
has been partly addressed by the UN 
Millennium Project, which has spawned 
a process of MDG costing exercises 
across developing countries which have 
developed costing methodologies for 
economic infrastructure such as transport 
and energy as well as for the core MDGs 
– education, health, water and sanitation. 
12 An interesting exception is the 
common minimum programme of the 
Indian government, where the large 
‘missions’ – flagship policy campaigns, 
such as for education for all, global health 
and others – are cross-referenced in the 
five-year development plan to create 
a convergent, cross-sectoral policy 
approach.
13 As Dodds et al. (2014: 4) observed, 
government officials involved in the 
preparation of the Rio+20 summit in no 
way expected that conference to be a 
launching pad for a new development 
agenda.
14 Regarding the we: since the Rio+20 
conference it has seemed evident that this 
is the global community, and the proposal 
for the SDGs as well as the UN SG 
synthesis report have adopted a universal 
approach – the goals, if indeed adopted, 
are to be applicable in all countries. 
15 There is, of course, much 
discussion on good governance which, 
however, narrows the role of the state 
down to the realm of dysfunctions, or 
efficiency, and does not look into the 
larger picture of the responsibility a 
functioning and legitimate state has to 
bear in terms of providing public goods 
and services. 
16 UNCTAD (2009: 155) lists the key 
features of a ‘developmental industrial 
policy’.
17 For a history of the debates 
and negotiations leading to the Social 
Protection Floor, see Deacon (2013).
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18 Hulme and Wilkinson (2014: 187) 
argue, for instance, that tackling the 
causes of poverty will not be possible 
‘because it is unlikely that the political 
economy of the current era will permit 
such a move’, citing the strong US and 
private sector interests. 
19 UNCTAD (2009: vii) speaks of a 
democratic developmental state, with 
continuing reflexive procedures calling 
on all actors, and (ibid.: vi) posits the case 
for ‘developmental governance’ geared to 
creating a better future for members of 
society through economic development 
and structural transformation.
20 UNRISD (2010: 261) also uses 
terms such as democratic developmental 
state, or developmental democracies, and 
UNCTAD (2011a: 86ff.) defines the role of 
a ‘cohesive, strong, catalytic and effective 
state’, the ‘CDS’ – catalytic developmental 
state for short – with a role in formulating 
a development vision and creating 
the policy space needed for structural 
transformation and dynamic comparative 
advantage (ibid.: 87–9).
21 UNRISD (2010: 281) makes the 
case for a ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy 
– professionals with a commitment to 
their job and a sense of service to their 
country, technical competence, a good 
work ethic, appropriately remunerated 
and recognized. On this, see UNCTAD 
(2009: 40, 45).
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As the Millennium Development Goals pass their 2015 deadline and the international community 
is discussing the future of international development policy, Poverty and the Millennium 
Development Goals brings together leading experts to provide a much-needed critique of the 
prevailing development agenda. Examining the MDG efforts and results, it exposes the misleading 
measurements that have led official sources to routinely underestimate the scale of world poverty 
and hunger, even as the global distribution of income, wealth and access to health services 
becomes ever more imbalanced. 
Arguing that any post-2015 development agenda will be futile unless it addresses the 
fundamental structural flaws of the current system, this timely book suggests the relevance of an 
independent, transparent methodology to measure results and outlines a radically alternative 
approach to development, in which policy is informed by those who live in poverty and face 
economic and social exclusion. It offers innovative poverty analysis built not only on realistic, 
grassroots data but on confronting the issue of power head on. 
Poverty and the Millennium Development Goals represents a vital contribution towards a 
more equitable agenda for social, economic, political and ecological justice, which can point the 
way towards a more holistic theory and practice of development.
‘This important book critically examines the MDG experience in an original way. Essential reading for 
anyone trying to understand how global governance might live up to its promise to eradicate poverty and 
achieve social justice.’
David Hulme, University of Manchester
‘A thorough analytical assessment of the impact of the MDGs in substantially reducing poverty around the 
world. It should be read by scholars, policy makers and civil society.’
Alberto Martinelli, University of Milan
‘A rich collection of contributions from multiple disciplines and perspectives, this book offers diverse views 
on whether the MDGs made a meaningful change. It is a welcome antidote to the triumphalism of those 
who proclaim the MDGs’ success.’
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